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Abstract
This study of Victorian Leicester has discovered three major findings about the
study of public health. First, that public health history is complicated and
inextricably connected to political history, social history, and cultural history.
The borough passed from one equilibrium in 1849 to another equilibrium in 1891,
but this passage did not occur by straight paths or by parallel paths.
Second, that public health is a societal construction and the construction
follows a pattern. First, a problem is defined. Second, a response is advocated.
Third, the response is implemented. Fourth, people must cooperate with the
response. Above all, the construction is complicated because there are a great
many publics involved. In Victorian Leicester public health responses had great
variation because of the number and different interests of the publics and because
health issues were addressed in piecemeal fashion. Moreover responses were not
necessarily ameliorative for the original problem.
Third, more local studies should be done to flesh out the complicated history
of public health in nineteenth century Britain. It was largely at the local level that
the drama of public health played out. Such studies, and indeed this study, are
relevant to current public health issues.
This study fills some of the holes in the field. It is a local study of Leicester, a
Midlands town that in some ways pioneered in public health and paid a penalty
for pioneering. This precocity and later recalcitrance are shown in chapter two on
sewerage. Chapter three on water supply illustrates the limited value of a for-
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profit public health measure. The typhoid fever analysis, chapter four, presents
Leicester's response to a typical yet deadly endemic disease brought to notoriety
by royal afflictions. Chapter five on scarlet fever demonstrates an aggressive
public health response that was measurably successful. Chapter six on summer
diarrhoea shows half-hearted and unsuccessful responses to a serious yet poorly
understood problem. Finally, chapter seven on smallpox vaccination is instructive
if ambivalent. The seemingly bizarre anti-vaccination sentiment in Leicester
became confused with the famous "Leicester Method" of victim isolation that
informed the World Health Organization's eventual eradication of the disease.
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1. Introduction
Who is the "public" in public health? Common sense discussions of public
health do not reflect the complexity involved in answering this question because
such discussions assume that "the public" means the population at large. This is
far from the case, at least in Victorian Britain, which is when and where modern
public health was being invented. There were numerous publics involved in the
constructii:m of public health both as decision makers and participants and each
public, or those several publics, had different interests and different dynamics in
shaping the construction of public health.
Despite those publics' different roles and weights, the process of the
construction of public health followed a common pattern. First, a health issue
must be defined as a problem. This historically has been less straightforward than
might be imagined. Second, some public must advocate a particular response to
the perceived problem. Third, some public must choose to implement the
proposed response or an alternative response. Fourth, some public or publics
must cooperate, or acquiesce, in carrying out the implemented response. Yet even
when all four steps were taken, the implemented response might not ameliorate
for the original problem. In nineteenth century Britain the fit between problem
and solution was unpredictable. Moreover the various publics involved in this
construction were not always involved at the same step in the sequence because
public health problems were defined in piecemeal fashion rather than under some
over-arching scheme.
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At the first level, the definition of a health problem depended upon what
segment of the overall population was suffering, how visible that suffering was,
and how that suffering affected other segments of the population. The mere
presence of disease or death did not necessarily demand response. In nineteenth
century Britain class was relevant to this level of the cqnstruction. Working class
diseases did not require responses in all cases, but to the extent that these diseases
threatened the higher classes, town leaders acted expeditiously.
At the second step, proposed solutions to public health problems came from a
variety of publics. These proposals often but not exclusively came from doctors.
Sometimes the medical profession as a whole proposed actions they deemed
ameliorative, sometimes individual doctors proposed solutions, and the medical
press often weighed in on particular health problems. In the case of nineteenth
century British municipalities, the individual town's Medical Officer of Health
(MOH), could be the most influential purveyor of suggestions. These MOHs
differed by background, personality, and level of medical knowledge. Thus there
was variation among the responses they proposed. Moreover the different
medical publics did not exhaust the possible publics who might propose solutions
to public health problems. In nineteenth century Britain, lawyers such as Edwin
Chadwick, civil engineers such as Thomas Wicksteed, politicians such as Joseph
Whetstone and publishers, such as James Thompson, all posited solutions to
perceived public health problems in Leicester. Not all of the proposed responses
were compatible.

3

The third phase, the implementation of a public health measure was, in
nineteenth century Britain, a political question (or problem). Some responses
were addressed by parliament, but of the critical decisions lay with local
authorities. Indeed most had to meet the approval of both national and local
publics. To reach the level of implementation, a public health response had to be
more than just perceived to be ameliorative; political bodies had to perceive costeffectiveness from the response. That implied class once again. Should such
political bodies accept the cost/benefit ratio, the nuances of implementation
presented another hurdle.
At the fourth phase of implementation, some public health responses in
nineteenth century Britain were compulsory, some suggested by local authorities,
and some by outsiders. This meant that the various publics affected by the various
responses could react in many different ways. This is not mere circular nonsense.

It mattered a great deal whether the public health response was compulsory or
advisory, who was being compelled or urged, and by whom. Compulsory public
health responses were met with both acquiesence and resistance, depending on the
threat to health and the burden placed upon a given public. Suggested responses,
especially when they originated from outside a borough, were often met with
defensiveness and inertia. Some responses were accepted by one segment of the
population and rejected by another.
The construction of public health remains more complex than the factors just
mentioned, but those four steps are crucial. The factors mentioned, indeed the
publics, are at the heart of public health construction. But in addition there is the
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question of results. Nineteenth century public health measures were sometimes
ameliorative, sometimes irrelevant, and sometimes helpful in spite of a
misapprehension of disease causation. So the construction of public health
involved trial and error and learning for the several publics, which inescapably
adds the historical dimension to the study of public health.
The decisive trials, errors, and learning took place at the local level, where
measures were implemented and where people lived, got sick, and died. But that
too was a matter of human choice and reflects historical decisions. The national
and local concerns about health were interrelated and sometimes battles over turf
complicated issues and delayed or modified responses. Because the early work
on the history of public health focused on the national arena and national leaders,
several recent scholars believe it necessary to complete the story with local
studies. This local study of Victorian Leicester illuminates the local stage upon
which the fitful drama of public health was played out. If a continuation of this
metaphor can be forgiven, the actors need description.
We should not be surprised that the history of public health is in part explained
by the state of medical knowledge in nineteenth century Britain. We might be
surprised to learn that there were different levels of knowledge among medical
practitioners and that "modern" discoveries were not immediately or universally
disseminated among medical professionals. Therefore, MOHs for the borough of
Leicester were not always among the leading lights of the profession. Yet the
MOHs hired by the borough of Leicester were sometimes quite adept in applying
new thinking. This variability among Leicester's MOHs reflects individual
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expertise rather than a grand plan of the borough to construct public health.
Moreover the Leicester town council's choice ofMOHs does not reflect a
particular construction of public health. Granted that John Buck and John Moore,
as the borough's first two MOHs, were middle class residents of the borough, it
gets more difficult to explain subsequent appointments to the MOH position. J.
Wyatt Crane was middle class and rather ineffective, but William Johnston was
closely associated with the working class and celebrated. Henry Tomkins, a
typical middle class professional, was the most scientifically oriented of the
borough's doctors, but is far from celebrated; he is largely ignored.
Besides the interests and personalities of the MOHs, the construction of public
health in Victorian Leicester reflects levels of understanding or misunderstanding
of disease causation. Theories of disease causation were competitive in the midnineteenth century. The most famous and influential health reformer of the time,
Edwin Chadwick, believed firmly in the miasmatic theory of disease causation.
This theory held that bad odors caused disease. This was a "localist" approach
which tended to reject the notion of contagion. The localist position implied that
disease was caused by immediate environmental conditions and discounted that
disease could be spread from person to person. For Chadwick, the solution to
health problems was to clean up the urban environment; efficient sewerage and
clean water would eliminate the smells associated with stagnant sewage and foul
water, thus eliminating disease. 1 A related theory of disease causation was
pythogenic theory. Many doctors in mid to late nineteenth century Britain
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accepted Chadwick's environmental premise but believed that disease was
caused by decomposing organic materials if certain disease-causing agents were
present in the decomposing material. The disease causing agents were supposed
to waft into the air as decomposition took place. This is again a localist theory
that leaves little room for the notion of contagion. Yet by acknowledging that
these vague disease-causing agents must be present in the decomposing material,
pythogenic theory contained the germ of germ theory. Germ theory itself was a
product of the 1860s. But the introduction of germ theory did not directly lead to
an epiphany among medical professionals or among the population at large.
Indeed for many years to come some doctors would hold pythogenic notions for
some diseases while simultaneously accepting germ causation for other diseases.
So the construction of public health was piecemeal partly because there was not a
generally accepted theory of disease causation that addressed all types of diseases.
We should not be surprised that social class was integral in the construction of
public health. Some diseases were clearly delineated along class lines. For
example, summer diarrhoea in Leicester killed working class infants almost
exclusively. Other diseases, such as typhoid fever and scarlet fever, were
perceived to originate with the working class but be capable of spreading to the
higher classes. These were the diseases most likely to be defined as problems by
middle class doctors, reformers, and politicians. So summer diarrhoea in
Leicester could be addressed without a great sense of urgency, but typhoid fever
and scarlet fever led to more frenetic activity by the borough's leaders and MOHs.
1

Sewerage refers to the pipes and other infrastructure that remove the waste; sewage is the
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But class was not just an issue of the definition of problems, because class
played important roles in the other steps of public health construction. Responses
were advocated with clear, if sometimes implicit, recognition of class distinctions
and responses were implemented against the backdrop of class. Moreover, class
insinuated itself into the cooperation needed for a successful implementation. In
this step, classes are often evident as different publics. For one example among
many, the isolation of working class children with scarlet fever proved effective
in reducing scarlet fever mortality in Leicester but as will be seen below, middle
class parents refused to allow their stricken children to participate in the
municipal program and scarlet fever mortality reached a plateau. Class was an
ever-present factor in the construction of public health.
We should not be surprised that there was a powerful economic component in
the construction of public health. This economic component had two sides: first,
a cultural emphasis on the sanctity of profit; second, the actual pounds and
shillings that would be spent upon a public health response. In the cultural system
of Victorian Leicester, water was a commodity from which a private Company
had a right to profit, rather than a public good provided by the municipality. The
budgetary constraints were obvious in all public health issues in Leicester. This is
because public health issues were the responsiblities of local authorities. The
landmark Public Health Act of 1848 made health a governmental responsibility
and a local responsibility. So the financial burden of public health responses was
borne largely by Leicester's town council and therefore by the town's ratepayers.
excreta and other waste that flows through the pipes.
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That meant that politicians, voters, and taxpayers formed different publics in the
construction of public health. Moreover this financial burden ensured that public
health was constructed in the realm of politics as much as by experts in medicine,
engineering, or other relevant fields.
Because public health was politically constructed, we should not be surprised
that personalities played an important role. Myriad individuals contributed to the
step by step construction of public health and those who refused to define an issue
as a problem were as much a part of the process of construction as were the
activists. But this is not a morality tale; well-intentioned reformers were
sometimes wrong in the responses they advocated or implemented. For example
Joseph Whetstone, the most heroic figure in Leicester's nineteenth century public
health history, saddled the borough with an innovative, expensive, and ineffective
sewer system in the 1850s. Thereafter it was more difficult to convince the
political public to undertake another expensive "experiment" in municipal
sewerage. Yet failure alone does not tarnish Whetstone's role as a leader in the
field of public health in Leicester. While other political leaders in Leicester
concerned themselves with more abstract issues, Whetstone consistently focused
upon improving the overall health of the populace. On occasion this placed
Whetstone in opposition to the difficult, if also well-intentioned, Chadwick, as
well as his colleagues in local government. But Whetstone is but one example of
the influence of personality on the construction of public health in Leicester.
Each MOH hired by the town council imprinted his own beliefs about disease
causation and appropriate responses upon his employers. Given the piecemeal
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approach to public health, this is less a chicken and egg conundrum than it might
appear. While MOHs undoubtedly were hired by the town council because they
held views that were compatible with the thinking of the politicians, the MOHs
were charged with identifying and proposing remedies to problems unforeseen at
the time they were hired. Sometimes these newly defined problems placed the
MOHs at odds their employers because the MOHs advocated more aggressive
responses than the politicians could accept. On at least one occasion, the town
council recognized that the borough's MOH was "behind the curve" of
contemporary medical thought.
Elected and appointed officials were not the only ones whose personalities
affected the construction of public health in Leicester. Other influential
personalities ranged from the single-minded anti-vaccinationist Amos Booth to
the publisher of the Leicester Chronicle, James Thompson. Booth's quirky and
indefagitable opposition to compulsory smallpox vaccination helped make
Leicester Britain's capital of anti-vaccinationism by the mid 1870s. Thompson's
unwavering support of Joseph Whetstone's vision of public health kept
Whetstone's construction alive well after Whetstone died. Booth and Thompson
represent extremes of personality in the construction of public health in Leicester,
but there were many others who were influential and fell between these poles.
Yet the mention of the Leicester Chronicle leads toward the role of the press and,
indeed, the role of outsiders in the construction of public health in Leicester.
The medical press, represented in this dissertation by the Lancet, often
challenged the borough of Leicester to define problems and implement responses.
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Nowhere is this more evident than with the case of summer diarrhoea. The
leaders of Leicester acknowledged that the Lancet was instrumental in defining
summer diarrhoea as a problem in need of correction. Unfortunately, the Lancet
could not recommend specific solutions to ameliorate the problem because the set
of symptoms that were perceived as a disease could not be specifically prevented
or cured. Nonetheless, the Lancet represented national medical opinion, summer
diarrhoea fatality was higher than anywhere else in Britain, and Leicester was
placed in a no-win situation of having to ameliorate the problem without being
privy to any special or particular knowledge of its causation. But the medical
press was not the only outside influence upon Leicester. Despite the local
responsibility for public health, the central government was involved in the
construction. Whetstone's efforts to sewer the borough met with opposition from
the central government in the person of Chadwick, Whetstone's desire to provide
a clean municipal water supply was precluded by parliament, and the central
government largely decided upon vaccination issues. So the central government,
the medical profession and its press, and the local press represented more publics
involved in the construction of public health.
We should not be surprised that topography was a factor in the construction of
public health, but this was subtle in the construction of public health in Victorian
Leicester. The town of Leicester lies in a topographical basin; it is a low-lying
town surrounded by higher ground. Natural drainage flowed from higher ground
to lower ground. Moreover the lower ground was closest to the River Soar and
could be inundated by periodic floods in the nineteenth century. In and of itself
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the topography of Leicester presented serious challenges for borough sewerage.
But, human beings complicated these challenges. To be sure, a civil engineer of
the likes of Thomas Wicksteed could have dug his sewer lines deeper and at a
sharper angle than he did, but that would have been expensive. Moreover much
of the working class housing in Leicester was constructed relatively hastily, in the
low ground, and without great concern to the firmament upon which it was
constructed. One working class region of town, Middle St. Margaret's Parish,
was built upon an old quarry. Garbage filled the old quarry: animal, vegetable,
and miscellaneous. Then multi-family dwellings were built on top of what was
termed "made ground." The quarry was bounded on all sides by clay. Middle St.
Margaret's soon became the epicenter for summer diarrhoea mortality in Leicester
and Leicester became the epicenter for summer diarrhoea mortality in Britain. So
topography seems to be an objective factor in the construction of public health but
on closer inspection human agency and human choices seem at least equally
important.
Given the multiplicity of publics in public health and the four step construction
of public health, we should not be surprised that public health is more history than
science. Science was indeed part of the construction, but only a part, and not
always the most influential part of the construction. So the history of public
health is much richer than a history of progress. The story of public health is
complex; it is not a history of right triumphing over wrong. The story of public
health requires an open mind, the good guys sometimes got it wrong, the bad guys
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were not necessarily evil in their intentions. Public health was constructed by
human beings, not malevolent microbes.
Victorian Leicester is a unique and fertile ground to explore the Victorian
construction of public health. The complexity of public health construction might
be visible in other municipalities, but Leicester's odd position at the margins of
public health reveal more potentialities than other towns. Nowhere else in Britain
was there such a leader as Joseph Whetstone, nowhere else did such a noble
leader fail. Yet Whetstone provides the parameters of this study; this study begins
with his efforts to provide sewerage to the borough and ends with the courtordered replacement of the sewer system he championed. So this story traces
events from 1849 to 1891. The year 1849 was chosen to reflect Whetstone's
response to the Public Health Act of 1848, but the year 1891 was chosen for
several reasons. Whetstone had been dead for many years, but 1891 ushered in
the Gordon sewerage scheme that replaced the original Wicksteed system. The
year 1891 also marked a large borough annexation that brought new residents and
new topographical challenges to Leicester. And MOH Henry Tomkins, the most
scientific of the borough's nineteenth century MOHs, died from influenza in
1891. The years 1849 to 1891 do not reflect straightforward progress from one to
the next, but they do represent certain parameters within the construction of
public health and show that one equilibrium (1849) can pass to the next
equilibrium (1891) by numerous and circuitous routes. The construction of public
health in Leicester did not begin in 1849 and it did not end in 1891, but these are
convenient and important dates for analysis.
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The borough of Leicester led other British municipalities in the pursuit of
public health during the late 1840s. But by the 1870s, citizens paraded through
the town to honor parents who refused to have their children vaccinated against
smallpox. Throughout the Victorian era Leicester suffered Britain's highest rate
of infant mortality and local leaders had to be goaded into taking any actions
about this mortality. Yet the same authorities aggressively combated scarlet fever
mortality with a degree of success heretofore unappreciated.
What can be gained from the study of public health in one nineteenth century
municipality? Leicester's rich variety of responses make it an ideal "field
laboratory. The borough had dynamic leadership on sanitary matters in the early
years of the period 1849-1891, and paid a penalty for pioneering. Yet at the same
time a cultural emphasis on the sanctity of profit led to legal restrictions that
limited some municipal initiatives, while precocious efforts in civil engineering
resulted in some expensive failures. Borough leaders responded to specific
diseases on the basis of who was at risk and whose opinions were expressed most
forcefully; working class infants who succumbed to summer diarrhoea never had
their voices heard, but middle class parents of scarlet fever victims were not
ignored. In short, nineteenth century Leicester was a municipality dealing with
public health problems in piecemeal fashion as they came to be defined as
problems. This sociology of medicine remains typical.
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As Thomas Kuhn once argued, medical science develops in reaction to
perceived problems rather than in the objective realm of pure science. 2 Though
public health measures are generally more preventive than curative, they are also
reactive. Since public health measures are responses to problems and public
health problems can quickly become crises of mere survival, histories of public
health go beyond informing those in the present about how we arrived at this
point. Indeed histories of public health can instruct the present and the future,
whether the lessons learned are about what to do or what not to do. The borough
of Leicester shows a wide spectrum of conceivable public health responses during
the second half of the nineteenth century and therefore represents the most
valuable unit of local study possible.
Leicester, a pioneer in municipal sewerage, a town vilified for infant mortality,
a leader in reducing scarlet fever mortality, and the seat of smallpox antivaccinationism, is the optimal municipality for a study of Victorian public health.
No other sizable town in Britain exhibited such extremes. Even London, the
focus of Hardy's study, can not show everything that Leicester has to offer
historians. In 1983, Anthony S. Wohl challenged researchers to do local studies;
in 1993, Anne Hardy challenged researchers to look at specific zymotic diseases;
in 1998, Christopher Hamlin challenged researchers to think beyond the
parameters of the Chadwickian construction of public health and consider social
justice; in 1999, Peter Baldwin challenged researchers to explore the relationships
between governments and geoepidemiology. This dissertation responds to most
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of these challenges because Leicester is a fertile source for evidence on so many
responses to public health problems.
About eighty-five miles north of London, Leicester is a town with ancient
roots. It is a town where the ruins of Roman baths share stones with a still
functioning church of Saxon and Norman construction. The River Soar generally
meanders through the borough but was subject, in the nineteenth century, to
periodic flooding that could inundate the lower portions of the town. At the
beginning of the nineteenth century Leicester was home to some 17,000 people;
by 1851 the population had risen to 60,642; in 1891 there were 174,624
inhabitants. A significant borough extension within 1891 explains only a fraction
of the population growth; the rest came from in-migration and a high birth-rate.
Leicester was a center for hosiery manufacture throughout the period and a
burgeoning shoemaking industry especially after 1850. Bill Lancaster enumerates
the difficulties of assessing the importance of factories in Leicester but it would
seem that some patterns can be discerned. 3 Workshops for hosiery manufacturing
were replacing the putting-out system of home production from the 1840s but the
shift was neither rapid nor universal. Moreover factories came on the scene only
rather late in both industries during the 1870s and 1880s. According to Nancy
Osterud the transition to factories was nearly complete by 1891. 4 Osterud reports

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962), 19.
3 Bill Lancaster, Radicalism, Cooperation, and Socialism: Leicester Working-Class Politics 18601906 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1987).
4 Nancy Grey Osterud, "Gender Divisions and the Organization of Work in the Leicester Hosiery
Industry," in Unequal Opportunities: Women's Employment in England 1800-1918, ed. Angela V.
John (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 45-68. See also Sonya Rose, Limited Livelihoods: Gender
and Class in Nineteenth-Century England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 4-7.
2
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that women were always heavily employed in hosiery and this tendency only
increased throughout the period, making hosiery into an industry with a
predominantly female labor force. This trend was not duplicated in shoemaking
but female labor still made up something like 33% of the total in this industry.
Osterud argues that married women were part of the workforce while their
children were quite young and only exited the labor market when their children
were old enough to replace the mothers' incomes. Contemporaries and historian
F.B. Smith contend that mothers' employment materially contributed toinfant
mortality. 5 I do not echo this argument, but the issue resonates in the
contemporary rhetoric of the problem.
Politically Leicester's local government lends itself to a periodization based on
the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act. The corrupt, debt-ridden, Conservativedominated local corporation, perpetuated by a system that allowed the leaders to
hand pick fellow leaders, gave way to a ratepayer-elected "reformed corporation"
on 1 January 1836. The new administration was overwhelmingly Liberal (52 to
4) and largely non-Anglican (40 to 16). 6 These two features continued to
characterize the town council throughout the period under consideration but some
changes did take place within the Liberal and dissenting leadership. According to
Peter Jones' study the original leaders of the reformed corporation were large
manufacturers but these men were gradually replaced by professionals and men of

5

Smith, The People's Health, 85-104.
A. Temple Patterson, Radical Leicester: A History of Leicester 1780-1850 (Leicester:
University College, 1954), 214-15. Denominationally, the dissenters were composed of 12
Unitarians, 12 Baptists, 10 Independents, 3 Quakers, 2 Methodists, and 1 Huntingtonian.

6
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lesser

means. 7

This finding is in keeping with E.P. Hennock's detailed analysis

of Birmingham and Leeds in Fit and Proper Persons: Ideal and Reality in
Nineteenth-Century Government. 8 These studies suggest that in the years after
1835 ratepayer parsimony increasingly dominated local elections. Not only did
·manufacturers remove themselves from the town council (in contrast to the
magistracies that they continued to find desirable), but the composition of the
professional members of the council shifted. In the early years of the reformed
corporation those professionals were physicians but in later years accountants and
other professionals replaced them. Despite such changes in personnel the local
government was staunchly Liberal from 1849 to 1891 although electoral
landslides to the extent realized in 1835 were a rarity.
The national government that produced the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act
was expanding in terms of participation by an extended franchise and in terms of
the central government's role in the lives of citizens and the administration of
local governments. Catholic emancipation in 1829 and especially the Reform Act
of 1832 ushered in the notion of the malleability of the constitution along with a
relatively small number of new voters. The reformed parliament promulgated the
Factory Acts of 1833, the New Poor Law of 1834, and of course the Municipal
Corporations Act. Central government concerns about public health heightened
with Edwin Chadwick's 1842 Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring
Population of Great Britain. Public awareness of deplorable urban living
Peter Jones, "The Recruitment of Office Holders in Leicester 1861-1931," Transactions of the
Leicestershire Archaeological and Historical Society 57 ( 1981-1982): 64-77.
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conditions grew from this well-publicized and well-distributed report;
legislation soon followed. 9 Piecemeal laws such as the Nuisances Removal Acts
of 1846 and the Towns Improvement Clauses Act of 1847 culminated in and were
consolidated to some extent by the Public Health Act of 1848. This legislation
created the central government's General Board of Health. Chadwick was
appointed the sole stipendiary commissioner of that Board, from which position
he attempted to guide local and national public health policies until his downfall
in 1854. 10 Under the terms of the Public Health Act of 1848, local governments
were permitted rather than compelled to create local boards of health. Both carrot
and stick incentives were present in the bill. Local governments choosing to
apply the Act became eligible to borrow against future rate revenue in order to
finance such projects as municipal sewerage systems. Local governments that
chose not to apply the Act could have its provisions forced upon them if their
annual death rates exceeded the level of 23 per 1,000 living persons. While that
compulsory aspect of the legislation was rarely if ever used, at least one historian
suggests that some municipalities applied the Act to avoid the intervention of the
central government in local affairs. 11 I can not say whether the reformed
corporation of Leicester was motivated by such apprehension to apply the Act. I
can say with certainty that some influential leaders of the corporation, led by
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Alderman Joseph Whetstone, supported passage of the Act by parliament but
hoped that the Act's final language would not give such coercive powers to the
central govemment. 12
Leicester's town council commissioned a survey of the town in 1847 to
prepare for municipal sewerage. The council was among the first English towns
to apply the Act of 1848. The council appointed the country's first MOH under
the auspices of the Act, Dr. John Buck, although Liverpool's MOH provision was
the legal template for such a position. The council, under Whetstone's leadership
but without unanimity, blazed the trail for Chadwickian sanitation yet came into
conflict with Chadwick himself on sewerage and piped water supply. After
Whetstone passed from the scene, the central government continued to pass public
health legislation. Two important pieces of legislation, the Public Health Act of
1872 and the Infectious Disease Notification Act of 1889, had no impact on
Leicester whatsoever because the town had already set similar or higher standards
for itself through private bill legislation
Much of the evidence for this dissertation comes from sources produced within
Leicester. The reports of the borough's Medical Officers of Health (MOHs) have
been exploited extensively. Each MOH, surgeon or physician, was hired by the
town council and charged with collecting health data and improving health
conditions in the town. The abilities of the MOHs varied considerably and their
responsibilities increased throughout the period under study. The Leicester
Chronicle (after 1864 the Leicester Chronicle and Mercury), provides both
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information and commentary. This newspaper consistently represented the
town's majority Liberal position. 13 Town council minutes are employed, but they
seem "sanitized" in order to minimize the differences of opinion among the
councilors. The council's minutes often do not record debate. Minutes from the
board of directors of the Leicester Waterworks Company have proven useful, but
are inconveniently missing for the period 1872-1878 when the Company passed
from private to municipal ownership. Numerous published pamphlets survive on
topics from sewerage proposals to summer diarrhoea to smallpox vaccination.
Local authors, from the Unitarian missionary Joseph Dare to the cantankerous
anti-vaccinationist J.T. Biggs, weighed in on public health issues and this study
reflects their opinions where appropriate. These sources, and others not
specifically mentioned, can be found at the Leicestershire Record Office (LRO) in
Wigston Magna.
Sources produced outside of Leicester have also been useful for this study.
Some documents from central government officials provide counterpoints to
locally generated documents. These include selected Parliamentary Papers and
pamphlets. The journal Lancet, was not an official publication of the British
medical community, but has proven particularly useful to represent the medical
community's positions on issues affecting Leicester and upon local responses. 14

12

Leicestershire Record Office (LRO) CM 1/5, Common Hall Books, Minutes of Town Council,
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13 Leicester's Liberals were not always unitary, even during the period when the leaders were all
Unitarians. James Thompson's Chronicle tended to favor Whig Liberals over Radical Liberals.
14 Precedents for using the Lancet for this purpose can be found in K. Codell Carter, "NineteenthCentury Treatments for Rabies as Reported in the Lancet." Medical History 26 (1982): 67-78 and
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Since its origins in the 1950s, the history of British public health has
broadened in scope and matured in analysis. Three important books published
within the last ten years represent the diversity and maturity of the field. 15 Much
work remains to be done to address the complex of medical, political, social,
economic, and environmental histories that make up the history of public health.
In particular the field needs more research at the municipal level because these
were the arenas where problems were identified and potential solutions were
implemented. Yet on a wider scale, public health problems long solved in Britain
continue to challenge other parts of the world and some problems that seemed to
have been solved worldwide might soon resurface. For example, though no
human being on earth has contracted smallpox for almost three decades the virus
is alive and well and could be disseminated in terrorist attacks or unconventional
warfare. So the study of public health history is more than an academic exercise.
Since public health problems can quickly become crises of mere survival,
histories of public health go beyond informing those in the present about how we
arrived at this point. Indeed histories of public health can instruct the present and
the future, whether the lessons learned are about what to do or what not to do.
The borough of Leicester shows a wide spectrum of conceivable public health
responses during the second half of the nineteenth century and therefore
represents the most valuable unit of local study possible.
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The historiography of British public health has evolved over the last five
decades. Perhaps the best example of this evolution is the treatment of Edwin
Chadwick. Chadwick remains a key figure in Victorian public health; in all but
the narrowest of studies his role can not be avoided. R.A. Lewis nearly beatified
Chadwick and the public health movement 16 while S.E. Finer explored the
motivations, actions, and foibles of the erstwhile Poor Law Commission
secretary. 17 Lewis' and Finer's emphasis on central government reformers helped
to spark a debate about the importance of Benthamism in British social reform.
Though most historians acknowledge that Chadwick created the public dialogue
about health in Britain, historiographical commentary in the 1960s and early
1970s devolved into a debate between Oliver MacDonagh and Henry Parris about
the pervasiveness of Bentham's Utilitarianism in social reform. 18 By 1988, this
tangential argument was resolved by Anthony Brundage's England's "Prussian
Minister:" Edwin Chadwick and the Politics of Government Growth. 18321854. 19 Brundage convincingly argued that Benthamites were few but
disproportionately influential. Brundage's work remains essential for its
exposition of how Chadwick's dogged style led to several central government
reforms.
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R.A. Lewis, Edwin Chadwick and the Public Health Movement, 1832-1854 (London:
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Yet not until Christopher Hamlin's work in 1998 were Chadwick's views on
public health properly contextualized. 20 Hamlin demonstrates that Chadwick was
not unique. In itself this was historiographically important but Hamlin went
farther. Hamlin took the time to explain Chadwick's opinions on disease
causation. Previous scholars acknowledged Chadwick's obsession with proper
sewerage and clean water supply to the extent that it has become cliche to
associate Chadwick with egg-shaped glazed earthenware pipes. But Hamlin
shows that Chadwick's Benthamist views were not destined to prevail because
they were based on ultimate "Truth." Chadwick believed that miasma caused
disease; "bad air" led directly to disease. Since "bad air" permeated the cities of
Victorian Britain it was no wonder that urban dwellers were ill. Following
Chadwick's logic, sick working class people made unproductive employees,
therefore cities should be made more healthful. Sewerage, garbage disposal, and
clean water should yield a more productive workforce. But Hamlin cautions that
truth won out only in the sense that we still subscribe to the "sanitary idea"
advanced by Chadwick and his associates. Indeed Hamlin argues that the very
term "public health" was claimed and defined along Chadwickian lines. Hamlin
reminds us that politics determined the course of public health, not Truth.
For all its merits, Hamlin's work leaves room for more explanation of disease
causation theories. He correctly labels Chadwick's view as miasmatic, but
Chadwick was a lawyer not a doctor and Hamlin's study ends in 1854. For the
period of the current study, many medical professionals subscribed to the
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pythogenic theory of disease causation. As mentioned above miasmatic and
pythogenic theories have similarities yet have an important difference. Specific
causative agents remained obscure well beyond Pasteur's work in 1864.
Moreover, germ theory was not once and universally accepted in 1864. Indeed
this study will provide examples of the gradual acceptance of germ theory and
microbiology among health professionals. But it was miasmatic theory that first
informed Chadwick and pythogenic theory that led to many sanitary reforms.
Hamlin argues that the Chadwickian construction of public health involved
epidemic communicable diseases, sewers, and water supply. In 1993, historian
Anne Hardy wrote that historians have not paid enough attention to the specific
diseases involved. Victorian public health officials referred to diseases that were
perceived to be contagious as "zymotic."21 Hardy's book, The Epidemic Streets,
addresses eight of these diseases in some depth. 22 This dissertation overlaps her
work on several of these diseases, though in a different locale and with some
differences in findings. But Hardy also engages another historiographical debate
in her work. In 1976, Thomas McKeown advanced the thesis that now bears his
name. 23 McKeown posited that improving mortality rates in Britain, especially
after 1870, resulted much more from improved nutrition than from preventive
public health measures. Hardy argues that some public health measures were

° Christopher Hamlin, Public Health and Social Justice.
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ineffectual but on the whole, public health innovations and interventions had a
positive effect upon mortality rates. This study agrees with her general thesis and
ironically strengthens it because her finding that scarlet fever mortality did not
improve from preventive measures is here contradicted.
Hardy's belief that public health responses proved effective places her in the
same historiographical camp as Anthony S. Wohl. But to Hardy's way of
thinking, Wohl's Endangered Lives focuses too narrowly on the sanitation side of
public health history. 24 Yet this book remains the finest primer in the field.
Indeed Christopher Hamlin argues that if the history of British public health
consisted of exposing horrific conditions and describing sanitary improvements,
such a history has already been written. 25 Published several years after F.B.
Smith introduced the social historian's statistical tools and bottom-up perspective
to public health history, Wohl crafted these new elements into a masterfully
written and researched book. Wohl exploited the records produced by Victorian
Medical Officers of Health (MOHs) more fully than had writers who came before
him and these records provide particularly rich source material. Moreover, Wohl
issued a call to researchers to investigate how local authorities dealt with public
health problems because he recognized that this was the critical level of
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implementation. In part, this dissertation responds to Wohl' s call as did Hamlin
in 1988. 26
Yet Wohl's work remains subject to criticism on two levels. First, it exposes
conditions that modem readers consider so abhorrent that it might seem that the
conditions alone led to the search for solutions. Thus "right-thinking" reformers
become heroes as they battle the apathetic or parsimonious villains holding power
over local governments. But the heroes were not always right, nor the villains
always wrong. Moreover conditions, however deplorable, did not directly lead to
responses. Human agency, politics, and the opinions of numerous publics defined
conditions as problems and limited conceivable responses.
Second, Endangered Lives takes a "triumphalist" approach to public health.
Wohl's admonition that readers should credit the reformers for their achievements
rather than criticize them for their failures is similar to Anne Hardy's acceptance
of the beneficial results produced by nineteenth century innovations. But Hamlin
suggests that the triumphalist view allows Victorian public health reformers to
write their own history. That is, Chadwick and his associates framed the
discourse of public health so effectively that contemporaries and historians alike
have allowed the framework to stand. While Hamlin's criticism of the
triumphalist view is valid and provocative, it does not diminish the value of
Wohl's contribution to the field. Wohl addresses the public health reformers on
their own terms. He measures success based upon what the reformers set out to
do using contemporary standards and knowledge.
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Hamlin's Public Health and Social Justice reinforces the political constraints
of public health policy in Britain. So does Peter Baldwin's Contagion and the
State in Europe 1830-1930 in a comparative way. In this recent work, Baldwin
assesses public health policies from a top-down perspective. Baldwin's book
problematizes previously accepted connections between political systems and
public health initiatives. Baldwin challenges the logical formulation, once posited
by historian Erwin Ackemecht, that countries with authoritarian governments
were interventionist and countries with liberal governments were not. 27 Simply
put, Ackemecht's position meant that authoritarian governments should have
accepted the notion of "contagion" and responded with quarantines; liberal
governments should have rejected "contagion" and safeguarded the freedom of
movement for individuals. Baldwin shows that logic need not prevail in the
history of public health. Indeed Baldwin persuasively argues that liberal Britain
accepted "contagion" and intervention under certain circumstances. So British
political authorities accepted restrictions upon the freedoms of individuals when
these individuals were perceived to be significant threats to the health of others. 28
Baldwin's ultimate argument then, is that public health initiatives did not proceed
from the type of government a state had. Rather, public health initiatives and
types of government both arose from geoepidemiological experience. 29
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While geoepidemiology is a cumbersome term, the concept behind it is
straightforward. Disease has always been a bane of human existence and
contagious epidemic disease creates the greatest amount of consternation.
Geographical and topographical circumstances enhance or inhibit the spread of
communicable diseases. Human societies respond to the connection between
geography and disease culturally. The culture that arises from the fear of disease
is then reflected politically. Governments have long been expected to protect
subjects or citizens. So different political systems are, at least in part, responses
to where different societies find themselves in the geoepidemiological landscape
because societies exhibit varying levels of vulnerability to "imported" diseases. 30
Baldwin's work, in one way, brings British public health historiography back
to Benthamism. After all the "felicity calculus" of the greatest good for the
greatest number should determine that the public's right to health outweighs an
infected individual's right to freedom of movement. Baldwin does not accept the
Benthamist position uncritically. But the top-down approach has limitations.
Baldwin recognizes that all individuals had the same rights in theory, but in
practice middle class individuals had more options than working class individuals.
Baldwin mentions this distinction, but it is not the focus of his project. In
Leicester, working class victims and working class diseases faced different
consequences and responses than did their middle class counterparts. Class issues
insinuate themselves into this story because they are present in the evidence.
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This study fills some of the holes in the field. It is a local study of Leicester,
a Midlands town that in some ways pioneered in public health and paid a penalty
for pioneering. This precocity and later recalcitrance are shown in chapter two on
sewerage. Chapter three on water supply illustrates the limited value of for-profit
public health measures. The typhoid fever analysis, chapter four, presents
Leicester's response to a typical yet deadly endemic disease brought to notoriety
by royal afflictions. Chapter five on scarlet fever demonstrates an aggressive
public health response that was measurably successful. Chapter six on summer
diarrhoea shows half-hearted and unsuccessful responses to a serious yet poorly
understood problem. Finally, chapter seven on smallpox vaccination is instructive
if ambivalent. The seemingly bizarre anti-vaccination sentiment in Leicester
became confused with the famous "Leicester Method" of victim isolation that
informed the World Health Organization's eventual eradication of the disease.
Readers of this dissertation might question my selection of the issues to be
discussed. For example, readers might well ask why cholera, the scourge of the
nineteenth century does not merit a chapter. The answer is fairly simple; cholera
was not a health problem in Leicester between 1849 and 1891. I recognize the
significance of the British epidemic of the early 1830s and I acknowledge the
importance of a renewed visitation leading to the Public Health Act of 1848.
Indeed Dr. John Snow's groundbreaking epidemiological investigations of waterborne cholera took place in 1849 and 1854, which are clearly within the
chronological parameters of this study but cholera was not defined as a problem
in Leicester between 1849 and 1891. Anne Hardy argues that as the last British
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cholera outbreak in 1866 was confined to London, the country had an effective
sanitary cordon. In Peter Baldwin's terminology, the central government's "neoquarantinist" policy was successful. So this study marginalizes the disease most
apt to cause panic in nineteenth century Britain. Moreover, this study does not
address typhus, another deadly disease that had very little impact on Leicester.
Rather than explaining why other diseases such as diptheria, whooping cough,
and measles are omitted, it would be more fruitful to discuss why the included
chapters have been chosen.
Hardy argued that sewerage and water supply were inappropriate for her study
of zymotic (contagious) diseases. I appreciate her position that not enough work
has been done on specific diseases and I believe this dissertation will help in that
regard. Yet sewerage and water supply were at the heart of the Chadwickian
construction of public health. Christopher Hamlin describes the primacy of the
Chadwickian construction in Public Health and Social Justice, but in another work
he provides a model to explain the implementation of municipal sewerage
schemes. 31 Such models need to be tested. This study shows that Hamlin's
model of municipal sewerage holds for Leicester, but in a very unusual way.
Hamlin argued that litigation to clean up rivers forced towns to provide sewerage,
yet Leicester's town council faced no such legal challenge when they introduced
the borough's first sewer system. This innovative system proved a failure
however, and ultimately litigation forced the council to provide another system.
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The history of the town's piped water supply pits public health in
competition with the drive for profit. Though it seems counterintuitive today, the
expectation that piped water would necessarily be used to flush sewerage does not
reflect mid-nineteenth century thinking. Water supply and sewerage could be
completely independent. Moreover Chadwick himself assumed that water supply
and sewerage would be managed for profit. Leicester's town council guaranteed
profits to a private company. Then it took nearly three decades for the town's
leaders to wrest away control of the piped water supply from the private company.
Hardy's call to focus on specific zymotic diseases is reflected in this
dissertation's chapters on typhoid fever, scarlet fever and summer diarrhoea. Of
these three, summer diarrhoea came to be the problem that national publics
closely associated with Leicester. As mentioned above, typhoid fever was
endemic throughout Britain. A classic example of a filth disease, typhoid fever
became notorious because it struck members of the royal family, but it brought no
particular opprobrium to the town of Leicester. The borough's health officials
responded to the disease according to the Chadwickian, sanitationist approach.
They tried to improve the urban environment by closing polluted wells and
upgrading effluent plumbing.
Scarlet fever was another deadly disease that did not place Leicester in the
national spotlight. In combating it, local officials were not satisfied with an
environmental approach aimed at filth and sanitation. They used legislative
measures and an isolation hospital to limit the spread of scarlet fever. Contrary to
Hardy's findings, evidence from Leicester indicates that this interventionist
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approach, which Baldwin would term "neo-quarantinist," succeeded in reducing
mortality from this disease. Yet the measurable value of this interventionist
approach waned when confronted with middle class resistance to victim isolation.
Summer diarrhoea was a little understood malady that brought Leicester to the
forefront of national attention. Infant mortality from summer diarrhoea was
consistently very high in the borough, indeed higher than in any other British
town. Because no one knew the cause of this "disease," the national medical
community heaped blame upon the town, but had little to offer in the way of a
remedy. Leicester's officials moved haltingly to investigate this working class
"disease," but continuous pressure from outside Leicester led local officials to
address the problem with rhetoric, shoe-leather epidemiology, and eventually
microscopic research. Hardy found summer diarrhoea too complex to address in
her book and I do not pretend to provide a definitive· etiological explanation in
this dissertation, but a study of public health in Victorian Leicester that did not
address summer diarrhoea would be a cowardly enterprise. Twenty-first century
medical practices can lessen the ravages of this "disease," but such symptoms
remain and occasionally lead to fatalities.
Likewise a study of public health in Victorian Leicester would be remiss if it
did not address the smallpox anti-vaccination movement. Chapter seven concerns
the resistance to compulsory vaccination much more than the disease itself.
Leicester became the anti-vaccination capital of Britain and people associated
with Leicester led the movement that ultimately achieved the parliamentary repeal
of compulsory vaccination laws. Anti-vaccinationist rhetoric claimed that the
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movement was about individual freedom and that the Leicester Method of
victim isolation was about sanitation. Baldwin accepts the first part of this claim,
but cites the Leicester Method as an example ofneo-quarantinism. 32 For many
years historians have accepted the anti-vaccinationists' claim that popular
resistance to smallpox vaccination in Leicester mushroomed when the Leicester
Method was introduced. 33 This dissertation shows that widespread resistance to
compulsory vaccination had less to do with the alternative Leicester Method of
victim isolation than it had to do with reduced penalties for parents who refused to
have their children vaccinated. This finding adjusts the historiography of antivaccinationism. Middle class leaders of the movement have, to some degree,
been allowed to write their own history much as Hamlin contends that Chadwick
and his associates did. Anti-vaccination leaders espoused abstractions about the
power of the central government. But working class people in Leicester
recognized the limitations of vaccination through personal experience and only
turned against vaccination in great numbers when the penalties for refusal were
greatly reduced.
A study of nineteenth century Leicester accomplishes more than most local
studies could. All Victorian towns faced public health problems but Leicester
handled these problems uniquely, with the exception of typhoid fever. Rather
than being a mere oddity in the history of public health, Leicester illustrates
alternative responses. To be sure, some responses were more effective than
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others, but that is precisely why this study has merit. Too often advances in
public health are assumed as by-products of "progress." We should recognize that
such advances were the results of processes that included trial and error, and
sometimes it was error that persisted. Responses had to be perceived as
ameliorative and economical by many different people who influenced
implementation.
This dissertation concerns a town at the forefront of Victorian public health.

In some ways the town's leaders put the borough in the forefront, in other ways,
with other issues it was outsiders who put Leicester to the front and, to be sure,
there were public health issues that left Leicester in the middle of the pack. I
believe that it is important to address all three scenarios and I believe that no other
nineteenth century British town can exemplify such diversity as does Leicester.
This dissertation shows that medical knowledge was changing in the second half
of the nineteenth century, it shows that medical knowledge needed to be
politically, economically, and socially accepted in order to be implemented, and it
shows that such acceptance depended upon popular beliefs and acquiescence.
The construction of public health was accomplished in a four step process:
definition, advocacy, implementation, and cooperation. Many publics were
involved in the construction. This dissertation reveals the complexity within the
construction. It shows the importance oflocal studies because they were the main
arenas within which nineteenth century British public health was constructed. It
dispels notions that public health was something other than a human construction
and clearly shows that health issues were addressed individually rather than
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according to grand schemes. Moreover, it traces a fascinating and complex set
of stories in a town with fascinating and complex people.
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2. "The experiment at Leicester failed:" 1 municipal sewerage

Rapid urbanization in the era of the industrial revolution was an unprecedented
phenomenon in Britain. Problems associated with such concentrations of
population were largely unprecedented as well. These problems were in a great
number of different areas but health problems were among the most significant.
By the 1830s, if not before, it was clear that towns were far more lethal than rural
areas. This situation was underscored by Edwin Chadwick's Report of 1842. As
a Benthamite, Chadwick was concerned by the effects of poor urban health on
productivity and the parochial poor rates. In terms of Chadwick's pythogenic
theory of disease, bad smells, or miasms, were actual agents of disease. Thus the
elimination of bad smells would materially lessen disease and thereby increase
productivity and reduce the burden on the rates. The construction of sewerage
systems to dispose of waste would clearly make towns less noisome.
Yet when Chadwick wrote his Report what would come to be called "sanitary
science" was in its infancy. Sewerage systems that existed in towns were
designed more as storm drains than as modem sewers. Moreover, in Britain,
these sewers were under the auspices of individual parishes rather than town
governments. Some engineers and reformers were quite interested in making
sewerage a comprehensive municipal service. Their theories of sewerage were
largely untested however because of expense and parochial control. In fact the
first comprehensive sewerage system in Europe, that of Hamburg in 1853, was

1 Richard Smith, PP 1864, vol. Xiv, Select Committee on Metropolis and Town Sewers, Minutes
of Evidence, 64.

37

only made feasible because a fire had destroyed much of the town. British
engineers had no towns to be rebuilt to use as experiments. In these conditions no
proven method of sewage removal and disposal, could have arisen. Some towns
would have to serve as guinea pigs before an accepted remedy developed.
The reformed corporation of Leicester, more specifically its Highway and
Sewerage Committee, was very quick to respond to the Public Health Act of
1848. The town council was among the first British towns to apply the Act to its
jurisdiction, transforming itself into a Local Board of Health. Moreover the town
was the first in England to appoint a Medical Officer of Health (MOH) under the
terms of the Act, in the person of the surgeon, John Buck.2 Additionally the
Committee set itself upon the task of petitioning the General Board of Health for a
sanitary inspection of the town. 3 This initiative was launched by the Unitarian
Liberal leaders of the town council, Joseph Whetstone and John Biggs.
Surprisingly, given their superficial similarities ofreligion, economic position,
and political party, the call for a sanitary inspection was one of the few times that
these two leaders would agree on a course of action. Whetstone and Biggs were
both members of the Unitarian Great Meeting. Whetstone was one of the
founders of the Meeting's Domestic Mission and Biggs was a substantial
contributor to the cause. Both men were significant manufacturers, Whetstone in
worsted and Biggs in hosiery. Both were Liberals. Both men advocated causes
Leicester appointed two MOHs, Buck being one of them, following the 1846 Nuisances Removal
Act but three months after these appointments Liverpool obtained a local act which "caught the
imagination of the nation." Anthony S. Wohl, Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian
Britain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 180. The Liverpool model was the
basis for the MOH in the 1848 act and Leicester was then the first town to conform to this model.
2
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for which England's leadership was not ready. Whetstone petitioned
Parliament for a national poor rate4 and Biggs agitated for something close to
universal male suffrage. 5 Both men recognized that Leicester had managed to
clear off the inherited debt from the pre-1835 corporation before 1849, but they
had distinctly different opinions on how the newly unencumbered revenue should
be spent. Biggs was an "improver" or Radical Liberal while Whetstone was an
"economist" or Whiggish Liberal. Biggs was a popular champion because of his
nearly Chartist ideals and his unilateral abolition of frame rents for his workers.
Indeed the following generation commemorated him as such with an impressive
statute, at an important crossroads in Leicester's City Centre. But when the future
MP, Biggs, considered physical "improvements" for the town his thought turned
to projects like a new building for the town council. 6
Paradoxically, sewerage became recognized as a problem to be addressed
when Whetstone, the "economist," insisted that a sewerage scheme must come
before any cosmetic improvements in Leicester. It has been posited that local
politicians who embraced the "sanitary idea" did so to diffuse concern over
egalitarian political issues. 7 Whetstone did not fit into this category. Whatever
his thoughts might have been about enlarging the electorate, and these are
unknown to me, he was such a singly stalwart supporter of sanitation and
3

LRO CM 1/5, Town Council Minutes [hereafter Minutes], 29 November 1848, 182-83.
Ibid. 1 March 1848, 77.
5 Bill Lancaster, Radicalism, Cooperation and Socialism: Leicester Working-Class Politics 18601906 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1987), 76.
6 The Guildhall which served as the town council meeting place and as a library among other
functions had been in existence since at least the fourteenth century.
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sewerage reform that there can be little doubt about his sincerity. Indeed, I
would argue that Whetstone was too zealous for his time; because of his personal
ability and tenacity Leicester would be saddled with a sewerage system that was
both inefficient and ultimately dangerous. It seems that Whetstone was moved by
Chadwick's 1842 Report and concerned about Leicester's overall death rate of 30
per 1,000 which was third highest in the nation. He would also have had contact
with Chadwick in the mid-1840s when the reformer took personal interest in the
drainage and watering of Leicester. 8 Whetstone wedded his personal concerns
about public health with the borough's newfound solvency and the opportunity
provided by the Public Health Act of 1848 to demand the primacy of sewerage
reform from his position as chairman of the Finance Committee of the town
council. Yet this is far from a condemnation of the man; if the Leicester sewerage
system eventually proved to be disastrous it was because later leaders, with
"weaker shoulders"9 than Joseph Whetstone, failed to react with the decisiveness
and forcefulness that he would have shown.
The sanitary inspection that Whetstone and Biggs requested, by William
Ranger of the national General Board of Health in 1849, was quite positively
received in Leicester. 10 This report pointed to deficiencies especially in regard to
the drainage of the town, but it did not prescribe any "particulars" to ameliorate
R. A. McKinley and C.T. Smith, "Social and Administrative History," in The Victoria History of
the Counties of England, A History of the County of Leicestershire, vol. 4, Leicester, ed. R. A.
McKinley (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 214. [hereafter VCH 4]
8 Anthony Brundage, England's "Prussian Minister:" Edwin Chadwick and the Politics of
Government Growth (University Park, Pa.: Penn State University Press, 1988), 104-06.
9 Councillor William Winterton addressing the town council as reported in the LC, 4 April 1874.
Despite Winterton's appeal the council shelved consideration of sewerage reform at that time.
7
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the situation. 11 Therefore Whetstone, the newly appointed chairman of the
Highway and Sewerage Committee, and Samuel Stone, the town clerk, took it
upon themselves to commission an engineer to design a system for Leicester's
sewage. 12 As comprehensive sewerage systems were neither legal nor plausible
before the late 1840s (as they were parish not corporation systems), Leicester
became something of a test case. 13
The decision-making process within the Highway and Sewerage Committee is
rather opaque, but the committee quickly affirmed Whetstone's choice of the
gentleman to evaluate the town and propose a scheme. Samuel Stone referred to
Thomas Wicksteed as "an eminent engineer" 14 and there is every reason to
believe that Wicksteed had earned such a reputation. Chief engineer of the East
London Water Works, Wicksteed pioneered the use of steam engines to lift
sewage, consulted on projects as distant as Boston and Berlin, and received an
engineering Gold Medal for his efforts. 15 In addition Wicksteed was the holder of
five separate sewage treatment patents out of only twelve such patents awarded in
Britain by 1850. The local press also believed that Wicksteed possessed "the
most eminent engineering advice to be had." 16 Table 2.1 helps to illustrate the
paucity of choices available to the town in 1849, and again points to the

10 Accounts of the Ranger Report can be found in McKinley, VCH 4, 264 or Malcolm Elliott,
Victorian Leicester (London: Phillmore & Co., 1979), 56-57.
11 LRO CM 1/5, Minutes, 27 July 1849, 289.
12 Samuel Stone was commemorated equally with Whetstone in the "shoulders" speech by
Winterton.
13 McKinley, VCH 4, 256.
14 LRO CM 1/5, Minutes, 5 September 1849, 313.
15 The Engineer 32 (1 December 1871): 383; Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical
Engineers (1872): 23.
16 LC, 4 September 1852.
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reasonableness of the Committee's offer to Wicksteed. Few engineers of the
time could boast ofWicksteed's experience in matters of sewerage.
On 17 September 1849, Wicksteed accepted the offer to survey Leicester and
design a sewerage plan. He informed the town council that he could not spare the
time to personally superintend the construction of the system. The council, acting
as the Local Board of Health, hired him at five guineas per day on 19
September. 17 The drainage conditions which confronted Wicksteed were dismal.
What rudimentary sewers existed in the town had been installed by individual
parishes or private developers with little coordination. These sewers were flushed
only by rainwater, had only a slight
Table 2.1. Sewage treatment patents awarded in Britain 1800-1875 18

17

Years

Patents

1800-1809

1

1810-1819

0

1820-1829

0

1830-1839

1

1840-1849

10

1850-1859

59

1860-1869

75

1870-1875

156

LRO CM 1/5, Minutes, 19 September 1849, 333-34.
PP 1857 vol. xx, Report on the Means of Deodorizing and Utilizing the Sewage of Towns by
Henry Austin, C.E., 93-96. PP 1876 vol. xxxviii, Report of a Committee appointed by the
President of the Local Government Board to Inquire into the Several Modes of Treating Town
Sewage, Appendix vi, 105-15.
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gravitational flow, and were square and angular; they tended merely to
accumulate filth. What effluent managed to escape the various systems was
simply discharged untreated into the River Soar. 19 Approximately 3,000
uncovered cesspools littered the urban landscape, occupying fully 1 ¼ acre of the
town. 20
The cesspools were concentrated in the poorer neighborhoods where
overcrowding was heaviest. The deleterious effects to health from stagnant, raw
sewage will be treated elsewhere in this dissertation, but it is relevant here to
mention the coincidence of such sewage with housing patterns. In 1850 the
Highway and Sewerage Committee attempted to respond to complaints by middle
class landlords and working class tenants about the high cost of having cesspools
cleaned by initiating a municipal program to empty their contents at five shillings
per week. 21 The committee soon halved the rate because the tenants, who were
held responsible for the fee, did not subscribe to the service in numbers acceptable
to the landlords.

It was clear to many members of the community regardless of economic status,
that the status quo for drainage and waste removal was unsatisfactory.
Wicksteed's comprehensive sewerage scheme was submitted to the Local Board
in March of 1850. Writing on behalf of the Highway and Sewerage Committee,
Samuel Stone called the plan "a very long, able, and interesting document [it]
19 Jack Simmons, Leicester: Past and Present, vol. 2, Modem City 1860-1974 (London: Eyre
Methuen, 1974), 13.
20 Wohl, Endangered Lives, 95.
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contains much information and suggestions of a very valuable character which
will require the calm and deliberate consideration of the Council."22 Stone's
words were taken to heart; five hundred copies of the report were printed and
distributed for "calm and deliberate consideration." Additionally, the Leicester
Chronicle ran a full description spread across two issues of what would come to
be described as the "Preliminary Report. " 23
The essence of the Wicksteed system was to drain the town's sewage in brick
lines, which were more porous but less expensive than glazed earthenware pipes,
by gravitation to the "works" which were to be located on the banks of the Soar,
north of the town and downstream from Leicester (see figure 1.1). There the
sewage would be pumped into long reservoirs where it would be treated with a
lime slurry to precipitate the solid matter. The liquid portion would move slowly
through two reservoirs totaling 190 feet at which point it would be deemed
"sweet" and be discharged into the river. The precipitated solid matter would be
raised by an Archimedes screw to a "Jacob's ladder" series of large buckets that
would raise the material to a height of twenty feet. Then it would be deposited
into a large pipe with perforated trays; gravitational force would press out any
remaining liquid. The trays would then be removed, the residue cut into brick
size, and dried to be sold as manure. 24

21

LRO CM 1/5, Minutes, 20 December 1849, 395-96.
Ibid., 20 March 1850, 451.
23 LC, 23 March 1850, 30 March 1850.
24 The most concise description of the Wicksteed system can be found in PP 1857, vol. xx, Royal
Commission on the Deodorization and Utilization of the Sewage in Towns, 22-24 [hereafter PP
1857, vol. xx RCDUST].
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Several key assumptions which would have both short and long-run effects
informed the Wicksteed plan. The first of these assumptions was that the
collection of sewage, or human excreta, could be a profit-making venture. While
"sewage for profit" sounds quite odd to twenty-first century ears, it was a
pervasive goal for Victorian reformers. 25 They were deeply convinced that
farmers would buy town sewage for fertilizer. Edwin Chadwick himself founded
a private company to distribute human waste to agricultural consumers. 26 It was
obvious to the Chronicle that "Mr. Wicksteed places great reliance upon the
returns to be derived from the sale of manure."27 In fact, Wicksteed anticipated
that the manure bricks would fetch £2 per ton, a price on a par with high quality
South American guano. However, Leicester did not enter into the venture to
make profit for itself. The corporation intended to bear the expense of installing
the lines and erecting the "works" as a civic function. Wicksteed's Patent Solid
Sewage Manure Company would receive the town's sewage in exchange for the
operation of the "works." Thus any profit that would accrue from the sewage
would belong to the Company. This does not mean that the corporation rejected
"sewage for profit" as too risky a venture; in the lease that was granted to the
Company, the Company was permitted to back out of the contract at any time. 28
Another faulty assumption underlying the Wicksteed system was an
underestimate of Leicester's future growth. Wicksteed estimated that his system
25

See for example S.E. Finer, The Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick (London: Methuen &
Co., 1952), 300.
26 Brundage, England's "Prussian Minister." 101-07.
27 LC, 16 March 1850.
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would be sufficient for thirty years, but it is unclear how he arrived at that
figure. If Wicksteed relied on what I would call "best estimates" a population
growth of 19% per decade might have been projected. 29 The actual population
growth rate over the thirty-year period (1851-1881) was 34% per decade. 30 Again
the Highway and Sewerage Committee accepted Wicksteed's figures, and
therefore the town council, or Local Board of Health, did as well. Thus the
corporation expected a thirty-year respite from sewage problems if the system
was implemented.
A third assumption, that rainwater would be sufficient to flush the proposed
system, will be dealt with in specific detail later. Here it must be argued that there
was no serious alternative. Flushing the sewers with municipal water may seem
eminently practical in the twenty-first century but it was hardly practicable in
1850s Leicester. Municipal corporations were legally prohibited from
establishing their own waterworks systems if private companies stood willing to
provide services. Such a company had existed in Leicester since 1846. 31
Although the corporation held a minority position in that company (originally
21 %) it was unable to set policy for the company. 32 One policy of the company
was that customers could not subscribe to the service merely to flush water
28

LRO L.614, John Moore, Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health for 1855 [hereafter
MOH 1855]. 7.
29 These figures can be constructed from the data presented in Barry Haynes, Working-Class Life
in Victorian Leicester: The Joseph Dare Reports (Leicester: Leicestershire Libraries and
Information Service, 1991 ), 10, 96, based on growth I 831-41 and I 841-51.
30 Ibid., 96. This average distracts from the increasing population growth. If Wicksteed
anticipated 57% over 30 years this was in fact realized in 20 years.
31 Simmons, Leicester: Past and Present, 11.
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closets. So even where dwellings communicated with the sewerage system via
water closets no benefits could be derived if the occupants used another water
source for other household uses. This situation made it hardly imaginable that
anything other than rain could have flushed Wicksteed's system; the seemingly
complementary services of water and sewerage were not in communication
conceptually even when such communication was physically possible.
A fourth assumption of the Wicksteed scheme, based on limited evidence, was
that a lime slurry could effectively purify the sewage. From Table 2.1 it is clear
that there were not a great many sewage treatment systems to choose from. The
lime slurry method of purification had not been attempted on as large a scale as a
town the size of Leicester but several experiments had produced results which
permitted optimism. Two chemistry professors from Guy's Hospital, Alfred S.
Taylor and Arthur Aikin, tested the lime slurry method under laboratory
conditions and found the resulting water to be quite pure. 33 A field test
undertaken in Leicester satisfied the Local Board of Health and positively
delighted the Leicester Chronicle. 34 That these tests formed the basis of the
town's acceptance of the treatment method tells us two important things. First the
lime slurry method of sewage treatment had achieved nothing approaching the
32

Robert Read, Jr., Modem Leicester: Jottings of Personal Experience and Research. with an
Original History of Cmporation Undertakings. and of each Regular. Militia. Yeomanry. & Rifle
regiment localized at The New Military Centre (Leicester: Winks & Son, 1881 ), 28-29.
33 LRO Pamphlets vol. 49, Report of the Highway & Sewerage Committee of the Local Board of
Health for the Borough of Leicester. Respecting the Proposed Scheme for the Sewerage of
Leicester. and the Report of the General Board of Health Thereon. with LA Report from Mr. Lee.
One of the Superintending Inspectors of the General Board of Health: 2. A letter from the General
Board to the Local Board: and 3. The Reply of Mr. Wicksteed to the Report of Mr. Lee [1852],
41-51. [hereafter LRO Pamphlets vol. 49, Report ... Respecting ... Scheme]. The two chemists
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status of an ameliorative technical consensus. It was still an experimental
method that required demonstration of its likely success. Second the leaders of
Leicester were rational, responsible consumers ofWicksteed's approach. They
personally attended the on-site experiment and evaluated the merits of the
method.
Under the terms of the 1848 Public Health Act it was not sufficient for the
Local Board and/or the corporation to accept a sewerage scheme. Parliament
would then need to pass a local bill and the General Board of Health must
approve the borrowing of the necessary funds. While Parliament proved not to be
a major obstacle to the plan, the General Board assumed a confrontational
position.
It has been argued that the General Board's antagonism to the Wicksteed

scheme was the result of personal animosities. Historian S.E. Finer concluded
that Edwin Chadwick of the General Board resented the arrogance of engineers in
general, and of Wicksteed and Robert Stephenson in particular. 35 That
contention is shared by all of the contemporary sources from Leicester. But in the
long run, the Local Board and the General Board both presented valid points and
mistaken conclusions.
The General Board of Health did not respond to the Wicksteed proposal in a
timely manner. The Local Board submitted Wicksteed's "Preliminary Report" to
the General Board at the same time that it initiated the legislative process for the
local act of Parliament. At this time the General Board had no comment. Several
34

LC, 2 October 1842.
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months later the Local Board forwarded Wicksteed's "Written Report" to the
General Board. The "Written Report" revised and refined the "Preliminary
Report." The "Preliminary Report" was drawn while Wicksteed was a five
guinea per day consultant, but the "Written Report" was drawn when Wicksteed
had signed on to oversee construction and operate the works.
The General Board "sat" on Leicester's plan until the day before the local bill
went before Parliament. According to Leicester's town clerk, Samuel Stone,
Chadwick and his board were accused of being dilatory, underhanded, and
unreasonable. 36 Indeed the timing of Chadwick's objection to the plan is
questionable. The substance of the objection was that the plan did not specifically
diagram how each dwelling in the town would communicate with the new sewers.
Since Leicester's program was precocious, the protocol for interaction between
Local Boards and the General Board was being invented as they went along. The
Local Board was not working closely with the General Board so the demand for
such specificity, however, desirable, came as a last minute surprise. Parliament
granted the local act, but the General Board retained the right of final approval of
the plans before the money could be borrowed.
Chadwick commissioned a senior inspector of the General Board, William
Lee, to evaluate the Leicester plans before they could receive General Board
approval. Lee reviewed the plans and toured Leicester in late 1851. On 26

35
36
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January 1852, Lee made his report to the General Board of Health. 37 Lee had
nothing positive to write about the proposed Wicksteed system; his numerous
objections can be grouped into four general complaints.
The first of Lee's complaints was that Wicksteed's scheme was incomplete. In
part this echoed Chadwick's demand that every building or court should be shown
to communicate with the municipal sewerage system. Lee contended that without
a house-to-house survey of Leicester no plan could predict either efficiency or
economy. Moreover Wicksteed's "Preliminary Report" described a system that
would be implemented incrementally as subscription funds became available.
Ultimately the system was funded by loans against the rates but the ambiguity in
the "Preliminary Report" allowed for a measure of local autonomy that could
have been perceived as a challenge to the General Board's control over future
sewerage systems.
Second, Lee pointed to problems that the system could have with rainwater.
Lee contended that the sewer's capacity was inadequate for sewage alone and that
rain could inundate and incapacitate the system. The inspector believed that
Wicksteed had erred in his calculation of the ability of the system to dispose of
rainwater because the engineer based his figures on average rainfalls rather than
the greatest deluges on record. In Lee's opinion, a large storm would "impound"
the sewage and prevent it from reaching the works.

LRO Pamphlets, vol. 49, William Lee, Report ... Respecting ... Scheme, 23-24. I have grouped
Lee's points into four topics and will treat each individually but the source remains the same until
otherwise noted.
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Third, Lee did not like the plan for the treatment works. He objected to the
size of the sewage reservoirs, claiming that their evaporation would be
"contaminating the air." Lee was not really out of step from educated opinion
with the pythogenic statement; indeed it is surprising how often pythogenic, or
miasmatic, explanations accurately describe the conditions leading to disease, if
not the actual mechanisms or vectors upon which transmission depends. Lee also
doubted the efficacy of using lime as a purifier, but he was unfamiliar with the
lime slurry method and had not troubled to acquaint himself with Taylor and
Aikin' s research.
Fourth, and a bit ironically, Lee objected to the expense of the Wicksteed
system. As mentioned above, Wicksteed had opted for brick sewer lines. Glazed
earthenware pipes were much less porous than brick but they were much more
expensive. Wicksteed attempted to compromise between the two methods by
proposing two overlapping layers of brick to minimize the amount of porous
material exposed to the sewage. Lee thought that the second layer of bricks was
an unnecessary expense. Moreover, Lee thought that the sewer lines ran
unnecessarily deep in the earth under the streets. If the proposed lines were
generally raised three feet, Lee foresaw great savings. Two months after his
initial report, Lee added that Wicksteed had acted irresponsibly by leaving so
much room for municipal growth in his scheme. Lee wrote that Wicksteed had
allowed for a fourfold increase in Leicester's population. This was an
unreasonable expenditure to Lee; it was "extravagant and full of injustice to the

51

existing

ratepayers."38

How Lee arrived at this population projection is no more

clear than how Wicksteed arrived at his, but from the 1851 census figures, Lee
thought that the system could accommodate up to 240,000 persons. As will be
seen below, the system proved dangerous with less than half of that population
level.
Lee urged the General Board to reject the proposed Wicksteedsystem in its
entirety. His report was the first volley in a series of battles between Chadwick's
General Board and Whetstone's Local Board. The General Board was victorious
in this first skirmish. Writing for the General Board on 13 February 1852, Henry
Austin informed Leicester that "[t]he General Board deeply regret the
inconvenience to which the Local Board will have been put by the preparation of
so imperfect, so wasteful, and so unsatisfactory a scheme; and by the necessity
which the general board consequently feel for declining to sanction a mortgage
for its execution."39 Austin also took this opportunity to accuse the Local Board
of being responsible for the delays in the General Board's actions. 40
Immediately after Austin's pronouncement on the Leicester scheme,
Wicksteed defended his plan before the Local Board. His correspondence to the
Local Board is largely a point by point rebuttal of Lee's objections, but he
prefaced all specific remarks by disclaiming, "I have abstained from personalities,
which are as undignified as they are unnecessary in making a plain statement of
LRO Pamphlets vol. 49, William Lee, Report to the General Board of Health on a Scheme for
the Drainage of Leicester, and the Conversion of the Sewerage Water thereof into Manure: also
Remarks on Mr. Wicksteed's Reply to the above-named Report (1852), 33. [hereafter LRO
Pamphlets vol. 49, Report ... also Remarks].
39 LRO Pamphlets vol. 49, Henry Austin, Report ... Respecting ... Scheme, 26.
38
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acts, or in arguing upon a scientific subject.',4 1 Without rehearsing Wicksteed's
technical disagreements with Lee, two points are worthy of mention: one notable,
the other notorious. The first of these is that Lee reviewed the "Preliminary
Report" (also called the "Printed Report"), in addition to the "Written Report,"
and criticized their inconsistencies. Wicksteed contended that the "Preliminary
Report" was relatively superficial and only the "Written Report" should have
been reviewed. The "Written Report" differed from the "Preliminary Report" not
only because it was more detailed, but because the projected reservoirs at the
works had been vastly reduced in surface area. This is notable because it
demonstrates that Wicksteed's technology, informed as it was by pythogenic
theory, changed over a relatively short period of time; there was no tried and true
method of sewage treatment in the early 1850s. The notorious aspect of
Wicksteed's rebuttal concerned the ability of the proposed system to handle the
combination of sewage and rainwater. Wicksteed claimed that Lee's concerns
about a great deluge would require sewer lines up to 26 feet in diameter to
sufficiently drain the town. More to the point, Wicksteed expressed his belief that
rainwater would "dilute" the sewage and make it less offensive. Dilution might
appear to have salubrious effects within a pythogenic framework because it would
weaken the smell. Of course dilution would have no helpful effects on the real
agents of disease, and any volume incapacities of the system would serve to
spread these agents to the extent that the system backed up.
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Wicksteed's defense of his proposed system meant nothing to the General
Board; it was addressed only to the Local Board. But the Local Board was not
cowed by the General Board. Having already secured Parliament's approval for a
scheme in 1851, Whetstone was not about to let Lee, Austin, and Chadwick
prevent Leicester from borrowing the necessary funds to get the system working.
In the spring of 1852, Joseph Whetstone proved to be a masterful politician,

marshalling his Local Board and outwitting the consummate bureaucrat, Edwin
Chadwick.
In late March, Whetstone approached the Local Board with four potential

responses to Austin's rejection of the scheme. First, they could meet with the
General Board to see if their differences could be overcome. Second, the Local
Board could petition Parliament to obtain the records of the General Board. The
purpose of this was said to be a suspicion that the General Board would approve
only plans that were drawn up by their staff engineers. Third, the Local Board
could submit Wicksteed's plans and the General Board could submit Lee's
objections to a mutually agreeable, impartial engineer for arbitration. Fourth, the
Local Board could do nothing and hope for a change in personnel or philosophy
within the General Board. 42 Scrapping the Wicksteed plan was not offered as a
potential response.
By his initiative, Whetstone kept the Local Board's debate within the
parameters of his proposed responses. Three of the four options were debated and
supported by some members of the town council. Opinions were floated about
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the high quality of Lee's report (Parker), the vindictiveness of Lee's report
(Moxon), and Lees apparent hypocrisy, seeming to approve the scheme while he
was in Leicester but denouncing it when he returned to Chadwick's London
(Crawford). Whetstone's third response, independent arbitration, escaped debate,
so the Alderman once again took the floor. Whetstone then presented his
strategy. The Local Board should humbly ask the General Board for the audience
mentioned in the first option. While there, the Local Board's deputation would
suggest putting the plan to an independent engineer. Whetstone told the Local
Board that its deputation should nominate the renowned railway engineer, Robert
Stephenson. Chadwick would find the name of Stephenson rather distasteful, 43
but if the proposed referral would appear spontaneous it would be difficult for
Chadwick to oppose such a celebrated name. Whetstone moved this plan and it
was quickly adopted.
In May 1852, the Leicester deputation was met in London by Chadwick, Dr.
Thomas Southwood Smith, and the chair, MP Lord John Manners. Leicester's
deputation consisted of members of the Highway and Sewerage Committee led by
Joseph Whetstone and Samuel Stone. According to Stone, the Leicester
deputation complained about the General Board's delays and Lee's report. In
Stone's account of the meeting, with its local viewpoint, Whetstone then put
forward his suggestion of an impartial engineer; either Stephenson or Rendel
would be acceptable. Lord Manners considered this idea to be "not at all
42
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unreasonable." Stone records no objections from Chadwick or Southwood
Smith, in fact they appear silent, and the Chair's opinion held sway. The
Leicester deputation departed the meeting and went directly to meet with
Stephenson. 44 Whetstone's strategy succeeded with ease.
On 26 May, Stephenson expressed his approval of the Wicksteed scheme; this
was something of a foregone conclusion since he was Whetstone's handpicked
arbiter. Despite Stephenson's endorsement of the scheme, the engineer
editorialized about the conduct of both sides: General and Local Boards were both
at fault. As an MP, Stephenson acknowledged the "transparently bitter feeling',4 5
between the two boards. With pomposity befitting an MP, Stephenson went on to
write that "it pains me more to trace a thread of acrimony running through the
negotiation, uncalled for, I think, in the part of the Local Board of Health,
although with provocation; and ... altogether undignified and unworthy on the part
of a General Board especially appointed to encourage and forward, and not to
thwart and delay, or, as has sometimes happened within my own knowledge,
altogether to stop improvements of a sanitary character.',46 Stephenson's approval
was essentially a go-ahead for the Wicksteed system; it was expected that he
would oppose Chadwick, but he did place some of the onus on the Local Board.
His distribution of guilt was not echoed in Leicester.
Finer, Life and Times, 380, 445. Finer points to disagreements and animosity between
Chadwick and the engineering profession generally as well as between Chadwick and Stephenson
specifically.
44 LRO Pamphlets vol. 49, Report of the Highway and Sewerage Committee of the Local Board of
Health for the Borough of Leicester. with 1.-A Report from Robert Stephenson. Esq. Civil
Engineer. 2.-Remarks on the Chemical Portion of Mr. Lee's Report, by Mr. Aikin and Dr. Taylor
(1852), 3-4. [hereafter LRO Pamphlets vol. 49, 1 Report ... 2 Remarks].
45 Ibid., 7.
43
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Throughout 1852 writers in Leicester defended the Local Board and attacked
the General Board. Regarding the problems between Wicksteed and Chadwick,
Stone wrote, "[a]t the time of [Wicksteed's] appointment, it was not known, or
even suspected, that any personal feeling of hostility existed towards him on the
part of any influential member of the General Board.',47 The Chronicle was clear
about whom it supported: "In vain does the Town Council persevere, with a
laudable wish to promote the public health, in promoting a well-matured,
carefully considered scheme, -there is a power which stands above it in the
metropolis which throws obstacles in its way, with a pertinacity that would do
honour to a better cause.',4 8 The Unitarian missionary Joseph Dare went so far as
to blame the General Board for working class people patronizing a folk-healer,
the "Wise Woman of Wing," for their ailments: "The London Board, by its
dilatoriness and needless objections to the proposed Drainage Scheme, has been
the best patron she has had in this neighborhood; for many here who visit her
have no positive disease, but are oppressed with the languid disenjoyment of
existence consequent upon malaria and undrained dwellings.',49 There are
numerous examples of poor opinions of the General Board emanating from
Leicester.
As the General Board had agreed to abide by Stephenson's decision,
construction began on the system in 1852. It was 1855 before the Wicksteed

Ibid., 12.
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48 LC, 4 September 1852.
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system was fully functional in Leicester. For much of the town the event was
eagerly anticipated, but MOH John Moore was displeased that many water closets
would not prove to be a link between a piped water supply and piped sewers. As
mentioned above, the water company sold only an "all or nothing" package,
showing no particular interest in public health for its own sake.so The Local
Board could do little to influence the water company; its independence was
perfectly legal. st Cesspools and middens remained but were reduced in the town,
and dry conservancy, from regularly emptied pail closets, would emerge as a
means of waste disposal.

In 1857, one year before the General Board's demise, the Wicksteed system in
Leicester was presented in Parliament as a possible national model.s 2 During the
hearings it was conservatively estimated that more than £30,000 had been
"necessary to bring the process to its present practical condition."s 3 It was also
claimed that Wicksteed could provide a similar system to a town of 500,000
people for £40,000.s 4 In 1857, only three other towns in Britain had sewerage
systems sufficiently comprehensive for the Royal Commission to consider as
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models. In terms of profitability none of them had results that were compelling
enough to form a technological consensus on sewage treatment.
Parliament's search for a generally accepted remedy on sewerage continued
into the 1860s. Many towns still had no system in the early 1860s and the
Wicksteed system continued to be evaluated. Testifying before the Select
Committee on the Sewage of towns on 12 May 1862, engineer and farmer Edwin

0. Tregelles observed that "chemically, the experiment at Leicester is a success; it
has cleansed the town, and it has materially lessened the mortality in the town; but
as a matter of pounds, shillings and pence, it is a loss; they are disappointed
there."55 Indeed Wicksteed's company was greatly disappointed. The concept of
"sewage for profit" was taking quite a beating in Leicester. Original calculations
valued the manure bricks at £2 per ton, but by this time the bricks were selling at
2 shillings per ton. 56 Wicksteed's company was realizing only 5% of ideal
revenue per unit. So the system that the company expected to realize £10,000 per
annum from in its first fifteen years (and double that figure per annum in the
second fifteen years), was quickly operating at a loss. 57 Moreover there was no
repeat business; "they sold it to fresh customers every time; that is to say, a man
used it, and then would not buy anymore."58 Tom Taylor, secretary to the Local
Government Board, testified on 16 June 1864, that the "dry manure which was
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produced at Leicester was next to

useless." 59

Taylor was also asked ifthere was

an exemplary sewage treatment process that the central government should apply
to provincial towns as a sort of template. He replied there was not. 60
In the 1860s the financial problems of the Wicksteed system continued to
mount while hints of its chemical failure began to be heard. First, Wicksteed's
private company "bugged out" of the project by turning it over to the corporation
in 1865. The corporation inherited the company's buildings and machinery at no
cost, but it also inherited a £2,000 annual expense to keep the system functional. 61
This £2,000 was equal to 15% of the corporation's entire annual expenditures in
the period before the Public Health Act of 1848 had been applied. Second, nonpecuniary deficiencies of the system began to be noticed in Leicester. R. A.
McKinley notes that by 1867 there were comments that the River Soar had
smelled bad for several years. 62 These two developments did not bode well for
Leicester's sewerage system. Moreover the man whose leadership on public
health issues had been so critical to this point, Joseph Whetstone, died in the
winter of 1868. Whetstone had been committed to "economy'' as well as
sanitation and his death occurred at the unfortunate time that the Wicksteed
system was open to criticism on both counts.
As problems in Leicester's system were becoming more pronounced some
other British towns were experiencing apparent success by a method of disposal
59
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known as sewage irrigation. By this method a town's sewage was drained or
pumped to rural areas where it would be allowed to percolate into the soil. On
this soil, which was perceived to be nutrient-enhanced, crops such as rye or hay
were cultivated for sale. This method would come to serve as the basis for a
generally accepted remedy on Victorian sewage disposal. The use of raw town
sewage for agricultural irrigation was perceived to bring two benefits. First, it
would ameliorate the problem of river pollution that came from imperfectly
treated sewage. 63 Second, it revived the notion of "sewage for profit."64
River pollution, or rather lawsuits arising from river pollution, provided the
impetus for many towns to initiate sewer systems. Christopher Hamlin has shown
that it was a norm for towns to resist such projects until they were forced to act by
court injunctions. 65 Indeed it was such a commonplace that Lord Robert Montagu
of the Select Committee on Metropolitan and Town Sewers were surprised to
learn that Leicester had not installed the Wicksteed system in response to such an
injunction. 66 While Hamlin's thesis looks bad in Whetstone's Leicester there
would come a time when the town would be forced to replace the Wicksteed
system on the basis of complaints about the condition of the River Soar.
"Sewage for profit" was a dream that refused to die and it was given extended
life by sewage irrigation systems. Lest we scoff at the tenacious notion of
"sewage for profit" we should perhaps consider how our own society hangs much
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of its commitment to the recycling of solid waste on the possibility of
recovering costs. 67 Before 1870 it was already obvious that farmers had little
interest in purchasing town sewage whether in solid or liquid form and the
opportunity afforded by irrigation, selling agricultural products rather than
fertilizer, provided an attractive alternative.
It is an intriguing but unanswerable question to ask how Leicester would have

reacted to the dual problems facing the Wicksteed system had Joseph Whetstone
survived. "Economy'' and public health were the foundations of his political life
and it is possible that the two issues could have dovetailed with regard to sewage
irrigation. Leicester had invested early and heavily in its sewerage system;
naturally there would be a reluctance to consider the efforts and expenditures on
the Wicksteed system as merely expensive mistakes. Could or would Whetstone
have led the town council decisively into a new era that would have required
further large investments? Sadly we shall never know.
Without Whetstone's leadership the Local Board was cognizant of problems
but hesitant to act. By 1869 the sheer cost of the Wicksteed system had induced
the corporation to commission civil engineer Baldwin Latham to design a new
sewerage scheme with the understanding that his experience was with irrigation
systems. 68 Latham' s proposal scheme would have made three important changes
in the Wicksteed system without laying entirely new sewers. The change that
PP I 864 vol. xiv, SCMTS, 176.
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appeared so divisive in 1870 was the conversion from lime slurry treatment to
agricultural irrigation. To the town this was the most expensive change in the
proposal because of the cost of the irrigation land. The Latham system offered
other farsighted opportunities. At the break from "high" land Leicester to "low"
land Leicester Latham proposed an intercepting sewer that would direct the
sewage to the existing "works" which would then become mere pumping stations
for the new irrigation system. Ultimately this intercepting sewer would have
prevented some of the worst human by-products from inundating the lower,
primarily working class, sections of the town. Latham also proposed that
rainwater from the lower sections be communicated directly to the river via new
lines, while the lower sections' sewage should continue to be directed through the
Wicksteed lines to the "works" and then to the irrigation farm. 69 By this strategy,
Latham's proposal may have addressed the most telling deficiencies of the
Wicksteed system. Amidst all the engineering subtleties and personal attacks,
William Lee's report of 1852 had pointed out that Wicksteed "admits the sewers
are neither adapted for the sewage alone, nor for the rain water; and he has failed
to prove their adaptation for a practical combination of the two."70
With scant attention to the rain/sewage problem the Chronicle urged the
adoption of the Latham irrigation scheme. Citing the pecuniary success of
irrigation systems at Croydon, Norwood, Aldershott, and Worthing, the Chronicle
proclaimed that a "very great improvement with the sanitary arrangements of our
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large towns is on the eve of being adopted in many parts of England. Whether
Leicester shall be foremost in the work or lag behind, depends upon the Town
Council and the ratepayers."71 The Lancet also heaped praise on Latham's
irrigation proposal. In 1870 the medical journal based its argument not on strictly
public health considerations but on cost-effectiveness and the devaluation of
manure. 72 Consensus was forming in some circles, but not in Leicester, and never
without reference to "sewage for profit."
The early 1870s witnessed fits and starts but little improvement in Leicester's
sewers. Nothing was done about Latham's proposal; it was considered too
expensive to rent the irrigation land. 73 The Lancet lamented:

It is confidently affirmed that the sewers are exceedingly foul, that they
are all but impervious [i.e., they were stagnant], that from insufficient
ventilation the gasses escape into the houses through defective service
drains, and that the single outlet is insufficient to take away the sewage
when it is increased to any considerable extent by rain. Some time ago the
subject of disposing of the sewage by irrigation was discussed; but, as
usual, the landowners of the district are so blind to their own interests as to
refuse to countenance the scheme. The Corporation is at this moment
threatened with legal proceedings, the river Soar being in a very polluted
state for many miles below the town. 74
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Rather than invest a large sum to initiate an entire revamping of the
Wicksteed system as Latham had proposed, the corporation contracted with the
Phosphate Sewage Company to chemically treat the sewage at the existing works.
The cost to the corporation was £1,000 per annum, less painful than the £6,312
annual estimate for Latham's system, but the corporation was still responsible for
the maintenance costs and rather than receiving a projected revenue of £24,000
per annum from irrigation products, the corporation would receive nothing. 75
The curious aspect of the decision to contract with the Phosphate Sewage
Company was that the company itself did not advocate its own treatment method
as an alternative to irrigation, but only as an adjunct to irrigation. 76 In fact, at
Tottenham the treatment had failed to meet national River Pollution Commission
standards for purity. 77 Clearly the corporation chose the less expensive means of
treatment. They had been promised the stars with Wicksteed's scheme, so
skepticism about Latham's scheme was not unreasonable in the early 1870s.
It can be argued that the Wicksteed experience jaded the Local Board into

minimal activity. I would further argue that the initial investment in the
Wicksteed system brought reluctance to invest in later potentially disappointing
schemes. Even partially remedial efforts were dealt with primarily with an eye to
parsimony. For example the Privy Council's inspector, Robert Rawlinson,
recommended venting sewer lines in the middle of roadways, but Leicester opted
for the less expensive method of ventilating the sewers through factory
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chimneys. 7s The health benefits of transferring backed-up sewer gasses from
basements to open-air ventilation are not measurable, but the factory chimneys
that were employed in 1872 were far more scattered than Rawlinson's suggested
street vents.
In 1873 there was a reputed falling out between Leicester and the Phosphate

Sewage Company for reasons that are unclear. This led the Local Board to
consider anew the prospect of a revamped system of sewerage. The Highway and
Sewerage Committee then sponsored a competition for a new scheme and the
winner of the 200 guinea prize was the local architect J.B. Everard. It is said that
a "modified version" of Everard's plan was submitted to Major Tulloch of the
Local Government Board and this inspector rejected it on the grounds that it was
too expensive and the raw sewage would be allowed to settle too close to the
burgeoning town ofBelgrave. 79
By 1874 there was growing pressure from outside Leicester. In early January
there was a written complaint from Belgrave, downstream of Leicester, to the
town council about the poor quality of the Soar.so This was merely a harbinger of
things to come. By March, the Leicester had implemented the "Rochdale system"
of human waste removal, a form of dry conservancy.s 1 By this method excreta
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was regularly collected at night in pails provided by the corporation. According
to Alderman Thomas Windley, chairman of the town council's recently formed
Sanitary Committee, the Rochdale system was far less desirable than water
closets, but the capacity of the water system to supply water closets was
questionable and Leicester's sewers were clearly inadequate. 82 The Rochdale
system was not exactly inexpensive for the corporation. Initially every landlord
who chose to participate in the Rochdale system was charged 10 shillings for the
original pail. Above that level the corporation absorbed the costs. Within a
month the cost to landlords had dropped to 5s. 83 Landlords reveled in such an
alternative to real improvements; by April there were 1,050 Rochdale pick-ups
ordered. 84 This dry conservancy method did not expire for many years and
neither did it solve the more expensive problem of the sewerage system.
Additionally in 1874, Leicester played host to the Midlands district chapter of
the Association of Municipal and Sanitary Engineers. At this meeting the
engineers were treated to a tour of the Wicksteed "works," which the Borough
Surveyor, E.L. Stephens, claimed that he had spent seventeen years improving. 85
Responding to a revealing question from one of the guests, Stephens explained
that the process took two years to compress and dry every single year's solid
sewage. 86 In addition to this precarious lag time, the poor marketability of the
manure bricks eventually led to an excess inventory of 5,000 tons of processed
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sewage. 87

Thus both the wet and the dried sewage were creating bottlenecks in

this troubled system.
If 1874 was a year of retrenchment and complacency, 1875 was a year of
positive drama regarding the Leicester sewerage system. The Local Board
commissioned yet another proposal for a new scheme. This time it was the
venerable Sir Joseph W. Bazalgette, architect of the vaunted London system, who
was hired to submit a plan. Ironically Bazalgette's scheme for the metropolis was
based on Wicksteed's conceptions of intercepting main lines and steam powered
pumps. 88 Moreover Baldwin Latham had based part of his proposal on the
perceived success of the capital's new system. The problem with Bazalgette's
plan for Leicester was most obviously the expense. The investment by the
corporation for this scheme would have involved some £300,000. 89
After quickly rejecting Bazalgette's scheme, the corporation moved to include
several nearby towns in its 1875 sewage proposal; significantly all of these towns
were upstream ofLeicester. 90 Meanwhile, the Buck-Franklin report, which will
be treated in greater depth later in this dissertation, accused the "imperfect
outfall" (i.e., poor drainage due to too gentle a fall to the River Soar) of the
existing system of being the prime cause in the town's excessive infant
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mortality. 91 But the Local Board, led by the Tory William Winterton, was more
decisive in its effort to fully acquire the waterworks company rather than to
undertake an expensive reworking of the sewerage system. While water supply
turned a profit, sewage remained a financial loser. 92
The devastating floods oflate July 1875 returned attention to the sewerage
system. In a town known for flooding the Chronicle observed that the inundation
was the worst in twenty-three years. 93 The connection between this natural
disaster and its attendant cost to public health was publicized and pointedly
directed at sewerage deficiencies by the newspaper. Immediately after the floods,
the Chronicle's rhetoric became more strident. The newspaper editorialized "that
the evils arising from the defects in the sewerage system, in the low-lying
districts, have again been alarmingly intensified and multiplied by such
inundations, with their inevitable trail of disease germs. " 94 A week later, the
newspaper was replete with references to the flood and its effects. The "long
neglected question of sewerage reform" should convince the corporation "that
they are rapidly approaching a crisis, when no mere half-measures, or patchwork
additions to the present costly and inadequate system will avail." Further, "[s]o
clear, indeed, is the connection between the choked-up sewers, the excessive
mortality among infants, and the wide prevalence of disease among adults, that
the inevitable cost of the delay of 'six or seven years' may be roughly gauged in
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the sacrifice of hundreds of human lives, and a degeneration in the stamina of
adults so great as it is incalculable."95 The Chronicle used the disaster to again
advocate irrigation; "[m ]any schemes will doubtless be considered only to be
sooner or later rejected; but there is only one which has no stood the test of
practical application ... and that is sewage irrigation. 96
The Chronicle did not speak for the corporation of Leicester. The Tory
Alderman William Winterton claimed that flood victims were "very much in the
hands of providence"97 but the corporation had "done its duty" if it did not "inflict
too heavy taxation on them [the ratepayers] to get these alterations made."98
Beyond that, "they must leave the rest to Providence. " 99 Although the Liberals
outnumbered the Conservatives by 36 to 20 in the 1875 town council, Alderman
Winterton's fatalism spoke for the Local Board in the pages of the Liberal paper.
The Chronicle printed Winterton's remarks in support of its own political position
on public health, yet it is significant that Winterton's do-nothing approach was
satisfactory to the Local Board as a whole. Moreover, in 1876, Winterton would
be the first Conservative mayor elected by the reformed corporation. While no
significant changes in Leicester's sewerage system occurred in 1875 the legacy of
that year would only add to the pressures on the town to reform its system.
Fits and starts continued through the 1870s, but fits were becoming more
frequent, and starts less convincing. Alfred Ellis, writing in 1876, complained
Ibid.
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that "[t]he impurity of the river at Belgrave has been increasing with the
population of Leicester." 100 In Belgrave, "[f]or many years past, during the
summer months, the annoyance from the river has been very great, and as the
evening vapour rises the stench is often sickening." 101 Dr. Sloane, a member of
the town council and a physician, criticized the sewerage system for its inability
to handle heavy rainfall; pumps at the "works" were inadequate to dispose of the
untreated "liquid," so floodgates would be opened and raw sewage was
communicated with the Soar. 102 While I might criticize Dr. Sloane's theory of
disease transmission later in this dissertation, there is no reason to doubt his
powers of observation.
When John Storey, Samuel Stone's eventual long-term replacement as town
clerk, reflected on 1877 he wrote that a mere extension of the Wicksteed "works"
enabled the Corporation to "drag on" for some few years without solving, or
without making any great effort to solve, the difficult problem which lay before
them as to an improved sewerage system." 103 In 1878, strengthened by Dr.
William Johnston's "Zymotic Report," the Chronicle averred that a new
"sewerage scheme is year after year laboriously struggling into birth." 104 The
Local Board was no longer running contests or consulting with eminent engineers
about the sewerage system; Borough Surveyor E.L. Stephens, the one who had
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been "improving" the Wicksteed system for decades, was the man responsible
for the system. It would be too simple to blame Stephens for the recalcitrance of
the entire town; Stephens was a functionary of the town and his actions were
consistent with the councilors who were content to tinker with the ineffectual
system since the 1860s.
Yet Stephens' death in 1880 ushered in an era of enthusiasm and innovation. 105
Stephens' successor, Joseph Gordon, immediately embarked on a program to
flush and ventilate the existing sewers at an approximate cost of £12,000. 106 This
began as the stench in Leicester had reached the point where "we must e'en hold
our noses and open our mouths" according to one Robert Read. 107 By the time
Gordon took the position, local reformers, neighboring towns, and finally the
central government increased pressure on the town to make more far-reaching
improvements and there were plenty of examples of more successful sewerage
systems.
In the cleansing and ventilating project, Gordon exhibited the imagination that
would characterize his later work. Not content with Rawlinson's recommended
sewer vents, Gordon placed them in the streets twice as frequently as the inspector
suggested. 108 Moreover, the surveyor set upon the separation of storm drains
from foul sewers, laying 4.93 miles of new lines. 109 The first comprehensive
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cleansing of the Wicksteed system caused numerous cases of diarrhoea, and
four cases of typhoid, among the workmen, 110 but led some observers to praise the
improved flow of the lines and the reduced pressure for the lines to handle both
sewage and storm runoff. 111
Despite the apparent successes of the cleansing and ventilating project
neighboring towns still lodged numerous complaints about the condition of the
River Soar. The Local Government Board convened an investigation in Leicester
at the behest of Belgrave and Barrow-upon Soar in 1884. Belgrave acted for both
towns as the "complainant" before the Local Government Board inspector and
arbiter of the dispute, Major Tulloch, while John Storey acted as the "defense" for
Leicester. The proceedings were nothing if not adversarial. Belgrave presented
witnesses testifying to the river's pollution and argued that Leicester, as the cause
of the nuisance, was responsible for its rectification. Storey countered with a
lengthy defense that mixed legalisms and a litany of excuses. One curious feature
of Storey's defense was that he called Islington's MOH, Dr. C.M. Tidy, to testify
that Leicester's sewage treatment was superior to irrigation. Leicester's MOH,
Dr. Johnston, was present at the hearing, but was not called to testify. Johnston's
criticism of the system may have forced Storey to search farther afield for a
supporter. Following the hearings Tulloch toured the Soar and the "works."
Ultimately, the inspector ruled against Leicester. 112 This binding ruling by an
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agent of the central government would mark the beginning of the end for the
Wicksteed system.
Joseph Gordon was obviously prepared for such an eventuality. Before the
end of the year, the Borough Surveyor presented eight possible new sewerage
schemes to the Highway and Sewerage Committee. All eight of the potential
systems conformed to Tulloch's insistence that the sewage be put into an
irrigation system, regardless of whether or not it was treated chemically.
Tulloch's point was that chemical treatment was not at a state that sewage, treated
or untreated, should be fed back into the Soar. Inexplicably, Dr. Tidy was now in
full agreement with the consensus on irrigation. Gordon's proposals would have
cost between £116,700 and £229,600 to construct, with an additional £100,000 or
more for the irrigation land itself. 113
In the mid- l 880s, the Chronicle proclaimed that the "[ s]anitary reformers are
now a power in the borough." 114 This is probably most evident in the town's
hiring practices at the time. Gordon was an innovator; his contemporary, Dr.
Johnston, was a famed innovator; and Johnston's successor, Dr. Henry Tomkins,
was that rare combination of scientist and practitioner. The town was less
decisive in other matters. The Highway and Sewerage Committee wrangled over
Gordon's proposals and submitted an incomplete plan to Tulloch in 1885. Rather
than delay the process by requiring that every nuance of the plan be set forth in
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great detail as had the General Board at mid-century, Inspector Tulloch
approved the scheme and returned it to the Local Board for finalization. 115
By early 1886 the council had honed down the eight Gordon proposals.
Sewage irrigation was accepted as the method of treatment and Beaumont Leys
was accepted as the site for the irrigation. The final point of dispute was whether
to lay entirely new sewer lines or to extend the storm sewer lines of Gordon's
cleansing and ventilating program. Gordon himself was polite but firm; 14.761
miles of entirely new sewer mains were essential. 116 The town council accepted
this most expensive provision of Gordon's scheme and spent a great deal to
acquire rights to the Beaumont Leys irrigation farm, but the lines that were laid
were somewhat less expensive than state of the art glazed earthenware pipes. 117 A
combination of brick and pipe were used on the new system, but the main lines
were primarily pipe. With this final nod to "economy," Leicester embarked on a
sewerage solution that, when completed in 1891, would remain in operation until
1965.
If a moral can be inferred from Leicester's sewerage experience in the more
than four decades from 1848 to 1891, it is not a rosy commendation of innovation.
Innovation, pushed through on the strength of Wicksteed' s vaunted engineering
reputation and Whetstone's tenacity and good intentions, left Leicester saddled
with an inefficient and ultimately dangerous scheme. But such "heroes" are only
part of the explanation. Two concepts, that is two socially constructed
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phenomena, proved decisive. First the early and durable consensus around
"sewage for profit," made it possible for Whetstone to push through Wicksteed's
system as an economically palatable solution. Second, the eventual development
of a generally accepted remedy around irrigation highlighted the defects of the
Wicksteed system and permitted at last the move to a different system.
"Sewage for profit" was clearly a consensual concept in the mid-nineteenth
century. While sewerage reform was recognized as a boon to public health, it was
not divorced from pecuniary gain in this period. In fact, Dr. Henry Tomkins,
Leicester's MOH, visited Berlin's sewage irrigation farm in 1890 to see if the
Germans' profits could be duplicated in the Midlands. 118 At mid-century,
reformers such as Chadwick, engineers such as Wicksteed, and local leaders such
as Whetstone, all sought a sizable recompense for the expenditure of money on a
sewerage scheme. Sewage turned out not to be profitable, except in Berlin, and it
was necessary for the idea to lose its untouchable status before real solutions
could take its place.
By the late 1860s a generally accepted remedy had developed around sewage
irrigation as a method of treatment. Although "sewage for profit," or at least to
break even, remained a secondary goal, irrigation was proving to be a salubrious
way to dispose of waste. While no disposal method could compensate for poorly
designed sewer lines, an irrigation system permitted the percolation of transmitted
waste into the subsoil in locations where it could do little harm. Thus, one of the
great problems of Victorian towns, river pollution, could be ameliorated along
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with the removal of dangerous waste products from residential areas. It should
be remembered that river pollution was at least one of the most important driving
forces in sanitary reform; this is evident from Hamlin's study as well as the
"Great Stink" of the Thames in 1858. What made Leicester unique, and dictated
so much of its sewerage history, was that the town did not wait for some private
or corporate party to take it to court before it initiated its sewerage project. But
by 1884, it would take neighboring towns and the Local Government Board to
pressure the town council into another major investment in sewerage. The price
for precocity was high. Evident failure in the 1860s was not enough to change the
system. An accepted remedy in the 1870s did not excite the town to activity
because it was deemed too expensive. Natural disaster in 1875 could not end
indecisiveness. A changing of the guard in 1880 only brought partial measures.
Only outside pressure, in 1884, could force Leicester to drastically re-work the
system it had fought so hard for in mid-century. Hamlin is vindicated in this tale;
extra-corporation action was eventually necessary to make Leicester conform to
the accepted remedy, but it is a different tale from Hamlin's. Leicester was
vigorous and innovative in the shadow of 1848; it was strong and independent,
more independent than the General Board of Health would have liked. But once
such a dramatic and expensive scheme had been put in place it was not easy to
admit, and even more difficult to pay for, failure. We cannot know if the broad
shoulders of Whetstone and Stone could have changed the council's actions; we
do know that no one quite took their places.
118
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3. "The Interests of the Proprietary:" water supply1

Leicester's initial experiment in providing sewerage for the borough was a
joint public and private venture. The municipality played the lead role in the
venture, originating the idea, raising the capital, and pushing the scheme through
parliament, although Thomas Wicksteed's private company was to handle the
operation of the system and share in its profits. Members of the town council,
which doubled as the Local Board of Health, sought to improve drainage in order
to improve the health of Leicester's citizens, but the councilmen also believed that
the sewer system would pay for itself over time. Ultimately, they believed that
health and cleanliness would improve without excessively burdening the
borough's ratepayers. Thus, they believed that sewerage would prove to be a
wash, both physically and financially. Providing fresh water to the borough did
not dovetail with sewerage as we might expect it to today. From the 1840s to the
late 1870s, water supply to Leicester was more a matter of profit than it was a
matter of public health. Leicester's fresh water supply, for these three decades,
existed for _the benefit of shareholders in the Waterworks Company, not for the
so-called "general public."
Indeed, the general public would have to conform to the Waterworks
Company's specifications to receive fresh, piped water supplies. Not all the
potential consumers met the specifications. Many of the borough's residents
rented their homes and therefore depended upon landlords to provide piped water
1 Minutes

of the Waterworks Company, 1847-1858, [hereafter WW Minutes], n.p., [26 May
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if it was to come at all. Others tried unsuccessfully to use piped water for some
purposes, but not all. The Waterworks Company often stood as an obstacle to
improved public health from its inception until the borough purchased this utility
in 1878. The Waterworks Company represented one public, its investors who had
good reason to expect a profit from the investment. The town council, led by
Joseph Whetstone until his departure, represented another public, the people of
Leicester. After Whetstone died in 1868, it took another ten years for the borough
to wrest the borough's water supply away from the company. Until 1878, profit
triumphed over public health.
As we shall see, the early arrangements between the town and the Waterworks
Company resembled a sort of Speenhamland system to protect the Company's
shareholders as though they were paupers facing the ravages of capitalism. In this
odd sort of outdoor relief, the town council pledged that all of Leicester's
ratepayers would underwrite the profits of those who had the funds and the
inclination to invest in the Company. The borough entered into a contract that
assured a profit of at least four per cent per annum for every share purchased.
Though profit motivated the Waterworks Company, Victorians generally
assumed that a fresh, piped water supply from the countryside would be healthier
than polluted urban wells. In Leicester these were the only choices available.
Therefore, both the town council and the company's directors desired a fresh
water system for the borough. The Waterworks Company officially incorporated
in 1846, but preliminary surveys for a reservoir and piping were completed in
1854], Leicestershire Record Office [hereafter LRO], CM 43/1.
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1845. 2 The incorporation date proved quite significant for the future of
Leicester's fresh water supply. The Waterworks Clauses Act of 1847 passed
parliament and provided a "template" for the establishment of private, local water
companies. 3 By September of 1847, the Leicester Waterworks Company had
fulfilled all of the Act's requirements. The Act precluded the establishment of
municipal waterworks operations where private companies existed to provide
such services. Therefore, the Local Board of Health could not control Leicester's
fresh water supply, but could only act in a supporting role, by guaranteeing profits
to those who bought shares in the Company. Members of the Local Board, led by
Joseph Whetstone, were anxious to provide the town with piped water and would
have preferred to be the ones taking the important decisions, but they also
respected the Victorian cultural norm regarding private enterprise. Since the law
favored private waterworks companies, the Local Board willingly became a junior
partner in the Leicester Waterworks Company by buying unsold shares and
ensuring the profitability of shares sold to the public in order to get the water
flowing expediently.
Joseph Whetstone, a prominent worsted manufacturer, led a faction of the
town council known as the "economists." Whetstone's group opposed a group
known as the "improvers." The labels proved ironic; Whetstone's faction insisted
that improvements in municipal sanitation take place before other, more cosmetic,
improvements. The "improvers," led by John and William Biggs, sought

2
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expenditures on projects such as a new building to replace the Tudor era town
hall. Though Whetstone and the Biggs brothers were staunch Liberals and
Unitarians, and the Biggs' vision conformed to the so-called "civic gospel,"
Whetstone managed to place his agenda close to the top of the borough's priority
list. 4 Four members of the town council were accepted by the company's
founders among the sixteen directors of the Waterworks Company in 1847. From
the existing records of the nascent Waterworks Company and the records of the
town council this seems mysterious; neither source makes mention of this
arrangement in 1847. By 1850, the connection between the two would be
contractually clear. The council's Local Board of Health used ratepayers' funds
to purchase nearly a third interest in the Company and guaranteed profits to
Company shareholders. In 1847, Mayor Joseph Fielding, Aldermen Whetstone,
Harris, and Hudson joined the waterworks directorship. Fielding and Hudson
never attended directors' meetings; Whetstone's input was noteworthy, if not
influential, upon decisions taken by the directors.
In the summer of 1847, the directors, under the chairmanship of John Taylor,

hired an engineer, Thomas Hawkesley, to formally propose a reservoir site and
submit a plan for the implementation of a piped water system. 5 By October, the
directors, parliament, and Her Majesty's Office of Woods, "after a most searching
investigation," approved ofHawkesley's plan. 6 The approved capital outlay

4 For the "civic gospel," see E.P. Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons: Ideal and Reality in
Nineteenth-Century Government, {London: Edward Arnold, 1973; reprint, Ann Arbor: UMI,
1991).
5 WW Minutes, LRO CM 43/1, 1-2.
6 Ibid., 3.
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amounted to £80,000. 7 However, the directors believed that the "existing
derangement of the monetary affairs of the Kingdom," made implementation of
the scheme impracticai at that time. 8 They shelved the plan until 1848.
Meanwhile, the national Public Health Act of 1848 was before parliament. The
directors appointed a subcommittee to watch the progress of the Act. In March of
1848, the subcommittee raised no objections to the Act, but by May they found
that the Act's revised language would allow the municipality itself to organize
and operate a waterworks system. The directors, over Whetstone's objection,
directed the company's clerk, Mr. Loseby, to lobby Leicester's MPs to adjust the
Act's language. 9 Minor alterations in the language of the Act, made at the behest
of less than twenty individuals, allowed the company to maintain its monopoly.
Loseby succeeded in his efforts and the final form of the Act kept the Waterworks
Company legal, while permitting the newly formed Local Board of Health to have
a supporting voice.
Once the Company's legal status seemed secure, the directors produced a
telling, though private, mission statement. This 1849 document made it clear that
the directors sought profit on two levels. The directors included some of the
borough's leading manufacturers; these gentlemen expected direct profit from the
sale of Company water and indirect profit from arising from improved economy
in industrial production. They explicitly addressed this second objective by
stating that "the necessity for an improved water supply in Leicester is daily

Ibid., 14.
Ibid., 3.
9 Ibid., 5, 7.
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increasing - the present supply is diminishing- the springs are becoming more
contaminated - [thus] the manufacturers are losing the advantages to be derived
from a larger and better supply." 10 By establishing the Waterworks Company, the
directors seemed to have obtained the best of all possible worlds. That is, they
could improve health amongst the borough's residents, they could potentially
realize a substantial return on their investments in the Company, and they could
collaterally increase the competitiveness of their industrial investments. The
Local Board had no objection to any of these goals, but Whetstone and his
supporters prioritized differently from the directors.
By May of 1850, the Local Board queried the Company's directors about the
plans and the timetable for implementation. The directors submitted Hawkesley's
scheme to the Board, who, in turn, submitted the scheme to Thomas Wicksteed
for his opinion. Wicksteed and Hawkesley were among the most respected
Victorian civil engineers. 11 Wicksteed and Hawkesley were also engineering
competitors. The Local Board had already contracted with Wicksteed to provide
the borough with sewerage and obviously trusted his judgment in matters
pertaining to pipes and pumps. Yet, Hawkesley would prove to be Leicester's
water supply engineer for decades to come.
Not surprisingly, the two engineers disagreed on several issues. Wicksteed
criticized Hawkesley's Thornton reservoir site because of expense, size, and water
quality. Wicksteed argued that using the River Soar's water would be cheaper

Ibid., 15.
For Wicksteed, see the chapter on Leicester's sewerage. For Hawkesley, see Malcolm Elliott,
Victorian Leicester (London: Phillimore and Co., 1979), 62.
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than building a reservoir, that the river could support a much greater population
than could the Thornton reservoir, and that the river water's hardness would
prevent the degradation of lead pipes. These issues merit individual consideration
below. Moreover, Wicksteed characteristically suggested using a steam engine to
pump Soar water into the town as opposed to Hawkesley's gravitational plan from
Thornton. Wicksteed calculated the initial capital outlay for the engine, pipes,
and sundry fixtures at £43,000. Hawkesley's Thornton proposal dropped to an
initial £65,000; this was down from his original estimate of £80,000 because of a
fall in the cost of pipes. Hawkesley's response to the expense issue was that
Wicksteed's pumping scheme would cost £2,500 per annum to maintain, while
the gravitational system would cost only £800 per annum. 12
Wicksteed contended that the proposed Thornton reservoir could supply the
needs of only 76,000 citizens. He further argued that Leicester's population
would grow to 145,000 by 1880 and 320,000 by 1910. Hawkesley considered
these population projections outrageous. From hindsight, Wicksteed's projections
were wrong, but not so wrong as Hawkesley imagined. Hawkesley rebutted
Wicksteed by saying that the directors had charged him with finding a water
supply for 80,000 inhabitants; the Thornton reservoir could supply not only those
80,000, but up to 100,000. Moreover, Hawkesley asserted adamantly that any
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Thomas Hawksley, "Leicester Water Works. Report of Mr. Hawksley, [sic] C.E. to the
Directors," 15 June 1850, LRO Pamphlets, vol. 50, 10-11. From these estimates, the Wicksteed
system would cost £93,000 over twenty years and the Hawkesley system would cost £81,000.
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attempt to plan beyond a generation would prove futile. 13 Both engineers'
projections were flawed.
Wicksteed believed that the Soar's harder water would fare better with lead
pipes than Thornton's softer water. Untreated Soar water tested at 33 grains of
solids per imperial gallon, while untreated Thornton water tested at 16 grains per
gallon. Employing Wicksteed's lime slurry method of purification, treated Soar
water measured 16 grains per gallon and treated Thornton water, 7 grains.
Hawkesley disagreed with Wicksteed's premise; he argued that soft water
improved health. Hawkesley noted that other towns sought and used water that
tested at one to four grains per gallon. Moreover, Hawkesley preferred a sand
filtration system to Wicksteed' s patented lime slurry method. 14
Finally, Hawkesley argued, the Company had already paid the parliamentary
costs of a local bill for the Thornton reservoir; changing to Wicksteed's scheme
would necessitate another expensive act of parliament. The Company's engineer
claimed that only one potential obstacle stood in the way of the Thornton project,
that the owners of the Thornton property might demand exorbitant prices for the
reservoir land. The Local Board found that Hawkesley's responses to
Wicksteed's objections were satisfactory and Hawkesley won the contract.
Nonetheless, the obstacle that concerned Hawkesley materialized in the person
of Lord Maynard. Two landowners, Lord Maynard and a Mr. Chamberlain,
controlled the seventy acres planned for the reservoir in the Sparkenhoe Hundred,
Ibid. Hawkesley based his projections on the need for eighteen gallons per person per day with
a 180 day reserve.
13
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nearly due west of Leicester. Both landowners balked at the Company's
offered purchase prices, but Chamberlain proved more amenable to negotiation. 15
The Company considered invoking the eminent domain powers of the Lands
Clauses and Consolidation Act to force the sale because of the perceived urgency
to break ground on the project. The directors claimed that such urgency arose
from four immediate needs: first, the convenience and comfort of Leicester's
inhabitants coming from indoor and perpetual supplies of soft water; second, so
that an ample water supply would be available "in the calamity of fire;" third, to
increase the facilities and advantages of the "staple manufacturers;" fourth, that
the "sanitary habits of the people may be promoted and improved." 16 The
directors made clear their priorities from this statement, but Hawkesley urged
them to avoid using the Land Clauses Act because he had seen landowners extort
money from railroad companies that had employed the Act. 17 Hawkesley favored
an abandonment of the scheme rather than an invocation of the Act. The directors
continued to negotiate with the landowners. Ultimately, in 1850, the directors'
agent reached a settlement with Chamberlain and Lord Maynard's agent at the
selling prices of £150 per acre including mineral rights from Chamberlain and
£ 100 per acre excluding mineral rights from Lord Maynard's agent. 18 For a
moment, the land purchase appeared settled.

14 Ibid., 3-5. Hawkesley's sand filtration system is closer to current practices than Wicksteed's
lime slurry.
15 The directors offered Lord Maynard £85 per acre and Chamberlain £80 per acre.
16 WW Minutes, LRO CM 43/1, 21-22.
17 Hawkesley, LRO Pamphlets, vol. 50, [14.]
18 WW Minutes, LRO CM 43/1, 23-30.
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This moment of apparent settlement proved illusory, but it sufficed to bring
the Local Board into the aforementioned contractual relationship with the
Waterworks Company. The Local Board of Health had begun naming four of the
Company's sixteen directors in 1847 and the contract of October 1850 formalized
this arrangement. In 1847, this concession by the Company seemed
magnanimous at best, mysterious by other measures. By 1850, magnanimity and
mystery evaporated. The Public Health Act of 1848 permitted local boards to
levy rates or borrow against future rates for large public works projects. The
directors knew the provisions of this Act as early as 1847. Therefore, the
directors welcomed the Local Board's minority position on the board. Knowing
that Whetstone was committed to an improved water supply for the borough, the
directors saw a fail-safe method of financing their operation. Indeed, Whetstone
found himself in a difficult position. Precluded from establishing a municipally
'

owned water company because of the "grandfather" clause of the 1847
waterworks act, Whetstone could do little more than use borough funds to buy a
stake in the Company.
The contract of 1850 gave the Local Board the power to name twenty-five per
cent of the Company's directors which corresponded to the borough's ability to
purchase twenty-five per cent of shares in the Company, should those shares
remain unsold to private investors. The Company offered three thousand, two
hundred shares at the rate of £25 per share. 19 The directors expressed their hope
that municipal investment would not materialize, but they extracted further
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concessions from the Local Board that solidified a return to private investors.

In return for its stake in the Waterworks Company, the Local Board guaranteed a
minimum shareholders' dividend of five per cent for each of the first three years
and a minimum of four per cent per annum for the next twenty-seven years.
Should profits exceed these minimums, the Company and the Local Board would
split the excess. 20 This contract necessitated a new local act of parliament,
obtained in May 1851. Though a majority of the directors approved of the
contract, they wanted the Local Board's guarantee on returns to attract private
investors, not the Local Board's influence on Company policy. 21 But the
investing public did not buy enough shares to bring the Company to full
capitalization; the Local Board purchased the final 680 shares, which amounted to
32% of the £80,000 at issue. 22
As the Company settled the matter of its own finances, the arrangement to
purchase the Thornton site became unsettled. Though Lord Maynard's agent
accepted the Company's 1850 offer, Maynard himselfrejected it. Ultimately, the
directors invoked the Lands Clauses Act in early 1852. Pursuant to the provisions
of the Act, the county sheriff summoned a jury to determine the value of the
property. The jury finished its work in February, but the directors soon
discovered "that Lord Maynard's Title was not in a state to enable him ... to
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complete the Conveyance."23 The directors, already irritated by Lord
Maynard's previous antics, bore the expense of clearing the title. On 28 April
1852 the Company paid Maynard £6,258 and took possession of the land. 24
Well before the Thornton reservoir land legally passed into the hands of the
Company, the directors began the search for and purchase of needed supplies. As
it was with the other start-up ingredients of Leicester's water, obtaining supplies
proved troublesome. The directors' first step was to solicit bids for iron pipes
manufactured according to Hawkesley' s specifications. In January 1851, the
Company's clerk wrote directly to iron manufacturers, advertised in four
newspapers, and placed an ad in the Mining Joumal. 25 The directors accepted
bids from the Cochrane and the Clayton companies, later supplemented by
purchases from Oakes and Company. 26 By November, the manufacturers began
filling the orders. Work had not yet commenced, of course, and the directors had
to pay storage costs on miles of iron pipes. In December, an entire shipment of
pipes fractured during the process of unloading; the rail carrier refused to unload
more pipes and this expense then fell to the Company. 27 By early 1852, the iron
pipe manufacturers began seeking payment for their products. The directors saw
fit only to authorize payments amounting to seventy-five per cent of the value of
unbroken pipes already delivered. This decision led to payments of £932 in
February to Cochrane and Clayton, £2,258 in April to Cochrane, Clayton, and
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Oakes, and £3,026 in June to the three

manufacturers. 28

The directors

continued their policy of paying 75% on delivered materials, sometimes months
after delivery, and the manufacturers fulfilled their contractual obligations. When
the directors sought to purchase an additional thousand pipes from Clayton, his
company "declined to execute any further orders. " 29
Familiarity with the Leicester Waterworks Company bred contempt among
some suppliers. Yet, Thomas Holland submitted a bid, later accepted, for the
borough's water mains and the firm of Tomlinson and Harpur successfully bid on
the construction of the Thornton reservoir. By May 1852, the mains were being
laid and ground was broken on the Thornton reservoir. 30 These "advances" led to
more problems. The "magistrates at Market Bosworth ... appointed a Special
Constable at Thornton in consequence of so many persons being employed at the
Works there." 31 The High Constable of Leicestershire determined that the
Waterworks Company should pay the special constable's salary for six months;
by July, the Company additionally was obligated to pay the entire Thornton poor
rate. 32 The High Constable's decision created the unusual situation whereby
Leicester's ratepayers became the guarantors of the Thornton poor rate.
Ultimately, the Company's obligations lay upon the bedrock of the contract with
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the Local Board. These arrangements continued as reservoir construction
continued for another year. 33
The quantity and quality of the borough's potable water deteriorated during the
construction. Unitarian missionary, Joseph Dare, wrote
I have heard during the summer [of 1852] innumerable complaints of the
failure of this indispensable element: quantity and quality are both at fault.
I can speak feelingly here, for my own supply has failed every week for a
long time. A person whom I regularly visit complains that fourteen
houses in his locality are without a pump, and he is obliged literally
to steal his water when the possessors of private pumps are out of the
way. Another intelligent friend residing in quite a different part of the
town, complains of water, "not fit to drink," for his own and a dozen
other households. 34
Dare recognized that Leicester's water problems threatened health but, ever the
optimist, he asserted that "[t]he completion of the Water Works will be a great
blessing to the town." 35
The directors expected this blessing to be functional by May 1853, but further
delays meant that the system did not begin operation until December 1853. 36 In
November, the directors established the rules, regulations, and rates for
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Wateiworks

customers. 37

The Company would be responsible for all pipes

from the mains to those laid up to six inches inside homes. Customers were
responsible for plumbing within homes, but had to conform to the Company's
specifications. For example, the directors mandated valves and cocks made of
brass. Moreover, the directors specified that
No plumber or other workman will be allowed to do or perform any work
connected with the supply of water, till he shall have been admitted,
enrolled, and published by the Directors, as 'an authorized Water Works
plumber', and shall have entered into a written engagement to conform to
and comply with the Rules and Regulations
of the Company. The Company would inspect interior plumbing at customers'
expense. Should inspectors find rules violations, or if a plumber balked at
providing the Company with information, the plumber's "name will be erased
(and] forthwith advertized as so struck off." Though the Company rigorously
enforced their regulations upon consumers and contractors, the directors proved
flexible about the self-imposed promise to customers that the water supply would
be constant unless unavoidably interrupted by pipe ruptures or repairs.
In setting the rules, the directors seemed very protective of their water. Waste
was their enemy. To combat "waste," they prohibited overflow pipes, insisted
that bathtubs be watertight, and demanded that bathtubs be constructed so that
water could not simultaneously flow in and drain out of tubs. Water closets
especially garnered the directors' attention. Company water could only be
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provided where wc's were designed to "prevent the waste, or undue
consumption of water." Consequently, the directors approved only two types
among the many patented wc's; the directors accepted only the "Pan Closet" and
the "Selfacting Closet." Without going into detail about various types of wc's,
suffice it to say that the two approved were efficient as measured by water usage
and were largely indiscriminate concerning disposal. Both models flushed with
piped water collected in service cisterns. Where the effluent went was not a
concern of the Waterworks Company, so long as "the return of foul air and other
noisome and impure matter into the mains, or other pipes of the Company" did
not occur. 38 The legal and conceptual differentiation between water supply and
sewerage persisted throughout the Waterworks Company's existence and
postponed some of the health benefits that eventually arose once the two systems
communicated.
The directors set rates for residential customers by the homes' rental values
and the presence of certain amenities, rather than by the volume of water
consumed. The Company based charges for large businesses, infirmaries, and
workhouses upon consumption as measured by volume meters, but dwellings
were on a fixed rate. Table 3.1 illustrates the original schedule ofresidential
rates. As Table 3.1 shows, the fixed charge per quarter increased with the value
of the dwelling, but not in proportional increments. The directors defensively
explained to the shareholders "that [as] a good supply of Water to the Poor was
calculated to improve the Sanitary condition of the Town, your Directors have
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fixed the Rates upon Cottage Property very low, and they have no doubt that in
doing so they have best consulted the interests of the Proprietary."39 Yet the rates,
though not flat, were regressive. The relative cost of Company water supply and,
particularly the relative additional costs for water closets, were higher for lower
valued housing units than for more expensive ones. Moreover, in homes with two
wc's, the second water closet was supplied at half the rate of the first. The rate
structure did not reflect some sort of "volume discount," that might be assumed as
housing values rose, because it was common knowledge, and often decried, that
population density was
Table 3.1. Quarterly residential rates for water supply, based on annual rents and
amenities, in pounds, shillings, and pence, as set 8 November 1853 40

Annual Rent

Quarterly Water

Additional Charge if Additional

Rate

Bathtub Present

Charge if
WC
Present

£ 10

0.2.9

0.1.0

0.1.0

20

0.5.0

0.1.6

0.1.6

40

0.8.6

0.2.0

0.2.0

80

0.15.0

0.2.6

0.2.6

Above £80

Varies by Rent

0.3.0

0.3.0

Ibid., [n.p.].
Ibid., [n.p.].
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highest in the crowded courts of the working classes. Yet the rate structure did
not reflect a "volume discount" to the benefit of the working classes either. The
quarterly rate for a £80 per annum unit was 55% in the pound of a £10 per annum
unit; thus a 45% discount accrued to the system's wealthiest customers. The
directors did not rely upon volume for residential supply; moreover, Company
piping for less valuable residences cost no more than Company piping for
residents of homes valued at the rentable rate of £80 per year. Discounts on
Company water accrued merely because of the value of residences. Wealthy
householders paid 45% less for Company water, based on the directors' rate
schedule. Should £20 housing units be used as the measure, the difference would
remain that £80 householders paid 60% in the pound compared to their less
affluent neighbors, so they realized 40% discounts on water from 400% more
valuable residences regardless of the volume of water used.
Should it be argued that there existed some threshold quarterly water rate
necessary to sustain the Company's operations, two contrary points can be raised.
First, the directors never made an effort to ascertain whether or not there was such
a threshold. Beyond the calculations of population, reservoir capacity, and
Hawkesley's perception of gallons per person per day, the directors did not
further explore residential water requirements, let alone specific cost to earnings
ratios. The directors did not really know what a gallon, or a thousand gallons,
cost them. Second, the directors relied upon the Local Board's promise of
profitability. There was no risk whatsoever, at least for thirty years, to the
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Company's shareholders. So, the directors set arbitrary rates for household
water supply and they set marginal rates highest for those least able to afford
them.
Joseph Whetstone objected to the rate structure on several grounds. Whetstone
and Richard Harris, Jr. "protest[ ed] against the minute subdivision of charges, and
would rather that a higher rate should be fixed upon than so many extra charges
be made.',4 1 In part this consideration reflected a multitude of rate variations for
businesses that are not apparent from Table 3.1, but Whetstone's other priorities
were shown at subsequent meetings. By 3 February 1854, Whetstone convinced a
majority of the directors to drop the extra charges for bathtubs and limit the
maximum extra charges for water closets to £0.1.6. 42 Later in 1854, Whetstone
used his influence upon the town council's Highway and Sewerage Committee to
have that body formally request that the Waterworks Company provide service to
customers who wanted Company water solely for the purpose of flushing water
closets. In September, "Mr. Whetstone moved a Resolution to the effect that an
independent supply to Water Closets should be given, but the same was not
seconded. ,,43
The Waterworks Company, throughout its existence, refused to allow
customers to lay on a supply of piped water merely to flush wc's. This obstinate
position reflected the directors' failure to measure residential water use by volume
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and their perception that water closets generally were wasteful. Two years after
Whetstone's motion, director Thomas Angrave moved
[t]hat in consequence of the complaints by the Public as to the terms and
regulations under which the Company consent to supply water (the present
rules virtually excluding a large number of persons from being
consumers) ... That all persons shall be supplied with water for any purpose
they may think fit and whether for water closets or otherwise who will
engage to for the water used by them. 44
Angrave's motion included a reduced minimum charge per quarter of £0.2.6 and
suggested a quarterly meter fee of £0.1.6 and subsequent charges based upon
usage, but with Whetstone absent from this directors' meeting, Angrave's motion
failed to find a second.
Whetstone, Angrave, and Leicester's Medical Officer of Health, John Moore,
believed that the directors' position on wc's posed a serious hazard to public
health. Moore believed that privy cesspools within the borough created health
hazards, especially where such cesspools were in close proximity to well-heads.

In the wake of Dr. John Snow's groundbreaking epidemiological studies of
cholera as a water-home disease, the Chadwickian public health calculus of water
supply and drainage reached its peak. Snow, the father of epidemiology, was
hardly Chadwickian, but his studies identified foul water as the source as the
source of Britain's most frightening disease. Eliminating urban cesspools and
wells also lay at the heart of Chadwickian sanitation. John Moore complained in
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1859, and again in 1866, that "[a] vast number of our population obtain their
supply of water from wells in the vicinity of privy cesspools, which have no
drainage into the public sewer.',45 One function of the Local Board of Health was
to make orders
for the substitution of water closets in lieu of privy cesspools, and a great
many more of these changes would be made, and privy cesspools to a great
extent abolished, but for the stringent regulations of the Waterworks
Company, who refuse to supply them with water for water closets unless
it is also taken for household purposes. 46
As mentioned above, Hawkesley's system began operation in December 1853.
Some six months after the water began flowing, the directors told their
shareholders that things were going very well. They praised the quality of the
water and suggested: "when an artificial supply becomes better understood, and
the fact is more fully appreciated that the removal of prejudices will have the
effect of lightening the burdens on property, a very rapid increase of Customers
may reasonably be expected."47 This statement appears obtuse but, from the
context of 1854 Leicester, one suspects that the "burdens on property'' involved
industrial enterprises; little burden on property was involved in a landlord's
resistance to supply piped water to tenants, yet an unpredictable supply of water
could affect production in a workshop or factory. The "prejudices" against
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Company water did not reflect knee-jerk Luddite reactions to innovation, but
reflected knee-jerk reactions to brown water. A full year later, the directors still
fought the "prejudices," by telling shareholders that "[t]he quality of the water is
greatly improved, and there is no reason to doubt that after a short period the
pipes will have become thoroughly seasoned, [and] the remaining slight tinge of
color [will] disappear."48 The "slight tinge" of the water cannot now be
measured, but its duration and the directors' statement imply that the origin of the
discoloration came from the iron pipes, not the water in the Thornton reservoir.
Edwin Chadwick consistently advocated the use of glazed earthenware pipes;
Hawkesley's iron pipes needed seasoning and ultimately were prone to rust. Not
everyone viewed the Company's brownish water as an improvement; nonetheless,
at a meeting in 1854, the directors proclaimed to the shareholders that "the Rental
already exhibits highly satisfactory results.',4 9 It is difficult to imagine what sort
of"Rental" might have proved unsatisfactory, given the Local Board's guarantee
of profitability to shareholders.
At its inception, the original Hawkesley system called for twenty miles of pipe
laid within the borough. By May 1856, fifty-two miles had been laid. Far from
being upset by the increase, the directors declared that "it is the true policy of the
Company to anticipate the wants of the inhabitants in the new streets and
districts," so the directors "have not hesitated to incur the additional outlay to
accomplish this object."50 The "additional outlay" and to a lesser extent the
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ordinary operating costs of the system exhausted the Company's original capital
outlay of £80,000 by May 1856. Though Hawkesley had projected that capital
investments and operating costs should reach £81,000 by 1870 at the earliest, the
directors did not hesitate to authorize the borrowing of an additional £5,000 in
1856. Many reasons could be offered for the discrepancy between Hawkesley's
1850 projection and reality of 1856. Such reasons might include the payment of
the Thornton poor rate, the litigation with Lord Maynard, and the unspecified
"additional outlay." Yet over time, all ofHawkesley's projections underestimated
actual costs. Nonetheless, the directors, who were quite tight-fisted when it came
to water closets, pipe breakage, or public use of Company water, had nothing to
lose when it came to capital improvements that might lead to future revenue.
The contract with the Local Board guaranteed shareholders a return of £1.25
per £25 share per annum during the first three years of the contract. The Local
Board guaranteed the subsequent twenty-seven years at a rate of £1 per share per
annum. Shareholders knew these dividends were unrelated to the value of the
company; they were absolute. Moreover, shareholders could favorably compare
the guaranteed returns of 4% per annum from the Waterworks Company with the
typical 2 ½% returns from provincial banks. 51 Investors who could afford
patience had nothing to lose from a Company backed by governmental assurances
of profitability.
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With their revenues secured, the directors were free to behave as
unrepentant monopolists. In April 1854, one of the twenty-four inch mains burst.
Although the water quit flowing, payments to the Company continued. The
directors proclaimed that "this Company will not subject themselves to penalties
in case of the supply failing." 52 Such a proclamation might seem fair, given that
volume did not determine rates, but the Company demanded payment in advance
for services. They never offered credit for service interruption regardless of the
length of interruption. 53 Though defensive about their own shortcomings, the
directors acted aggressively toward those who had wronged them. When
municipal sewer construction inadvertently fractured a Company pipe in 1855, the
directors immediately billed the Local Board. The directors expected cash on
demand; they had no inclination to accept 75% remuneration some months after
the accident. 54 In 1857, the Company acted against a plumber because the
directors, in an extra-legal decision, "found him guilty of laying on a service
without giving the customary notice. " 55 The plumber, a Mr. Catlin, had not
attempted to defraud the Company so was not stricken from the Company's list,
but to stay on their list the directors forced him to pay a guinea "and sign a
confession of his guilt and contrition for publication in the local papers." 56
The directors negotiated with the Highway and Sewerage Committee of the
town council about the use of Company water for public purposes. Whetstone
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proposed that the Company supply such water at the rate of ld. per thousand
gallons. The directors rejected Whetstone's proposal. Eventually the directors
and the Committee agreed upon a rate of2.5d. per thousand gallons. According to
town clerk Samuel Stone, "the Committee [did] not admit their obligation to pay
so large a rate" in perpetuity. 57 "Public use" of Company water began with
supplies to the railway station and the Lunatic Asylum; by 1857 it included street
watering and sewer flushing. One year later the directors agreed to supply water
to three public urinals in the borough at the rate of £1 per year per location. 58
This last arrangement appears financially trivial to both the borough and the
Company, but it helps to demonstrate the Highway and Sewerage Committee's
commitment to sanitation. Because unpleasant odors arising from organic
decomposition formed the heart of pythogenic disease theory, activities such as
street watering, sewer flushing, and providing flushable urinals would
theoretically reduce disease incidence as they reduced unpleasant odors.
The Company's gross revenues exceeded operating costs for the first time in
1856, but the profit did not reach the 5% threshold established in the contract with
the Local Board so the borough's ratepayers paid the bulk of the dividends to
shareholders. In 1857, as the guaranteed return by the Local Board dropped from
five per cent per share to four per cent, the Company showed a gross profit of
£576 over expenditures. 59 Thus the Company's earned profit justified a dividend
of 0.72%. The ratepayers of Leicester paid approximately £2,066 to the
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shareholders of the Waterworks Company in addition to what they paid for
public water use and whatever expenses that individual ratepayers incurred as
customers of the Company in 1857. To the extent that ratepayers were
simultaneously landlords, these expenses likely would be reflected in rents.
Renters, of course, were not consulted.
By 1864, the flow of dividend money from the borough to the Company
reversed. In August the directors reported gross profits of £3, 1000. This
translated to dividends of six per cent per share, free of income tax. Moreover,
the Company paid £643 to the Local Board as per the profit sharing agreement.
Six per cent dividends continued until 1866, when the directors authorized seven
per cent dividends. In late 1868, the directors returned to the six per cent level.
Profits and dividends were substantial from 1864 on, despite a crisis in the
Company's ability to supply the borough with water. 60
As early as 1864, the directors called a special meeting because of the
"gradually diminishing supply of water in the Storage Reservoir at Thornton."
The directors considered interrupting or limiting the flow of water to Leicester but
instead chose to print and post handbills encouraging conservation. At a followup meeting, Hawkesley told the directors that the water shortage was caused by
"defective Water Closets and High Pressure Meters." Yet one month later, the
directors told their shareholders that "[t]he unusual drought of the last two years
has doubtless been the main cause."61 Moreover, population growth might have
drained the Thornton reservoir; in 1865, borough authorities estimated Leicester's
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population at 80,500, almost the exact number of souls that Hawkesley
originally had been charged to supply. 62 Though not every one of the 80,500 used
Company water, the town clearly grew faster than Hawkesley had imagined.
Likewise, during the disagreement with Wicksteed, Hawkesley erred in his
assertion that Thornton could supply 100,000 residents. Regardless of the
ascribed causes, the directors began the search for a new source of water in 1865.
Ample rain in 1866 brought Thornton to a more acceptable level, but
preliminary efforts to obtain another reservoir were already underway. In May,
parliament authorized the Company to raise another £120,000 of capital. This
brought the total number of Company shares to 8,000. Existing shareholders
purchased all but 188 shares from the new offering of 4,800, as the directors gave
them the right of first refusal. 63 Clearly, shareholders had been pleased by the
returns to their investments. Hawkesley agreed to oversee the new project at his
Thornton rate: 3 ½% of all expenditures, including expenses incurred securing
parliamentary approval. 64 The site at Bradgate (later called Cropston), northwest
of Leicester, was selected and purchased with ease when compared to the
acquisition of Thornton. The Company puchased 168 acres from the Earl of
Stamford for £24,000, in January 1868. 65
Hawkesley effused, "that if the Town of Leicester obtains possession of this
very advantageous source no Town in the Kingdom will be better supplied with
60
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water for many years to come and .. .I have no doubt that the undertaking will
be highly remunerative notwithstanding the first outlay may appear to be
considerable."66 The project proved to be highly remunerative, but neither the
quality nor the quantity of the reservoir's water lived up to the engineer's
hyperbole. Quality problems arose as soon as the Company took possession of
the land. Soil tests and borings prompted Hawkesley' s obtuse comment that "the
nature of the ground is unexpectedly peculiar. " 67
After Bradgate water came into general use in 1871, the directors told
Hawkesley that their satisfaction with the project "has been somewhat marred by
the complaints which have recently [been] made of the quality of the Water
supplied by the new Reservoir."68 The engineer responded that "[t]he water is
good and daily improving, but for some time to come will present a slightly
'earthy' flavour to the palate in consequence of a small quantity of vegetable
matter being dissolved by the water."69 Privately the directors were placated, but
in order to convince shareholders and skeptical customers "that this water, though
temporarily disagreeable in taste and colour, contains nothing injurious to health,
[the] Directors have forwarded samples for Examination to Dr. Letheby."
Letheby, an analytical chemist and one of London's MOHs who was paid by the
directors, reported "although turbid, the Water is excellent for domestic use, and
may be drank and otherwise used without the slightest cause for apprehension."
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Letheby blamed flooding for the "peaty" water even as sources closer to
Leicester characterized the period as on "of unusual drought." 70 The Local Board
of Health, not satisfied by assurances provided by Company hirelings, sent their
own Borough Surveyor, E.L. Stephens, to test the waters at both Bradgate and
Thornton. Stephens found problems at both sites; of Bradgate, he complained that
the reservoir collected runoff from the unsewered village of Newtown Linford.
But the borough of Leicester remained a junior, if not silent, partner in the town's
water supply; concerned councilors could not affect Company decisions.
Hawkesley's projections about Thornton quantity had already proved wrong,
but the directors accepted his Bradgate projections. Hawkesley contended that the
addition of Bradgate would allow water supply for 160,000 to 200,000 people
though he vaguely hedged this projection upon "the ... number of Water Closets
introduced." Bradgate never approached the 200,000 that Hawkseley imagined
and Leicester faced water shortages before and after the reservoir came on line.
In the summer of 1869 Thornton was pressed beyond its capacity "to give a

supply at all times to the highest portion of the Town and Suburbs."71 In 1869
Leicester, the highest portions of the town roughly corresponded to the more
affluent residential portions of the town. The directors responded by asking the
town council to discontinue street watering and sewer flushing, activities directed
toward cleansing the lower portions of the town. The council reduced the
frequency of these activities, but by the late summer of 1870, the directors took a
decision that contradicted their original mission statement. They had once
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promised a continuous supply of water; now they flushed this promise. The
directors posted large notices throughout the borough, informing customers that
because of"the long continued DROUGHT" and "the low state of the Company's
Reservoir, FROM THIS DATE [28 September 1870], the Water should BE
TURNED OFF from the mains at 6 o'clock every evening until 6 o'clock the
following morning." 72 Of course, using the word "should" did not make this a
recommendation; twenty-four hour service became twelve hour service without
further ado. But despite this reduction in service, there was no reduction of
quarterly residential rates. Households paid the same regardless of the volume of
water they used, while industries continued to pay only for the volume of water
they used.
The circumstances of 1870 illustrate that such profit-driven private water
companies as the Leicester Waterworks Company limited the potential public
health benefits that might arise from piped supplies to municipalities. In theory,
this limitation was structural; the directors had to protect the interests of the
shareholders. In practice, the Local Board's four per cent guarantee was still in
place; the shareholders were in no danger of losing money. So the directors based
their decisions upon other criteria. I contend that in 1870, the directors chose
profit over public health in three ways. First, the hours of water supply fit the
needs of industry. The directors made no effort to ascertain what hours of
operation would be most useful to residences, but six o'clock in the morning until
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six o'clock in the evening worked well for the metered consumers and metergenerated revenues of industry. Second, residential consumers of Company water
were obligated to pay quarterly rates in advance. During the "crisis" of 1870, no
rebates were offered and residential consumers were not offered reduced rates for
limited future supplies. Third, the directors rejected a petition from the town
council to lower residential water rates. Council members were alarmed that
builders of new homes were sinking new wells within the borough rather than
preparing such homes for the introduction of piped water. The council had no
power to prevent the sinking of wells; builders and buyers recognized that such
wells seemed less expensive than Company rates and regulations. 73 Urban wells
were notorious for disease causation long before 1870, but the Company's
directors proved intransigent.
Within three years ofBradgate's completion, Hawkesley warned the directors
that Leicester would soon face further water shortages. The engineer proposed
that the reservoir be expanded. In order to finance the expansion, the Company
again needed parliamentary approval. When, in 1874, the directors took their
case to parliament, they used the opportunity to argue for an end to the profit
sharing arrangement with the borough. The dividend guarantee from the
borough's Local Board had served the Company well in its early years, but now
the directors had confidence in their ability to attract investors based upon earned
profit alone. The borough provided the foundation for the Company's success; by
1874, the directors perceived it as a drain on profits. Yet, the move to exclude the
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borough from profit sharing awakened a sleeping giant. Though the Public
Health Act of 1848 legally precluded the borough from establishing a municipally
owned waterworks system, subsequent legislation had opened this door.
Beginning in 1874, the borough engaged the Company for control of Leicester's
water supply.
In his 1979 book, Victorian Leicester, historian Malcolm Elliott traces this
struggle and describes Leicester's municipal water system after the borough fully
purchased the system in 1878. 74 Elliott exploited the extant documents on this
issue and I find his telling of the story to be insightful and sound. The only
documents that Elliott did not consult on this issue, the Waterworks Company's
minutes from 1872 to 1878, are missing. Therefore, this study recapitulates
Elliott's findings on the transfer of the Company into municipal hands. I am not
troubled by deferring to a summarization of Elliott's work because this study's
thesis has been demonstrated by events prior to the municipalization of the water
supply. Profit-driven, private waterworks companies were obstacles to improved
public health while they improved public health. The paradox is not inexplicable.
Clean water supplies benefited all ~hose who had access to them; those who could
not afford such amenities suffered. Water became a commodity in Leicester after
1850, it had not been a commodity in Leicester before 1850.
Elliott shows us the irony of the municipalization of Leicester's water supply.
William Winterton, a Conservative, led the effort to municipalize. His effort
gained the support of the conservative Leicester Journal and raised the ire of the
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liberal Leicester Chronicle. The Chronicle was suspicious of the coalition
Winterton formed between Conservatives and radicals. Winterton, an abrasive
individual, was not an ideologue;_ in 1876 he became the borough's first
Conservative mayor since the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. Whiggish
Liberals, the late Joseph Whetstone's followers, decried Winterton's position
because of the debt the borough would inherit. But Winterton used Whetstone's
own logic to support municipalization. When the Whiggish Liberals protested
that the acquisition of the waterworks would bring the borough into great debt,
Winterton countered that the borough's rates would grow much larger from
increases in disease and consequent poverty. Moreover, Winterton argued against
Whetstone's position that municipal debt had to be erased with alacrity.
Winterton argued that debt could be dealt with gradually. But, Winterton argued,
urban wells had to be eliminated forthwith. Eliminating urban wells formed the
basis of the mayor's municipalization position, but the Company's refusal to
supply water to water closets furthered the public health argument.
Several court battles ensued, but by 1876, the Company seemed unwilling to
pursue additional litigation. By 1878, the Leicester Waterworks Company passed
into municipal ownership. The borough accepted new debt from this acquisition,
but water revenue to the borough proved to be the greatest single source of
revenue to the borough for many years.
Although Malcolm Elliott's history of the transition from private to municipal
ownership of Leicester's water supply is triumphant and Whiggish, the history of
74
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Leicester's private water supply is an unfortunate one. Time after time the
Company's directors sought profit at the expense of public health. Of course
investors hoped for a reasonable return on their money, but the directors seemed
impervious to health concerns despite their original mission statement that
indicated public health was one of their goals. From this one example of a
private, for-profit utility we should be cautioned. Profit and public health were
not necessarily complementary goals.
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4. "Our Endemic Pest:" typhoid

fever 1

Typhoid fever was a disease that has been juxtaposed with cholera in that
typhoid was labeled Britain's endemic disease while cholera was considered
foreign and epidemic. Given these distinctions, one might think that typhoid was
not capable of causing panic or significant change in Victorian society. Such
assumptions would be wrong. If typhoid did not lead to panic in the sense of an
exodus of the wealthy from infected areas, it led to frenetic activity on the part of
wealthy householders, plumbing regulators, and aided in the development of a
new profession, termed "Sanitary Engineer." Though some sanitary engineers
would cause mischief in other public health issues, they helped reduce the
incidence of typhoid fever as did the professionalization of plumbers. Typhoid
fever was a common ailment in Victorian Britain, one that all urban areas
experienced. Typhoid fever did not place Leicester in a unique or unusual
position compared to other British towns. Nonetheless, when typhoid fever rose
to national prominence in the early 1860s Leicester's health authorities addressed
the problem. In Leicester, as in other locales, typhoid fever was combated largely
by Chadwickian sanitation. Chadwick's emphasis upon safe excrement removal
and untainted water supplies proved ameliorative for typhoid fever, despite
Chadwick's misconceptions of disease transmission. In the case of typhoid fever,
miasmatic and pythogenic theories of disease were close enough to the truth that
simple cleanliness could indeed save lives. So in Leicester health authorities

1 See Lancet, 17 August 1872, 235, and Anthony S. Wohl, Endangered Lives: Public Health in
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emphasized tainted water, that is, well water that was likely to be
contaminated by human feces. Condemning foul wells became a large part of the
borough's response to typhoid fever, at least by the 1880s. The town council and
its MOHs had limited powers over the disposal of human excrement but, in 1879,
gained the power known as Compulsory Notification, which allowed borough
authorities to investigate all cases of typhoid fever. The efforts of Leicester's
health authorities proved helpful; typhoid fever mortality was significantly
reduced between 1861 and 1889.
The initial problem with the disease was that typhoid fever was confused with
typhus; other fevers were confused as well. Typhoid fever and typhus exhibit
similar symptoms, both cause severe headaches, high fevers, and a white "fur" on
the tongue. Today, differentiation between the diseases would be clinical, but in
the nineteenth century differential diagnoses might well have been based upon the
"rosy'' blotches produced by typhoid fever and the "bluish" blotches produced by
typhus. 2 Both typhoid fever and typhus would qualify as "filth" diseases; typhoid
fever communicates from human to human through fecal matter while typhus
comes to humans from insects that infest rats. In large measure and within a
confused medical community, the form of "fever" which attracted the most
attention was typhus, at least until 1861. When Prince Albert contracted and died
from typhoid in 1861, a spark was lit in regard to the prevention of typhoid.
Historian Anne Hardy explains that some distinctions between typhus and typhoid
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had already been suggested by that point.3 The Registrar-General recognized
the subtle symptomatic differentiation between these diseases by late 1868, when
he advocated the new name "enteric fever" for typhoid so as to reduce confusion
with typhus. 4 Anthony Wohl contends that the differentiation between typhus and
typhoid fever occurred in 1869, but to many Victorians the importance of typhoid
fever dated from 1871 5 . It was in 1871 that Edward, Prince of Wales, contracted
the disease and nearly met the same fate as his father.
Though ever present in nineteenth century Britain, typhoid fever spurred
greater interest than summer diarrhoea because typhoid fever showed less respect
to age and class. If an adult member of the royal family could contract the
disease, surely everyone was at risk. Of course, not "everyone" merited the same
concern as the royals. But historian Christopher Hamlin argues that in the
Chadwickian notion of public health, many reformers focused upon adult working
class males and the relationship between health and productivity. 6 Yet diseases
which could transcend classes transcended the utilitarian focus on productivity.
Typhoid fever indeed transcended classes; middle class and even upper class
individuals could fall victim to a disease that was etiologically based on "filth."
Thus the diminution or eradication of typhoid had more of a natural constituency
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among the middle and upper classes than did a working class "disease" such
as summer diarrhoea.
Typhoid fever arises from the bacillus, Salmonella typhi. Unlike other
members of the salmonella genus, S. typhi is specific to humans. The common
link among infective sources is the contamination by tainted human feces.
Infection can occur from contaminated water sources, contaminated foods, fecaloral contact, or an insect vector such as a housefly. Outside of a human host, ,S..
typhi survives well in sewage-contaminated water and it cultures well in milk or
other dairy products. A typical incubation period (from exposure to the onset of
symptoms) is in the neighborhood often to fourteen days. A person with typhoid
fever experiences flu-like symptoms and an increasing fever usually occurs.
Sometimes he or she has other symptoms that are not present in all cases. Death
rates among untreated victims today approximate 15%. A further 3% of infected
people might become "carriers" who retain the organism within their systems for
as long as fifty years. 7
The fecal to oral transmission of typhoid fever assures that this is indeed a filth
disease. Yet the extended incubation period of typhoid complicated nineteenth
century epidemiological investigations. Moreover, imprecise theories of disease
causation and transmission created confusion among those who sought to limit or
prevent the disease. Specifically, pythogenic theory allowed for the airborne
transmission of typhoid, most importantly through the noxious medium of "sewer
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gas." Nonetheless typhoid was a disease that could, at least in part, be
ameliorated by the application of Chadwickian sanitation. Hygiene, both personal
and public, had the eventual effect of reducing typhoid incidence and therefore
mortality through the second half of the nineteenth century.
Unlike summer diarrhoea, typhoid did not bring particular notoriety to
Leicester. Therefore, the health officials of the town were not in the spotlight to
uniquely understand or deal with the problem. Because Leicester was not in a
unique position among British towns regarding typhoid fever, we are ironically
presented with a unique situation to observe how the borough's health authorities
dealt with a "typical" public health problem. This does not provide us with a
"control" population in the experimental connotation of the word, but it does
contrast the responses to Leicester's typhoid problem with the spasmodic
responses to summer diarrhoea and the borough's precociously aggressive
response to scarlet fever. Though all responses to public health problems were
"reactive," the difference here has to do with what impetus the officials were
reacting to, beyond etiology or mortality. Summer diarrhoea was burdensome to
Leicester's health officials because of its peculiar prevalence in the borough and
adverse publicity; typhoid was not unusually prevalent in Leicester. Indeed on
one occasion a Leicester Medical Officer of Health (MOH) congratulated himself
and the Sanitary Committee of the Local Board for the remarkable "immunity
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from Fever fatality here evidenced." 8 During that year, 1879, only twenty-two

inhabitants died from typhoid. For the embattled MOH, J. Wyatt Crane, such a
low number of fatalities was evidence that he was not powerless against all
diseases. Though summer diarrhoea was uniquely rampant in Leicester, Britain's
endemic filth disease was not an embarrassment to the town.
Leicester's MOH's varied in time, ability, and resources. 9 The first, John Buck,
was a pioneer in the MOH profession, he was not a leading light in epidemiology.
His successor, John Moore, might have had more imagination and insight than Dr.
Buck, but Dr. Moore was a product of his time. When Moore reported on the 354
"fever" deaths between 1861 and 1865 in Leicester, he argued that "it should be
borne in mind that cases are not infrequently registered as Typhus Fever who only
become Typhoid near the termination of some other disease. 1110 This confusing
statement indicates that Moore had little concept of typhoid fever as its own
disease; it seems as through he believed in the mutability of disease within the
course of an individual illness. He gave further explanation of this thinking about
typhoid in 1866: "it is ascertained that out of this number of deaths [53 in 1866]
there were many that did not arise from any miasmatic cause, or from contagion,
but were cases which became typhoid from the depressing effects of other
diseases." 11
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From Moore's statements about typhoid fever, two more or less tenable
inferences can be drawn. First, Moore may have had some awareness of the
varying fatal complications that can arise from a case of typhoid. 12 Yet Moore
did not personally attend the victims and, of course, Moore did not perform postmortem examinations on them. So it is unlikely that Moore's statements reflect a
knowledge that death from typhoid can come from liver abscess, intestinal
hemorrhage, or other immediate causes. Second, and more important, Moore's
dismissal of both miasmatic and contagionist causes meant that public health
officials in Leicester had no role to play in the prevention or limitation of typhoid.
Indeed, Moore argued that the level of typhoid mortality, 0.633 per 1,000 in 1866,
"plainly shew a satisfactory condition of our public health." 13 Given Moore's
unusual causation theory and the fact that the borough's typhoid mortality did not
attract scrutiny from outside, we should not be surprised that typhoid fever
received little official attention during Moore's watch.
This is not to say that no one paid attention to the disease while Moore was in
office. Aside from those directly affected by typhoid, the Unitarian missionary,
Joseph Dare, let it be known that he believed the disease was preventable. Dare
was Chadwickian in his association of filth and disease and he was part of the
"shoe-leather" tradition of urban investigators stemming from Southwood Smith
to Rowntree. Dare's concern was about the conditions of the poor and working
classes rather than comprehensive public health per se and in his annual reports he
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did not often overtly offend his middle class patrons. Yet indirectly his 1866
report accused the borough's landlords of allowing typhoid mortality to persist
through their neglect. In this report, Dare cited several cases of filthy and
overcrowded rental properties that were "home" to fever, but with one particularly
telling case he suggested that the property's owners were merely the dupes of an
unscrupulous property manager. In this case a father had succumbed to "fever,"
no doubt typhoid.
The wife thought, very properly, that the house should be well
cleaned, as it had not been whitewashed for seven years. But the
house-agent peremptorily refused to have it done, and threatened
her with immediate expulsion if she made any to do about it.
Nothing is done, she leaves; another family comes in and inherits
the filth and disease of the pre-occupiers, through the ignorance
and inhumanity of the collector. 14
The unnamed owners of this property were guilty, in Dare's couched phrasing,
merely of ignorance of the conditions and insufficient oversight of their overseer.
But, Dare's implications were clear. The widow understood that typhoidproducing conditions existed on the site and, when able, she removed her family
from the environment. The owners of the property demonstrated no such
understanding. Though Dare placed blame, perhaps correctly, upon the owners'
agent he was simultaneously urging lessors to visit and improve their properties.

Joseph Dare (1866) quoted in Barry Haynes, Working-Class Life in Victorian Leicester: The
Joseph Dare Reports (Leicester: Leicestershire Libraries and Information Service, 1991 ), 48.
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We cannot ascertain how many landlords took interest in the sanitary state of
their properties on the heels of Dare's report. It can be imagined that Moore's odd
etiological description of typhoid, carrying with it the presumed expertise of a
Medical Officer of Health, would have a greater effect upon complacent landlords
than would the vague accusations of a sectarian missionary, particularly since the
MOH's position placed no financial burden upon landlords to improve their
properties.
The year 1867 brought a new MOH to Leicester and with him a new view on
typhoid fever causation. In J. Wyatt Crane's first annual report he explained that
"it is now well understood that both Typhoid Fever and Cholera are propagated as
much from impure water, contaminated by faecal matter, and containing the
germs of these diseases as from aerial emanations from these agents." 15 So Crane
acknowledged the fecal-oral nexus of typhoid while simultaneously holding to
pythogenic theory which demanded acceptance of the notion that typhoid fever
can be an airborne disease. Though typhoid is not an airborne disease and it was
still not peculiarly problematic in Leicester, Crane's view allowed for the activity
on the part of public health authorities. Moreover Crane's view determined that
for at least the next ten years, the borough's health authorities would combat
typhoid fever as a product of human filth.
The practical ramifications of Crane's ideas about typhoid fever meant that
water supply and excrement disposal were the keys to eradication of the disease.
Indeed these were culprits in the spread of typhoid, so improvement in these areas
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would prove beneficial regardless of the disease theory that informed such
improvement. Moreover, Crane's misconception that typhoid fever could be
airborne or waterborne was far from unique. Peter Baldwin has competently
established that despite the apparent polarity of miasmatic and contagionist
disease theories, most practitioners fell somewhere in between the two theoretical
extremes in this period. 16 It is also noteworthy that Crane's more respected,
indeed revered, successor, William Johnston, subscribed to the notion of multiple
media transfers of typhoid fever pathogens. So, Crane's belief that typhoid could
be ingested or inhaled did not place him on the medical fringe in the same way
that his "simple heat" theory of summer diarrhoea did.
Regarding water supply, Crane believed throughout his tenure that the
Leicester Waterworks Company provided a product free from typhoid. In
hindsight there is no reason to doubt Crane's assessment. So, one might presume
that Crane might have suspected that infection came from the many wells, public
and private, within the borough. As early as 1867 Crane argued that the
contamination of one particular well led to three typhoid deaths within the same
family, "no other cause being discovered." 17 But, the borough's power to close
wells under the Nuisances Removal Act of 1846 was clumsy and rarely invoked. 18
By 1874 Leicester did receive more efficient authority to inspect and close wells,
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and did so with much greater frequency than under than Nuisances Removal
Act, 19 yet Crane steadily backtracked on his 1867 assertion that typhoid arose
equally from water supply and "aerial emanations." Ironically, Crane seemed to
be burrowing more deeply into pythogenic theory at the same time that other
medical practitioners began drifting toward germ theory. So, for the most part,
Crane set his sights on excrement removal, because of its fumes, rather than on
water quality.
Crane's emphasis on excrement removal undoubtedly had beneficial effects for
Leicester's residents even though it was not as energetic as it might have been and
it was based on erroneous principles. Moreover his principles, though
consistently pythogenic, showed variation. Pythogenic disease theory was, in its
infancy, merely a refinement ofmiasmatic disease theory. To the arch-miasmatist
Edwin Chadwick, bad smells were disease. In pythogenic theory, bad smells
arising from decaying organic matter led to disease because such vapors
contained putrefying organic materials. In and of itself this shift in thinking was
not earth-shattering. Yet pythogenic theory had important flexibility with regard
to the contagionist-localist debate within medical circles. Pythogenic theory
could accommodate germ theory; it could be, and was, argued that a deposit of
pathogenic microbes into decaying organic material could, under the right

tenants. This power was used with somewhat greater frequency and usually involved the
application of Waterworks Company product.
1 During the years 1874-79, from the date of the expanded power to the end of Crane's tenure,
some 760 wells were inspected and 309, or 41%, of these were closed. Crane, MOH 1878, 22;
MOH 1879, 60.
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conditions, become airborne and thus infectious when inhaled. 20 On the other
hand, pythogenic theory allowed for anti-contagionism in that person-to-person
contact was irrelevant unless an infected individual was spewing putrefied organic
material into the air. In one sense this was a step up from miasmatic theory
because disease did not spontaneously arise from decaying organic material; some
introduction of the disease had to be presented. Assuming that to be the case, the
temperature and moistness of the soil in an affected area could be sufficient to
explain the incidence of disease. 21 This aspect of pythogenic theory was localist
and fatalistic; it was the very soil upon which people lived that would cause and
explain their experiences with zymotic diseases. Somehow, through the right
combinations of meteorology, topography, and filth, typhoid fever was
propagated.
Crane was a thorough believer in the pythogenic origin of typhoid fever
despite his "waterborne" statement in 1867. Nonetheless, he deserves some credit
because of his acceptance of the difference between typhus and typhoid, his
ruminations on typhoid, and his concern with the town's sanitation. Beginning in
1868, Crane expressed his belief that typhoid was the only "fever" disease
affecting Leicester. 22 Indeed this proved to be true; typhus was not a problem in
Leicester though a few doctors erroneously continued to label it a cause of death
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well into the l 870s. 23 Crane never proclaimed the existence of a louse vector
for typhus, it was sufficient to the MOH that typhus symptoms were rare in
Leicester and never implicated natives. No constituency had to be convinced that
typhus was a problem for Leicester's public health officials to solve.
Crane's ruminations on typhoid were consistent with his pythogenic theory.
This MOH was a firm adherent of the "sewer gas" ramification ofpythogenic
theory. In 1868 Crane claimed that Leicester's sewer system was "fraught with
danger" because sewer gas escaped into homes. 24 The MOH regularly argued that
homes with untrapped or imperfectly trapped waste drains invited typhoid fever
with the rising fumes from sewer connections. 25 Even in the best of homes, Crane
lamented "the negligence of servants in kitchens and sculleries leaving off the
traps and thus admitting the gases into the houses. "26 This was the way that Crane
explained the majority of typhoid fever in Leicester. But, Crane allowed that
sewer gas could infect the town's atmosphere more generally. During an outbreak
in 1878 the borough's sanitary inspectors, Buxton and Braley, were unable to
correlate the sites of fatal cases with defects in plumbing or cleanliness. So Crane
argued that for this outbreak the air in the town was "the only possible medium
which could have conveyed the infection. "27 In the same way though, in 1871,
Crane argued that "in Leicester Diarrhoea is not caused by the entry of sewer
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gases into the houses." 28 On the one hand, the clean and well plumbed houses
of victims implied that typhoid was diffused throughout the borough's
atmosphere, while on the other hand, the same conditions meant that his "simple
heat" theory explained summer diarrhoea without reference to any pathogenic
microbes. Yet over time Crane came to the conclusion that summer diarrhoea
was "a disease of similar origin and closely allied to Typhoid fever." 29
Given Crane's notoriety from "simple heat" theory, this epiphany deserves
brief exploration. From the beginning of his tenure as Leicester's MOH he was
convinced of the ability of sewer gas to cause typhoid and he never wavered from
this belief. Ten years into his term he could assert that "[m]any cases of Zymotic
disease, especially Typhoid fever, have occurred in my own practice ... whose
origin I could distinctly trace to sewage-gases. 1130 Armed with this erroneous but
quasi-clinical conviction, numerous medical investigations, the seasonal and
geographical correlations between the two diseases, and the observation that
"[t]he one forms the most constant symptom of the other," Crane would come to
assert that he had "a strong conviction that the majority of the cases of infantile
Diarrhoea are but forms of Typhoid fever, rendered irregular in their course and
fatality. "31 Crane's appeal to authorities on sewer gases regarded typhoid fever in
the main, but implicated summer diarrhoea and scarlet fever as well. The actual
seasonal correlation between typhoid fever and summer diarrhoea was sometimes
consistent. The geographical correlation within the lower parts of Leicester
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became more consistent with the passage of time. The MO H's contention that
diarrhea was the most definitive symptom of typhoid was not correct, nor was his
association of scarlet fever with typhoid fever and summer diarrhoea. Yet by the
end of his tenure, Crane considered most, if not all, infectious diseases to be
connected to sewer gas. Ultimately he argued that typhoid could arise from milk
or fruit, which indeed it can, but Crane believed that these sources of infection
must have been exposed to the bugaboo of sewer gas. 32
One might correlate Crane's epiphany over milk and fruit with the arrival in
1877, of an Assistant MOH, Dr. William Johnston, rather than significant new
epidemiological evidence. Leicester's MOH reports took on new depth and length
in 1877. Moreover, Crane's views, beginning in 1877, became more like
Johnston's views. That these views were pythogenic is not surprising. When
Johnston became the borough's lead MOH for the 1880 report, pythogenic theory
and germ theory seemed thoroughly compatible.
Still, Crane generally maintained an interest in the borough's excrement, or at
least removing it, because of its association with typhoid fever. To be sure,
Crane's emphasis upon the removal of human waste linked with the dangers of
sewer gas, but it encompassed more. In his first year, the MOH expressed his
shock that in one Leicester neighborhood "there were only two privies to 27
houses!" 33 Christopher Hamlin suggests that such shocked indignation at the
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discovery of deplorable conditions was a useful fiction in sanitary reform. 34
Such "discovery" absolved blame all around; to the extent that conditions had
heretofore been unknown, no one need be held responsible. Hamlin's argument is
specific to initial investigations pursuant to the Public Health Act of 1848, but it
translates easily to the situation of a new MOH taking responsibility for a
borough. Crane's "discovery" did not implicate his employers, the Local Board of
Health, and if any aspersions were cast at all they would be toward John Moore,
not J. Wyatt Crane. It should not be forgotten that Joseph Whetstone was very
near the end of his life when Crane's initial report was promulgated; less
conscientious officials could more easily feign ignorance.
In the late 1860s, Crane thought it impractical to imagine that water closets
would replace privies and cesspools in Leicester. 35 Moreover, Crane thought that
the sewer gas associated with water closets was sufficiently dangerous to
recommend that they be constructed out of doors. 36 But in lieu of these, Crane
suggested "earth closets" for indoor use because they had no connection to the
sewer system. 37 Earth closets would soon be implicated in the spread of typhoid
yet Crane never retracted his view that sewer gas was more dangerous than the
collection of feces within homes. 38
Though well closures were rare under Crane's watch, Sergeants Buxton and
Braley, the Local Board's inspectors, were active. As early as 1868 the inspectors
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were taking some contractors before magistrates because of poorly
constructed water closets. 39 By 1874, Buxton and Braley were annually issuing
more than five hundred repair or cleansing orders for water closets and privies. 40

It remains difficult to assess the relative prevalence of water closets, earth closets,
or privies in 1870s Leicester. The census of 1871 counted 19,287 inhabited
houses which corresponded closely with the borough's own count of 19,289 at the
end of 1870. 41 But the borough counted a total of 9,900 wc's and 9,929 privy
cesspools. 42 This count was almost certainly inaccurate because a similar count in
May 1872 identified only 5,090 wc's. As Table 4.1 indicates, by the end of 1878
there were still only 7,476 wc's in Leicester. Yet Table 4.1 also shows a striking
reduction in the number of privies and cesspools in the borough during the 1870s.
Though some of the decrease is explained by the increase in wc's, much more is
explained by the increase in ash pits (earth closets) and the introduction of the pail
system.
By the time of his last annual report in 1879, Crane remarked upon the
numbers of typhoid fatalities in the borough (21) and addressed the borough's new
power of compulsory notification of infectious diseases with regard to scarlet
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Table 4.1. Prevalence of domestic waste disposal systems in Leicester, 1872
and 187843
System

1 May 1872

31 December
1878

Privy Cesspools

4,297

1,100

Privies

6,309

1,500

Water Closets

5,090

7,476

Ash Pits

3,660

7,388

0

5,040

Pails

fever, 44 but spent most of his remarks on typhoid, congratulating himself and the
borough for the low local mortality. Crane selected several years of low mortality
rates to impress his audience. In 1860 Leicester's typhoid mortality was 0.162 per
1,000 living, in 1877 0.17 per 1000, and in 1879 0.159 per 1,000. 45 Crane took
this opportunity to explain how he and the Local Board had triumphed over
typhoid. The MOH listed four reasons why Leicester was "very remarkable" with
regard to fever mortality and he listed them in order of the importance he placed
upon them. 46 The order of this enumeration was not arbitrary; it clearly reflected
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Crane's priorities with regard to typhoid. The first claim for such "immunity"
was that it was "very rare indeed" to find house drains directly connected to the
sewer system in the low lying areas of the town; thus sewer gas was mitigated.
Second, "very few" cesspools remained in Leicester by 1879 (the 1,100 in 1878
might not seem to be "very few," but the reduction between 1872 and 1878 was
indeed substantial). Third, without explanation, Crane declared Leicester
"absolutely free of 'slums'." What he meant by this is vague but in 1887, MOH
Henry Tomkins was able to state that of"[c]ellar dwellings in the Borough there
are none. "47 Whether or not the two MOH's were remarking upon the same
conditions is impossible to say. Fourth, and last on his list, Crane complimented
Leicester's "good supply of water of pure quality" which was "in almost general
use."
Crane's final, 1879, report was replete with self-congratulation with regard to
typhoid fever. The MOH might have failed in the area of summer diarrhoea, but
Crane thought he had brought England's "endemic pest" down to a reasonable
level. In his mind this was a sincere belief; typhoid killed fewer Leicester
residents in 1879 than it had killed in 1867. But, Crane was not the type of MOH
to search for data which might challenge his assumptions.
Crane's replacement, William Johnston, was more flexible than Crane, his
previous boss. Johnston, the famed originator of the "Leicester Method" of
smallpox control, was a man caught between pythogenic and germ theory. With
regard to typhoid, this confusion was not a major problem. That is, typhoid could

130
be reduced by Chadwickian methods. With proper sanitation and personal
hygiene, typhoid could nearly be eliminated, though the existence of carriers was
unknown in 1880.
Johnston's views on typhoid strongly resembled those expressed by Crane
during his last years in office, whether this was due to Johnston's influence upon
Crane or possibly coincidence. The new MOH did not argue that typhoid and
summer diarrhoea were different forms of the same disease, as had Crane, but
Johnston did argue that they were meteorologically correlated. Hot and dry
summers led to increased mortality from both maladies; he believed both were
primarily airborne.
Though in his mind the primary medium of infection was air, Johnston
believed that floods during 1880 produced "a considerable number of cases of
Typhoid fever reported to the Health Authorities during the year [that] resulted
from the drinking of polluted well-water." 48 The connection between flooding
and the incidence of typhoid was epidemiologically sound. Floodwaters could
spread .s_. typhi to wells in two ways. First, the Soar itself could harbor the
microbes to be diffused when the river overran its banks. That the Soar actually
contained .s_. typhi would have been likely, though in what concentration cannot
be measured. Even though Leicester was sewered and the sewage treated before
re-entering the Soar, the same cannot be said for small villages upstream. Second,
the sewers undoubtedly contained .S.- .tYPhi in varying concentrations. In the low-
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lying areas of Leicester the Wicksteed system had long been notorious for
being unable to accommodate even a heavy rain without backing up. Such backups of untreated sewage would then diffuse into wells. This diffusion probably
would have been due to the porosity of both the Wicksteed system and the various
wells in the borough rather than outright inundation of the wells.
So one of Johnston's concerns about Leicester's typhoid incidence was the
continued use of well water for drinking purposes. While MOH, Johnston did not
simultaneously hold the office of Borough Analyst; that position was filled by a
Dr. Meadows. 49 Still, the MOH was quite interested in the testing and analysis of
well water within Leicester. Since the inception of the borough's power to test
and close wells in 1874, the town's officials used the "Wanklyn method" of testing
for impurities. From 1875, the first full year of the power, until mid-1881, 944
wells were analyzed and 403 condemned.so The Wanklyn method of testing thus
yielded a closure rate of 42.7%. But Johnston did not consider the Wanklyn
method to be the most rigorous and advocated a type of testing that would include
borings. In 1881 the MOH convinced Meadows and the Sanitary Committee of
the Local Board to adopt a modified "Frankland method." This new type of
analysis began in mid-1881 and by the end of 1889 some 733 wells had been
tested and 535, or 73%, condemned.s 1 But the disparity of well condemnations
arising from the methodological change is even more striking when appraised

49 Johnston, MOH 1883, 48. The two positions were combined when Henry Tomkins succeeded
Johnston in 1884.
so Johnston, MOH 1881, 38-39.
51 Ibid,; MOH 1882, 42; MOH 1883, 49; MOH 1884, 49; Tomkins, MOH 1885, 24; MOH 1886,
77; MOH 1877, 60-61; MOH 1888, 99; MOH 1889, 106-107.
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under the first few years of the Frankland method. Between mid-1881 and the
end of 1883, 492 wells had been analyzed and 409, or 83%, were condemned.
Thereafter the number of wells analyzed (241) and the percentage condemned
(52%) declined through 1889. These declining figures did not represent flagging
interest in the purity of well water by Johnston or his successor Henry Tomkins.
Rather, the declines show that many of the most offensive wells in the borough
had already been identified and condemned.
The actual number of wells in Leicester remains difficult to ascertain, though
later figures are more reliable than earlier ones. Crane's count of 5,589 houses
(out of 19,829), being supplied by well water in late 1870 is dubious in and of
itself, but likewise tells us nothing about the number of wells which existed at that
time. Yet we may infer that many of the houses supplied by wells were among
the more crowded courts of the working classes, particularly before 1874 when
the borough acquired the power to close wells. Johnston claimed that by the end
of 1882, 846 wells remained in Leicester, serving households numbering in the
thousands. 52 By the end of 1883 wells supplied 1,400 houses, or approximately
7,000 people. According to Johnston, at the end of 1884, some 1,200 houses were
supplied by well water. 53 The most reliable numbers actually come from
Johnston's successor, Henry Tomkins. Tomkins, simultaneously holding the posts
of MOH and Borough Analyst, reported in 1885 that 469 wells remained and they
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supplied 978 houses. 54 By the end of 1888 Tomkins could find only 297 wells
in Leicester. 55 The upshot of the quest to analyze and condemn polluted wells can
be lost in these statistics; the mere subtraction of condemned wells from existing
wells did not yield the next year's existing wells. The numerical anomaly
between wells condemned by the borough and those that remained actually
indicate an increasing concern about the quality of water. For example, in 1886
some 88 wells were closed without the expressed orders of the MOH. These
wells were closed largely by informal recommendation by borough authorities,
but at least nine were closed by proprietors without any borough activity.
The second important development which occurred while Johnston was the
lead MOH in Leicester was that the fruits of the Compulsory Notification Act
were more fully realized in 1880, beyond the partial data available in 1879.
Typhoid, unlike summer diarrhoea, was one of the diseases that fell under
Leicester's private bill to require that victims and/or physicians acknowledge
incidence of the disease. Though doctors in Leicester railed against the idea of
compulsory notification they complied. The doctors' complaints were twofold:
first, the doctors argued that compulsory notification could embarrass their
patients. This argument was not very strong with regard to typhoid because it
seemed to be a classless disease. Second, doctors objected to the idea that they
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might incur a £5 fine for failure to report the disease to the MOH. Private
doctors apparently wanted to avoid such responsibility. 56
Nonetheless Johnston was privy to information that Crane was not because of
the legal mandate to report cases of, in addition to deaths from, typhoid fever.
Thus it became possible for Johnston and his successors to ascertain the casefatality rate in Leicester. 57 Through the 1880s the average case-fatality rate of
typhoid fever in Leicester was 15 .1 %58 Unfortunately Leicester's case-fatality
rate of typhoid fever is unknowable before 1880, but even this one decade's worth
of data proves useful. Paul Hunter's research indicates that typhoid fever,
untreated by antibiotics, typically yielded a case-fatality rate of 15% in the late
twentieth century. 59 Leicester's mean case-fatality rate actually fell below 15%
from 1886 to 1890, to 13.8%, but this diminution is not statistically significant.
Thus we can infer that typhoid fever's virulence has been consistent for at least a
century. Yet the value of early notification and reasonable responses in reducing
typhoid fever incidence and mortality should not be underestimated. Compulsory
notification did not mean that all typhoid fever victims were taken to the
borough's fever hospital, far from it; the fever hospital was generally off-limits
for typhoid patients. But compulsory notification raised awareness of typhoid
fever and the borough's health personnel then visited residences where cases of
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typhoid, rather than fatalities, occurred. Some of the most obvious sanitation
defects could then be addressed with the families of victims and some fecal-oral
connections broken. Such hygienic information proved ameliorative without
necessarily being founded on accurate disease theory.
By 1886 the new MOH, Henry Tomkins, initiated a blanket house-to-house
inspection, far beyond the case-by-case survey of the early 1880s. This
extraordinary measure surpassed what might be expected from a Liberal local
government, but Tomkins was determined to obtain a comprehensive overview of
Leicester. The MOH used data from compulsory notification to prioritize
inspections, but still managed to have 22,773 out of 27,000 homes inspected in
1886. 60 Such a feat might imply that the inspections were cursory, but this seems
unlikely because 40.6% of the homes inspected were ordered to make
improvements. Most of the improvements that were ordered, 83.2%, pertained to
excrement removal or faulty drainage. Tomkins noted that "these discoveries are
[often] made in the best class of houses." But Tomkins contended that such faults
would fade away in time; [n]o such blunders or errors of construction and sanitary
arrangements are permitted now, in the building of new houses."
Tomkins had good reason for optimism. In response to nationwide fears of
typhoid fever "sanitary engineering" was developing as a profession. Moreover
in 1887, Tomkins applauded the voluntary testing of plumbers established by the
"Worshipful Company of the City of London," and hoped that such testing would

59
60

Hunter, Waterborne Disease, 118.
For this and below, see Tomkins, MOH 1886, 29, 34.

136
become compulsory. 61 Typhoid fever declined among cause-specific death
rates in Leicester. 62 Typhoid fever case-fatality rates declined in the borough.
Leicester was, at worst, average in annual typhoid fever mortality rates among
large British towns, but more often than not it was below the national average.
Yet typhoid fever did not go away. In 1890 some 165 cases were reported and 24,
or 14.5%, were fatal.
Tomkins used information made available from Compulsory Notification to
provide home inspections and hygienic education, but he also actively inspected
the borough's supply of milk. Milk can be the source of typhoid fever and by
1882 an outbreak of the disease in Leicester could be traced to milk. 63 From 1881
to 1884 the borough inspected milk shops if complaints were made; this
complaint-based inspection system resulted in 6.8% of the product being
condemned. Tomkins undertook an inspection of all 176 licensed milk shops in
Leicester and between 1886 and 1889 some 11.7% of milk was condemned, an
increase of 72%. 64 This data should not be interpreted as though the milk that was
condemned tested positive for s.typhi as such a test did not exist. The MOH
commented that "the abstraction of cream or the addition of water are the
common mal-practices." But it is logical to infer that comprehensive inspections
likely had a positive effect on the handling and storage of milk in the shops and
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one suspects that those purveyors who illegally diluted milk with water might
not have exercised great care in selecting the purest water available.
Some outbreaks of typhoid fever in the 1880s were traced to workers cleansing
and reconstructing the sewerage system, an unpleasant but very real reminder of
the fecal-oral nexus of typhoid fever. Unprotected sewerage workers would
unavoidably contact the sewage and we could hardly expect them to avoid
touching their own faces. But in Tomkins' mind there was an even more
dangerous nexus for typhoid fever transmission: pails for excrement collection
within homes. This once-heralded excrement collection and removal system was
undoubtedly an improvement over open cesspits, but hardly an effective substitute
for water closets. The collection of feces within a home necessarily increased the
likelihood of fecal-oral transmission of typhoid fever. So Tomkins lamented that
some 7,000 pails were still in use in 1889, but he was gratified that new pails were
no longer being introduced. 65 . Yet the borough's full conversion to water closets
was not even accomplished by the completion of the Gordon sewerage system in
the 1890s. 66 An ideal sewerage system and the universal use of water closets
would have hampered the transmission of typhoid fever considerably;
Chadwickian sanitation could lessen, but not eradicate the disease completely.
To some extent typhoid fever remained the "endemic pest" in Leicester
throughout the Victorian period and was impervious to sanitation improvements
because it can exist in a carrier state. Yet, the borough's rate of typhoid mortality
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Tomkins, MOH 1889, 45-46.

138
declined over time. Given typhoid fever's endemicity and that it can exist in a
carrier state, Leicester's dealings with the disease can be counted as a qualified
success. For researchers it would be useful to have rates of incidence as well as
rates of mortality, but since such information is unavailable before 1880, we make
due with the information at hand. Yet some historians might question the value of
chronicling Leicester's successes in dealing with the ravages of typhoid fever.
Indeed this is the type of case study that Christopher Hamlin considers redundant
at best. 67 Hamlin does not perceive a need for more chronicles of the success of
the sanitary idea. He sees such histories as "Whiggish" in that they tell a winner's
tale. Hamlin seeks a history of public health that is more integrated with political
and social history, thus more problematized. With respect, I disagree with
Hamlin's position as it regards typhoid fever in Victorian Leicester.
Hamlin does not approve of viewing nineteenth century public health as a
contest between right and wrong to be judged by twenty-first century historians.
But Leicester's tale of typhoid fever is not a teleologically informed story of right
triumphing over wrong. Ironically it is a story of largely wrong thinking that led
to a measure of success against a disease that was only vaguely perceived as a
specific disease in the beginning of the period. It was a happy accident that
Chadwickian notions of improvement actually helped to control the disease. Such
was not the case for all of the so-called zymotic diseases in Victorian Leicester.
Indeed it was the success of Chadwickian sanitary measures against typhoid fever

Wohl, Endangered Lives, 95. According to Wohl, some 6,700 pails remained in Leicester in
1895.
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that make this story newsworthy. Because pythogenic theory was in the ·
mainstream of medical thinking and because Leicester's health authorities
ultimately acted vigorously, Leicester was not notorious for typhoid fever
mortality in Victorian Britain. With due respect to Hamlin, it is the pedestrian
nature of the history of typhoid fever in Leicester that aids this dissertation.
Many Victorian public health problems placed Leicester in a national
spotlight; typhoid fever did not. The whole of the nation worried about typhoid
fever; Leicester was fairly anonymous. So the borough's leaders were free to deal
with typhoid fever as they saw fit. Some actions were vigorous, such as
Compulsory Notification; some were complacent, such as blaming the
"atmosphere." The responses by Leicester's leaders to typhoid fever form only a
part of the story that needs to be told; this was how they reacted to problems that
were not posed as unique to Leicester. During the 1860s, and certainly after
1871, typhoid fever was perceived as a problem for all Britons; given Leicester's
unique position with regard to other public health issues, such anonymity was a
godsend.

67

Hamlin, Public Health and Social Justice, 9-10.

140

5. "A Necessary Evil Incidental to Childhood:" 1 scarlet fever

Scarlet fever presents one of many paradoxes in Leicester's public health
history. On the one hand, an interventionist preventive and therapeutic policy was
initiated in the 1870s and gained widespread public compliance before 1890.
Leicester's mortality rates from scarlet fever decreased. On the other hand, the
"better class of people" resisted the initiative and recently historians have made
the claim that intervention was useless concerning scarlet fever. 2 Taking England
as a whole, scarlet fever mortality decreased by the 1890s. This study shows that
the paradox mentioned above is more apparent than real. The streptococcus
responsible for scarlet fever most likely decreased in virulence in the late
nineteenth century without human intervention. But, this diminished
streptococcal virulence can not explain why some children in Leicester had a
better chance of survival than others. The interventionist and ultimately classbased approach taken by Leicester's public health authorities in the 1870s and
1880s succeeded in reducing scarlet fever mortality.
Scarlet fever incidence does not statistically correlate with social class, but the
treatment of scarlet fever victims in Victorian Leicester depended upon the
victims' social class. The improvements in Leicester's scarlet fever mortality

1 Henry

Tomkins, Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health, 1886 [hereafter MOH 1886],
11. LRO 20 D/74.
2 Tomkins, MOH 1890, 14. Anne Hardy, The Epidemic Streets: Infectious Disease and the Rise
of Preventive Medicine, 1856-1890 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 66. Anthony S.
Wohl, Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian Britain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1983), 129. Wohl also credits heightened levels of immunity and hints that
intervention was another ameliorative factor.
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occurred because of the activity of several medical professionals in service to the
borough and the willingness of working class parents and the town council to
accept these doctors' recommendations. The borough and its ratepayers erected a
"fever hospital." The fever hospital was originally a facility for the isolation of
smallpox victims, but became a facility that handled scarlet fever patients as the
bulk of its business. The town council acquired the "powers of compulsory
notification of infectious diseases." Explained in detail below, for the moment, it
suffices to say that "compulsory notification" led to the borough's Medical
Officers of Health being informed of every new scarlet fever case in the borough.
The knowledge gained from compulsory notification and the isolation made
possible by the fever hospital led to reduced scarlet fever mortality in Leicester,
especially in the 1880s.
Historian Anne Hardy contends that scarlet fever diminished in virulence as
the result of microbial (in this case streptococcal), change rather than human
social change. She argues that preventive public health measures did nothing to
reduce deaths from scarlet fever; that decreases in scarlet fever mortality, though
not scarlet fever incidence, arose from the competition between various
streptococcal strains. Therefore, according to Hardy, common scarlet fever did
not produce high mortality before 1840 or after 1870. 3 An earlier historian
acknowledges the naturally occurring decrease in virulence, but also credits
preventive and isolationist methods for reducing the disease's mortality. 4 For
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reductions before 1889, Hardy supports her argument by anecdotal evidence and
mortality rates. After 1889, she supports her argument with incidence data and
case-fatality rates. The differences between these types of evidence are
significant. Cause-specific mortality rates usually identify deaths per population
at risk, but it is difficult if not impossible to determine the Victorian population at
risk. Hence, Hardy uses the number of deaths from scarlet fever divided by
overall population to calculate mortality rates. Oftentimes historians consider
themselves fortunate to have enough information to calculate the type of mortality
rates that Hardy uses to 1889; such rates are preferable to raw mortality numbers
because rates are comparable, whereas raw numbers are not. Epidemiologists
define case-fatality rates as the number of deaths occurring among new cases of
the particular disease. Hence·, the calculation of case-fatality rates requires
knowledge of how many people contract the disease. Though historians often
rely upon mortality rates per population, changes in disease virulence are best
measured by reference to case-fatality rates. Given the knowledge of how many
people were stricken with a particular disease, relative mortalities can be
calculated. This is because variables of time or treatment become measurable.
That is, case-fatality rates become the best measures of success or failure of
preventive and therapeutic actions because an artificial, but historical, control
group can be identified. While not the same as experimental control groups,
historical "control" groups can suggest whether intervention succeeded. 5

5
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It is hard to calculate case-fatality rates for Victorian Britain. Often, the only
available data comes from raw mortality and population estimates. Important
exceptions arose from some municipalities that achieved parliamentary approval
for "compulsory notification of infectious diseases." Compulsory notification
acts varied because they were local acts until a template was established by
parliament in 1889. What local compulsory notification acts had in common was
that local authorities had to be alerted to the presence of an infectious disease
within their communities. That is, once a municipality gained the powers of
compulsory notification, anyone who knew of a case of a disease perceived to be
contagious (so-called "zymotic")6. was required by law to notify the borough's
Medical Officer of Health. Compulsory notification proved to be a grand step in
epidemiology because, for the first time, public health officials could track all
cases of disease incidence. Leicester joined several other pioneering British
towns when the borough acquired compulsory notification powers in 1879.
Hardy's reliance upon raw mortality rates until 1889 can only suggest that
scarlet fever virulence was decreasing; it cannot measure the effectiveness of
interventionist policies with any accuracy. Moreover, Hardy's study focuses on
London and London acquired the power of compulsory notification of infectious
diseases only in 1889. The borough of Leicester acquired the power of
compulsory notification of infectious diseases a full ten years before London and
consequently an analysis of Leicester and scarlet fever reveals more than Hardy's
6

"Zymotic" currently implies fermentation, which would have dovetailed with Victorian
pythogenic disease theories, but "zymotic," could also be defined as gastroenteric, or infectious.
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masterful analysis of London could. I contend that in Leicester, after 1879,
scarlet fever mortality decreased because of intervention and isolation by the
borough's public health authorities.
The interventionist approach employed by Leicester's Sanitary Committee and
the borough's Medical Officers of Health (MOHs), produced positive results with
regard to scarlet fever mortality and the attendant publicity probably led to
heightened awareness of scarlatina! symptoms among victims' parents. Given the
borough of Leicester's Liberal political bent such an interventionist strategy might
seem· out of character. Historian Erwin Ackernecht posed a paradigm that
correlated liberal politics and anti-interventionism, but more recently, historian
Peter Baldwin has demonstrated that such a position oversimplifies the problem. 7
Ackernecht's paradigm suggests that authoritarian governments would be likely
to accept the contagionist theory of disease because it would lead to quarantine
strategies, but liberal governments would be likely to accept the localist, or quasimiasmatic, theory of disease because such a theory would allow for greater
individual freedom. Baldwin contends that the liberal position could hold in the
abstract that the healthy community's right to freedom from infection outweighed
the infected individual's right to freedom of movement. One might suspect that
this position merely reflects the historical evolution of liberalism toward greater
governmental involvement in social matters. The actual development of public
health policies shows such formulaic suspicions to be unfounded. At a national
See Clayton L. Thomas, ed. Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary. 13 th ed. (Philadelphia: F.A.
Davis, 1977), z-4.
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level, Liberals led the movement to repeal the interventionist laws requiring
smallpox vaccination. Within Leicester, the development of public health policies
did not follow a straightforward path toward greater governmental intervention in
people's lives. Though Baldwin's argument is more convincing and more
explanatory than Ackemecht's in a general sense, it can not be supported by direct
evidence from Leicester. The evidence from Leicester indicates no philosophical
balancing act between the rights of the individual and the rights of the community
until the element of social class is considered. fu Liberal Leicester, middle class
citizens were accorded freedom of movement rights, but working class victims'
rights were subordinated to the community's rights. As shown below, by the late
1880s, this disparity became explicit. So Baldwin's sophisticated and
comparative analysis of epidemic diseases is useful but remains above the level of
practical implementation, British public health problems were addressed locally
according to local priorities. Baldwin's argument allows for variation between
interventionism and non-interventionism within particular political viewpoints,
but it says less about how different segments of the general public were treated.
One of the lessons learned from Leicester's experience is that some people were
treated differently from other people. This is not an earthshaking historical
finding, but in the historiography of public health, it is too often overlooked that
the "public" was not a seamless amalgam of citizens. Rather, the "public" was a
construct, and a construct with a great deal of flexibility in definition.

7 See Peter Baldwin, Contagion and the State in Europe, 1830-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, I 999), 12-36.
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Scarlet fever is a streptococcal disease arising from a Group A hemolytic
streptococcus bacterium. 8 Typical symptoms include sore throat, rash, and fever.
Scarlet fever is clearly an infectious or contagious disease; thus in Victorian
parlance, it was a "zymotic" disease. Often the transmission from person to
person gives the appearance of an airborne disease, but the bacteria are actually in
colloidal suspension in heavier than air droplets coughed or sneezed by an
infected person. Thus the bacteria do not aimlessly float about the environment
with the ability to infect, but droplets from a human sneeze can travel as far as
thirty feet. Infected milk or food can also transmit scarlet fever. Once
introduced, the disease incubates in people from one to three days before
symptoms appear. 9 No universal, untreated case-fatality rate can be posed as a
baseline because the bacteria indeed vary in virulence. Other Group A hemolytic
streptococci affect human beings with rheumatic fever or tonsillitis, among other
maladies, so a diagnosis of scarlet fever is both clinical (implying the laboratory
identification of particular microbes), and symptomatic in the twenty-first
century. Strep microbes, such as the infamous "flesh-eating" bacteria, continue to
challenge modem researchers, but George and Gladys Dick identified the scarlet
fever streptococcus in the 1920s. 10
Scarlet fever, or scarlatina, is and was a childhood disease; it was not a filth
disease and it did not respect social stratification. Leicester's MOH, J. Wyatt

8 Clayton Lay Thomas, ed., Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary. 13 th ed. (Philadelphia: F.A.
Davis Company, 1977), S-15.
9 Roger Webber, Communicable Disease Epidemiology and Control (Cambridge: CAB
International, 1996), 335.
1 Clayton, Taber's, S-15.
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Crane, reported 174 scarlet fever deaths in 1875; 98.9% of these deaths were of
children under the age of fifteen. 11 Such age-specificity was not unusual; for
England as a whole, 95% of fatalities were children under ten years of age. 12 Yet,
infants under one year of age were not the primary victims of scarlet fever
mortality; they represented only 7% of Leicester's 1875 deaths, while 74% of the
deaths were children between the ages of one and five. Some 18% of fatalities
were "school aged" children between five and fifteen. 13 This information tells us
that mortality was highest among ambulatory children who had yet to enter
school, but that notwithstanding, mortality from scarlet fever could be significant
among students and potential students.
Parliament might have facilitated the spread of scarlet fever by the
establishment of secular school boards in 1870 and compulsory education of
children between the ages of five and ten beginning in 1880. As might be
expected, these parliamentary measures led to more children attending schools
and therefore more opportunities for the transmission of scarlet fever. As early as
1869, the Lancet recognized that schools provided forums of communication
between those infected and those yet to be infected. Characteristically, the journal
recommended that panels of doctors, rather than school administrators, should
decide when and for how long schools should close during epidemics. 14 As
schooling increased in Leicester, so did concern and scrutiny about scarlatina
mcrease.
11

12
13
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Wohl, Endangered Lives. 128.
Crane, MOH 1875, 26.
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In 1869, scarlet fever was not a large problem in Leicester; only eight deaths
were recorded from the disease. Indeed scarlet fever claimed only seventy-four
lives in the five-year period 1865-1869, and the majority (40) occurred in 1867 . 15
However, 1870 was an epidemic year; some 263 died in this year alone. Dr. John
Barclay, an elected member of the town council and a physician who had served
the council, recommended the construction of a "fever hospital." 16 Barclay and
MOH J. Wyatt Crane advanced the idea of a fever hospital because victims of
scarlet fever, smallpox, and erysipelas were not admitted to the borough's
infirmary. This local initiative echoed the sentiments of John Simon, the lead
physician to the Privy Council. Simon was "frustrated by the failure of sanitary
measures to contain" scarlet fever. 17 Chadwickian sanitation could be effective
against filth diseases such as typhus, but in the late 1860s some medical
professionals were recognizing that the transmissibility of other diseases did not
involve pythogenic media. Pythogenic disease theory was a logical step between
miasmatic disease theory and genn theory. Pythogenic theory supposed that
decaying organic material, if the requisite microbial disease agent was present,
could release such an agent in something akin to an unseen miasmatic cloud.
Perhaps Barclay and Simon were developing sophisticated notions of disease
causation. Crane's ideas were not always sophisticated. Yet, the point of this
study is not to provide a rehearsal of the diffusion of germ theory among medical
professionals. Rather, this study is largely about political salesmanship. Dr.
14

Lancet, 6 November 1869, 663.
Crane, MOH 1874, 21.
16 Lancet, 19 November 1870, 718.
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Barclay had to persuade his fellow councilors that a fever hospital would be
economical and practical improvement upon contemporary conditions.
In late 1870, Barclay was able to convince the town council that a facility for

the isolation of both smallpox and scarlet fever patients was necessary. The
managers of the Leicester infirmary proved unwilling to accept such an addition
to their grounds because they recognized the potential of person to person
transmission of these diseases. 18 The town council's Local Board of Health was
likewise "foiled" in the attempt to purchase an existing building on another site. 19
Barclay then led a campaign to erect a fever hospital, supported by both borough
and private funds, on an undesirable piece ofreal estate known as "Freake's
Ground." But, a public meeting of ratepayers, held in the midst of a scarlet fever
epidemic in December 1870, rejected the purchase ofland and construction of the
hospital; the proposal "negatived by a large majority. 1120 Despite Barclay's
successful efforts to convince the Local Board of the need for a quarantine facility
and his recruitment of"country gentlemen" to support its construction financially,
Leicester's local ratepayers rejected his initiative to build the Freake's Ground
hospital.
In 1871, the scarlet fever epidemic in Leicester coincided with an outbreak of

smallpox. Smallpox was different from scarlet fever in that scarlet fever
remained a childhood disease. Adults died from smallpox and everyone knew
that smallpox transcended social classes. Moreover, many people doubted the
Wohl, Endangered Lives, 128.
Lancet, 3 December 1870, 793
19 Ibid.
17
18
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value of their own smallpox vaccinations. Thus when, in 1871, Barclay repeated
his call for the construction of a fever hospital, this time as a facility for the
isolation of smallpox patients, the hospital was approved by ratepayers, erected,
and opened before year's end. As mentioned above, Crane and Barclay always
hoped that the fever hospital would accommodate victims of other zymotic
diseases, but while smallpox was epidemic in the early 1870s, the hospital simply
did not have space for scarlet fever patients.
Leicester's scarlet fever mortality was still high in 1871, with 173 fatalities,
but then there was a dramatic drop-off, so that only twenty-nine children died
between 1872 and 1874. 21 By 1875, anew epidemic of scarlet fever began, but
by then the smallpox epidemic had long since passed and scarlatina! patients
could be admitted to Freake's Ground. By 1877, most of those patients
"removed" from their homes to the fever hospital were stricken with scarlet
fever. 22 Such children were not removed by force; borough inspectors convinced
the victims' parents that such isolation would protect their other children. This
trend toward Freake's Ground as a scarlet fever hospital continued throughout the
Victorian period. That is, except for those rare occasions when smallpox was
epidemic, scarlet fever was the diagnosis that led to the overwhelming majority of
cases admitted to the hospital.
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It was Leicester's good fortune to have hired Dr. William Johnston as
superintendent of the fever hospital in 1876. 23 Likewise in 1876, the Sanitary
Committee of the town council appointed Johnston the borough's first assistant
MOH to aid the aging J. Wyatt Crane. 24 Johnston was youthful and energetic. By
1878, he persuaded Leicester's town council to apply for a local act of parliament
to require the "compulsory notification of infectious diseases." As Johnston's
municipal positions were part-time he was also a private practitioner. But this
young Irish doctor who lived in "the artisan area of the town" 25 came into conflict
with the established private practitioners of Leicester.
Private practitioners and MOHs had already come into conflict about scarlet
fever in other parts of England. In 1869, one London practitioner complained that
MOHs wanted to be notified of the presence of the disease yet, once notified, the
MOHs were slow to respond and their responses included nothing more than a
"call at the door, and ... a printed paper of directions as to disinfection. " 26 Yet the
opposition to compulsory notification of infectious diseases by doctors in
Leicester had little to do with the actions an MOH might or might not take after
being notified of the presence of a disease. Rather, private practitioners objected
to the provision of the bill that would assess a penalty to doctors, as well as the
families of victims, for failure to notify the MOH.

For this and other biographical infonnation on Johnston, see S.M.F. Fraser, "Dr William
Johnston (1846-1900) of Leicester - an Unknown Victorian General Practitioner," Journal of the
Royal College of General Practitioners, 33 (1983): 369-371.
24 Crane was becoming challenged physically, but more important he was becoming obstinately
out of touch with contemporary medical opinion. See the chapter on summer diarrhoea.
25 Fraser, "Johnston," 370.
26 Lancet, 11 December 1869, 825.
23

152

Technically, the Sanitary Act of 1866 made it illegal for anyone to expose the
public to an infectious disease. 27 Yet only the infected person was bound by this
Act and there was no requirement to notify health authorities of the existence of
infectious disease. The local act advocated by Leicester's Sanitary Committee
included a £5 fine upon those who failed to notify the MOH, whether that fell
upon the victim's family, the victim's doctor, or both. 28 At the time the Sanitary
Committee approved this action, five English towns already had compulsory
notification powers, including nearby Nottingham. 29
Johnston's argument for compulsory notification, presented under Crane's
name, stressed the importance of the early detection of potentially epidemic
diseases and was closely tied to the notion that victims of such diseases should be
removed quickly to the isolation hospital. Yet within the report Crane's
prejudices overshadowed Johnston's pragmatism. Crane took pains to castigate
"the lowest classes of a community'' whose "ignorance, filthy habits, and over-

°

crowding" led to epidemics. 3 Crane contended that "[i]n nine cases out of ten,
epidemics are imported, fostered, and subsequently spread amongst the
inhabitants of a town by its poorer classes,"31 who were unlikely to be under a
doctor's care except in the last resort.
Objection to compulsory notification did not come from the general public,
rather it was the medical community who raised "well-nigh unanimous

27
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objection."32

As the proposal for compulsory notification made its way to the

floor of parliament, doctors from Leicester petitioned parliament to reject the
clauses of the bill that contained penalties for medical professionals. They argued
that these clauses "imposed upon them new and onerous and unnecessary
obligations" and such obligations were "inquisitorial in character, uncalled for,
and likely to lead to endless mischief and complication."33 The Lancet, a
professional journal at its root, supported the Leicester doctors, accusing the
corporation of"blundering management" by attaching financial penalties to
medical professionals who failed to comply with compulsory notification. 34 The
lines were drawn between the MOH, with the backing of the city, and private
practitioners, with the backing of the Lancet. In this instance parliament sided
with the interventionist approach to public health. The Leicester Corporation
Improvement Bill passed committee on 23 May 1879 and became law on 13
September 1879. 35 Though not required by the compulsory notification law, the
removal of scarlet fever patients to the hospital increased. Moreover, once
compulsory notification became law, "not a single complaint ... reached the ears of
the Sanitary Authority from either the general public or the medical men
themselves of any mischievous result or complication having arisen from their
compliance with the newly-imposed duties." 36

Lancet, 8 February 1879, 206.
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With the power of compulsory notification and having the fever hospital in
place, Crane and Johnston were quick to praise their combined effects. They
compared scarlet fever deaths to the borough's population during three epidemic
periods (see Table 5.1). From the data shown in Table 5.1, they argued that
compulsory notification had saved forty-one lives in the fifteen weeks from the
inception of the law to the end of 1879. In 1875, scarlet fever mortality had
amounted to seventeen per ten thousand living. At that rate, the epidemic of 1879
would have led to 213 deaths. Instead, in 1879 mortality was but eight per ten
thousand living, leaving 105 children dead. 37 Extrapolating from this
information, and with the knowledge that scarlet fever mortality was typically
highest in the fourth quarter of the year, Crane and Johnston stated that expected
mortality in the fourth quarter should have been 107. However actual fourth
quarter deaths were sixty-six. The MOHs failed to

Table 5.1. Scarlet Fever Deaths and Population in 1870, 1875, and 187938
Years

1870

1875

1879

Deaths

263

186

105

Population

93,000

110,000

126,000

Raw Mortality

28.3 per 10,000

16.9 per 10,000

8.3 per

Rate from Scarlet

living

living

10,000

Fever

38

Crane, MOH 1879, 31.
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mention that the rate of scarlet fever mortality was twenty-eight per ten thousand
living in 1870, and that rate was substantially higher than the 1875 rate without
recourse to compulsory notification. Given this diminution from 1870 to 1875,
one might assume that mortality from scarlet fever decreased naturally and, other
things being equal, that intervention produced no real benefits.
Yet, circumstances had indeed changed between 1870 and 1875. The
borough's fever hospital accepted scarlatina! patients by 1875. This might have
had a beneficial effect on scarlet fever mortality, but without corroborating
evidence one might still suppose that the decrease in mortality was natural. The
MOHs saw "it [as] highly satisfactory to note the marked augmentation in the
number of admissions during September [ 1879] and following months, a period
concurrent with the application of the powers for the compulsory notification of
infectious diseases." 39 Could the MOHs have been biased in attributing the drop
in mortality rates to compulsory notification and isolation in the fever hospital?
Perchance, but if scarlet fever virulence naturally decreased and human
intervention played no role, as Anne Hardy argues, there should exist no
discemable difference in mortality between hospitalized children and children
who were not hospitalized.
Did the removal of scarlet fever patients to the fever hospital produce any real
benefits? An epidemiological analysis of scarlet fever mortality in Leicester, in
the 1880s, suggests that interventionist public health measures produced positive
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results. From 1880, the first full year of Leicester's compulsory notification law,
to 1889, when London received compulsory notification powers, the overall casefatality rate from scarlet fever in Leicester was 9.3%. The overall rate was typical
for Victorian England. Among sick children removed to the fever hospital, one in
twenty died (5.0%). Among those children not removed to the fever hospital in
this period, more than one in eight died (13.5%). Thus, other things being equal,
children left in their own homes were almost three times as likely to die from the
disease as those who were taken to the fever hospital.
There was an obvious comparative advantage in survival based on removal to
the fever hospital, yet the hospital's benefits appear to have largely evaporated by
1888. Ironically, this might be explained in part by the very success of the
Freake's Ground hospital. Whereas in 1880, only 29% of scarlet fever patients
were removed to the fever hospital, this percentage rather steadily increased so
that by 1888, 65% of all cases were removed and in 1889, 80% were removed. 40
Except for certain rare and specific situations, the borough never had the power to
force removal to the isolation hospital, so persuasion was the chief means
available to MOHs and their agents to effect removal. In 1881, Johnston
lamented that 657 householders refused to have their scarlatina} children taken to
the hospital,
that in these cases the disease ran its course unimpeded, for the great
majority of them were in houses of the artizan [sic] class, having from
two to six rooms and the scanty space which such dwellings can afford,
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together with the inability of the parents to provide a separate nurse for
the sick, render it quite impossible either to properly isolate the sick,
or to prevent the extension of the disease to other houses in the locality. 41
This MOH, who lived among the "artizans" and worried about the effects upon
children of working mothers, was sympathetic to their plight. He wrote, in 1883,
a year when 48% of all scarlatina! patients were removed to Freake's Ground, that
working class mothers were diligent in their efforts to isolate children who had
scarlet fever. Indeed, according to Johnston, investigations revealed that such
children were quarantined and that mothers took care to wear special "sick room"
clothing. 42 Nonetheless, Johnston wrote, mothers eventually let their guards
down. By relaxing isolation measures too early in the course of the disease,
mothers facilitated the spread of scarlet fever by child to child communication or
by the contact of previously uninfected children with the "sick room" clothing.
Johnston redoubled his efforts to educate the parents of scarlatina! patients about
the perceived communicable period of the disease; as shown below,
communicability was thought to last approximately a month.
By the late 1880s it would become commonplace for working class people to
see their children removed to the fever hospital because of scarlet fever. By 1886,
under the auspices of MOH Henry Tomkins, 53% of scarlatina! patients were
removed to the fever hospital. Thereafter the majority of victims were isolated in
the hospital, except for those years after 1890 when smallpox was epidemic. The
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MOHs credited compulsory notification for this trend. One early side effect of
the compulsory notification law was that any household reporting a case of scarlet
fever would receive a visit from the borough's sanitary inspectors, Buxton and
Braley. The inspectors advised householders of the potential of contagion, the
risk of spreading scarlet fever at schools, the benefits of the fever hospital, and in
the last resort, the possibility that parents could be prosecuted for allowing
"desquamating" children to move about in public. 43 Yet, Johnston's successor,
Henry Tomkins, believed that a "serious obstacle to our successfully coping with
this disease is the apathy and ignorance of the people themselves. Small Pox they
fear, Typhus Fever and Cholera they dread, but by too many Scarlatina is looked
upon as a necessary evil incidental to childhood. ,,44
So Tomkins implemented tactics that might have had greater preventive
potential than those employed by his predecessors. The year 1885 brought a new
epidemic of scarlet fever as well as a new MOH. Rather than waiting for returns
arising from compulsory notification, Tomkins placarded the town with handbills.
Tomkins hoped to create heightened awareness among Leicester's residents
before their individual families were struck with scarlet fever, rather than letting
them wait for the visits from Buxton or Braley after cases were reported. These
handbills extolled the virtues of the fever hospital and, not subtly, reminded
parents of the £5 penalty attached to the concealment of cases. Tomkins also
initiated an interventionist approach in schools located within the borough. He
43
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had students inspected for scarlatina! symptoms, he sent notices to all teachers
describing the symptoms, he extended the schools' Christmas holiday to three
weeks, and he had all school buildings disinfected during the extended holiday. 45
Tomkins had two goals from these measures implemented in 1885. First, he
wanted to extend the therapeutic benefits of the fever hospital to a larger number
of victims. Second, he wanted to minimize the spread of the disease arising from
child to child communication. His efforts led to conditions that had the potential
to realize his goals. That is, in the midst of the 1885 epidemic more parents than
ever before proved willing to permit their scarlatina! children to be removed to
Freake's Ground, and the epidemic of 1885 passed more rapidly than previous
scarlet fever outbreaks. Nonetheless, Tomkins' therapeutic efforts were frustrated
in part because the fever hospital was unable to accommodate the demand for
beds. One thousand eight hundred and sixteen cases of scarlet fever were notified
in 1885. Of these, 933 found beds in the fever hospital, and an unknown number
were turned away due to lack of space. The borough hastily constructed a twentybed addition to one of the hospital's five "blocks" at a cost of £430. 46 The
Freake's Ground facility ultimately housed 51.4% of scarlatina! patients in 1885,
at a mean cost of £2.5 per patient and with an average stay of 39.5 days. 47 These
annualized figures suggest that there were unoccupied beds at the fever hospital in
1885, and there were, but scarlet fever in 1885 was at its peak in the fourth quarter
of the year. This was not only typical of 1885, but typical of scarlet fever
44
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generally. Scarlatina} patients were not turned away from the hospital throughout
the year; they were only turned away when the epidemic was in full force during
the fourth quarter. So, at the height of the epidemic, not all who wanted to take
advantage of the hospital's services could.
Tomkins complained that the fever hospital was built as a temporary structure
during a smallpox epidemic and that it was "makeshift" and "unsatisfactory.',48
He believed that it had outlasted contemporary structures of wholly wood
construction because it was partly covered by corrugated iron. For this durability,
he was grateful, but Tomkins found fault with the design of the five Freake's
Ground blocks. Three of the blocks contained "one large ward each, and the other
two [were] only partially divided.',4 9 The problem then, was that "it [was]
entirely without such small wards as might be set apart for the reception of
patients of a better class.''50 Without accommodations of a "superior and more
private character ... patients of a better class ... [would not] make much use of this
means of isolation.''51 Tomkins did not complain about the therapeutic measures
taken by the hospital staff; the benefits of fever hospital isolation were selfevident by the mid- l 880s.
Middle class resistance, rather than working class obstinance, explains why the
fever hospital peaked at about an 80% removal rate in the late 1880s. In
Tomkins' first year as MOH, 51.4% of reported cases were removed to the fever

Ibid., 28-29. Expenses averaged 9s. 6d., per patient per week.
Ibid., 26.
49 Ibid., 25.
50 Ibid., 26.
51 Tomkins, MOH 1886. 37.
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hospital. In 1886, the rate increased to 53% and, in 1887, to 56%. In 1888, fully
65% of all notified scarlatina! cases were removed to the fever hospital. At this
time, in a non-epidemic year, Tomkins became more sanguine about removals.
He wrote that the "public, and especially the lower classes, are being slowly
educated" to the precautions necessary to limit the spread of scarlet fever. 52 His
perception was correct; during the following three years the average removal rate
was 80%. In 1884, Johnston had proclaimed that the 374 refusals were
"scattered ... over every district in the town." 53 Of the forty-six refusals in 1888,
Tomkins decided that "there existed satisfactory means of isolating [the victims]
from the rest of the family." 54 Tomkins decried the limitations of the Freake's
Ground facility, but he came to accept the idea that middle class families would
deal with scarlet fever without recourse to the fever hospital.
Middle class parents of scarlatina! children were not pressured to allow
removal of their children in the same way that working class parents were. The
borough's inspectors not only counseled working class parents to allow removal;
they threatened prosecution. Parents could not be prosecuted merely for refusal;
rather prosecution arose from allowing a scarlet fever victim to encounter
members of the general public. As might be expected, the potential for person to
person contact was greatest in the more densely populated areas of Leicester and
these were the working class areas. Scarlet fever was ubiquitous. Moreover,
scarlet fever was not a disease that stigmatized the victim; there was no
Tomkins, MOH 1888, 9.
Johnston, MOH 1884, 38.
54 Tomkins, MOH 1888, 17.
52
53
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motivation for middle class parents or doctors to conceal or misdiagnose the
disease. Thus, it is likely that the number of notified cases of scarlet fever bears
close resemblance to its actual prevalence. Therefore, that prosecutions fell only
upon working class parents suggests that there was a double standard.
No evidence exists that might even hint at prosecution threats toward middle
class parents. 55 The MOHs always provided warnings before prosecutions
commenced. When the magistrates imposed fines, such fines were in the range of
£3 to £4, rather than the £5 allowed by law. 56 Logic and housing patterns implied
that middle class parents were capable of preventing the spread of scarlet fever
because of the roominess of their dwellings and, thus, their ability to provide
isolation for victims. Yet, there is no mention in the records of domestic servants
as victims. It would seem that domestics, to the borough's public health officials,
did not rise to the level of the "general public." The extent to which domestic
servants were exposed to scarlet fever was not a matter of public record. The
MOH, J. Wyatt Crane, had expressed his view that zymotic disease passed from
the working class to the middle class; no one worried that disease could spread
from the middle class to the working class.
One specific occupation concerned Henry Tomkins more than others did.
Tomkins was Borough Analyst as well as MOH and he thought that milk spread
scarlet fever. In 1885, he tested milk supplies that were connected to scarlet fever
cases. He found no correlation. 57 William Johnston had suspected a correlation
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as early as 1883 in Leicester, and had implemented a special penalty for milk
purveyors. Milk shop owners whose children came down with scarlet fever were
required to permit the children to be removed to the fever hospital or face the
closures of their businesses. 58 By the 1880s, it would be appropriate to label milk
shop owners whose shops adjoined their residences as working class. 59 These
families were the targets of the health authorities. In 1886, an epidemiological
investigation in North London seemed to confirm the potential of milk-borne
scarlet fever. 60 By 1888, Tomkins asserted that it was "certain" that milk could
transmit the disease. 61 Tomkins believed that scarlet fever was a disease that
cows shared with humans; he discounted the idea that milk became contaminated
after human contact. 62 Though it would later be shown that milk could indeed
convey scarlet fever, Tomkins erred in his conception of the etiology.
Nonetheless, milk shop owners who lived adjacent to their retail shops were
coerced to allow their scarlatina! children to be removed to Freake's Ground.
Tomkins applauded efforts to expand compulsory notification throughout the
kingdom. In 1887, the Local Government Board advanced such a proposal;
Tomkins welcomed such a move because it would provide comparable data on
disease incidence among municipalities. The MOH also hoped that it would lead
to information from the villages and other unincorporated areas on the outskirts of
58 Johnston, MOH 1883, 26-27. Anne Hardy shows that milk supplies had become suspected of
transmitting scarlet fever as early as 1867. Hardy, The Epidemic Streets, 78.
59 For the separation of businesses from middle class residences, see Leonore Davidoff and
Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850,
~Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 364-369.
Tomkins, MOH 1886, 12.
61 Tomkins, MOH 1888, 18.

164

Leicester. 63 Tomkins summed up compulsory notification in commandment
form; "in effect it says 'Thou shalt not conceal a case of infectious disease, which
unknown and unguarded against may kill needlessly another person. "'64
Parliament passed a "national" compulsory notification law, but the compulsory
provision only applied to London and only attached to London in November
1889. For the rest of the country, "compulsory" notification remained
permissive. 65
November 1889 marks the time when historian Anne Hardy can trace the
effectiveness of compulsory notification. She claims that the "declining fatality
of scarlet fever in the later nineteenth century bore no relation to sanitary reform,
or to preventive medical strategy."66 Indeed, the declining fatality of scarlet fever
in the late nineteenth century was likely related to the diminution of virulence of
the streptococci. This is a reasonable conjecture and can be supported from
evidence throughout England in the 1890s. Indeed, Hardy cites the low mortality
rates in Leicester and Nottingham, for 1888, as indicators of a nationwide trend
toward lessened scarlet fever virulence. 67 Yet, these two towns were among the
earliest to acquire powers of compulsory notification. Hardy did not know that
"preventive medical strategy," in the form of the Freake's Ground hospital was
clearly effective from 1879 to 1888. That the effectiveness of fever hospital
removal declined after 1888, does not diminish its success during that decade.
62
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Leicester was unusual with regard to many public health problems, but the
borough's response to scarlet fever can be considered relatively successful.
Mortality from scarlet fever decreased throughout England by 1890, but
Leicester's experience shows that not all the credit need be given to the
streptococci. The fever hospital was important, the compulsory notification law
was the essential factor, and the ability of the MOHs and their agents to induce
people to let their children be removed to the fever hospital saved many lives.
Though this study shows that intervention was helpful with regard to scarlet
fever mortality, it also shows that such intervention proved to be class-based.
Leicester's MOHs first attacked scarlet fever by attacking the working classes.
Crane blamed the working classes for all "zymotic" disease. Johnston was more
thoughtful and sympathetic, but ultimately found fault with working class
mothers. Tomkins initially acted as a crusader to hospitalize all victims, but his
resolve wilted in the face of middle class refusals. In the matter of scarlet fever,
the public was not defined as the population at risk. To so define the public
would mean that all children would have been treated in the same way. This was
not the case. This was a case of successful public health interventionism, but the
level of intervention applied bore an inverse relationship to the wealth of the
victims' families.

67
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6. "The blot [on] their otherwise fair escutcheon:" 1 summer diarrhoea

Perhaps no nineteenth century public health issue was more problematic to
British reformers than infant mortality. In at least one sense it remains so for
historians today. Composite and adult death rates dropped in the second half of
the nineteenth century, most markedly after 1870, but infant mortality remained
stubbornly high into the twentieth century. 2 From 1849 to 1891 infant mortality
averaged about 151.7 per 1,000 live births in England and Wales. 3 For the fifteen
year period 1846 to 1860 the figure was 155.7, from 1861 to 1875 it was 153.7,
from 1876 to 1890 it was 142.7. This slight but seemingly steady decline was
reversed in the next fifteen year period to 148.3. Pronounced and continuous
declines did not begin until after that point. 4 There were many causes of the high
infant mortality rates in Britain; only one "cause" and one town will be explored
here.
For better or worse the one cause of infant mortality that brought notoriety and
consternation to Victorian Leicester is one of the more provocative challenges to
medical history; the one cause that perennially placed Leicester among Britain's
most lethal towns for infants was diarrhoea. This is a problem for medical
historians because of the multiplicity of disorders that could lead to a Victorian

1 Thomas

Windley, quoted in the Leicester Chronicle [hereafter, LC], 4 September 1875.
General discussions of infant mortality can be found in Anthony S. Wohl, Endangered Lives:
Public Health in Victorian Britain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 10-42 and
F.B. Smith, The People's Health 1830-1910 (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 65-135. A chapter on
infant mortality in Leicester can be found in Malcolm Elliott, Victorian Leicester (London:
Phillimore & Co., 1979), 86-99.
3 Smith, The People's Health, 65.
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diagnosis of diarrhoea. It is a problem in the history of public health because
of the stresses and interactions within a community that concerned itself with this
"disease." The community was made up not only of Leicester's residents and
their leaders but also health officials on local and national levels repeatedly
goaded by the local and medical press. Because diarrhoea seemed to respect
socio-economic boundaries it was sometimes considered to be a predictable, if
painful, consequence of nature and poor breeding. But because diarrhoea defied
attempts rationally and conclusively to determine its cause, numerous more or less
vague theories were posited. In the absence of a known agent of disease (as in
smallpox) or a known vector of disease (as in cholera) much attention was
directed to the site where diarrhoea was most destructive. Whereas all British
towns suffered the loss of children from diarrhoea every year, it became a
problem associated specifically with Leicester in part because of Leicester's very
high death rate but also from a lack of other targets.
To Leicester, the dialogue of diarrhoea was as important as the "disease" itself.
There are two ways to substantiate the importance of discussion and debate in the
construction of the "disease" as a problem that Leicester became responsible for
solving. First, documentary evidence will show that local office holders explicitly
responded to negative characterizations of the town in the medical press. Second,
critics focused on Leicester's "excess" mortality, although diarrhoea was common
in English towns. That Leicester could have an excess of the "disease" implies

4
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that there was an acceptable level of diarrhoea mortality. Certainly there
were levels of diarrhoea mortality that would not bring national attention to a
town.
One critical reason that diarrhoea was often treated with rhetoric and
theorizing is precisely because the "disease's" victims were infants.· Adults might
have felt sadness and frustration in dealing with diarrhoea but they would not
have felt panic. 5 Unlike cholera or smallpox, diseases that could cause panic,
adults did not see their peers dying from diarrhoea; they did not fear for their own
lives. This slight emotional detachment and the predictable visitations of the
"disease" helped to make diarrhoea the subject of a number of inquiries with
varying degrees of rationality and limited urgency. Since the children who died
were almost exclusively working class children, middle class town leaders were
further detached from the victims. But Leicester was the town in Britain with the
highest summer diarrhoea mortality. So whether the investigations were
conducted by local, national, or independent investigators, the investigations into
summer diarrhoea mortality always involved Leicester.

In his annual report for 1884, Leicester's MOH William Johnston provided a
twelve step description of the course of the "disease" and the symptoms
associated with each phase:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5

Irritable, feverish, sleep disturbed
Bowels slightly loose, odor worsens
Vomiting episodes, sour odor
After 2 days, symptoms 1 through 3 become more pronounced

For a discussion of parental reactions to the deaths of children see Ellen Ross, Love and Toil:
Motherhood in Outcast London 1870-1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 181-94.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
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Frequent crying, high fever
Very frequent bowel movements, bad odor, unable to keep baby clean
Vomits all nourishment
Extreme thirst
All "baby fat" lost, extremities shrivel, fontanelle sinks
Continuous moaning rather than crying
Purging continues unabated
Death or recovery (first sign ofrecovery is a less offensive odor from
excreta). 6

Whether death resulted from pitiful dehydration or violent convulsion the
condition that caused such mortality was referred to as "infantile" diarrhoea or
"summer" diarrhoea. These terms merely categorize rather than define a disease.
The adjectives are hardly specific; mortality was highest among infants and in hot
weather but that does not narrow the field of potential causative agents greatly.
Several diseases that resist eradication in our society have etiologies that resemble
that of diarrhoea. Salmonella, shigella, E-coli, and cryptosporidium could all
have been spread in the conditions that existed in Victorian Leicester. These are
cited as examples rather than hypotheses but any diarrhoea-like disease would be
exacerbated by poor waste and refuse removal or poor hygienic practices. In a
densely populated, poorly drained town with low-lying sections that experienced
periodic flooding it is not surprising that Leicester had high rates of diarrhoea.
This paper will be concerned with the conditions that were favorable to the
diffusion of the "disease" rather than with a full biological description, or
etiology. Naturally it would be helpful to have such an etiology and perhaps Dr.

6
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David C. Reeder's current work on the problem will yield a solution. 7 But a
history of public health in Leicester can hardly be written if one waits for
definitive etiological explanations that were unavailable to the aforementioned
community. Just as it is impossible to understand Leicester's reticence to install a
"modem" system of sewerage without knowing the history of the Wicksteed
system, it is impossible to understand other public health issues in Leicester
without recognizing the reputation that the town acquired because of its diarrhoea
mortality. Anne Hardy's recent volume on infectious diseases, The Epidemic
Streets, sidesteps diarrhoea because it "has a hugely complex history, and merits
more detailed attention than can be given here."8 But Hardy's work focuses on
London; such a proviso will not suffice in a discussion of Leicester.
The reputation that Leicester acquired was based on the very real mortality that
existed in the town to be sure, but without the visibility afforded to the town by
the statistical reports of mortality by the national Registrar-General (formally
known as the General Register Office) the pressure to solve the problem would
have been less intense. The Registrar-General's comparative mortality statistics
were compiled weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annually and made available to
the press. The independent medical press, represented by the Lancet, seized upon
the statistics to criticize the Leicester's "sanitary authorities." The local press
publicized the Registrar-General's data and often editorialized on the problem.

7 David C. Reeder, "Infant Mortality in Leicester 1860-1920," (1993), unpublished paper,
photocopy obtained from the Centre for Urban History, Leicester University. As of 2002, it does
not appear that any new findings have been reached.
8 Anne Hardy, The Epidemic Streets: Infectious Disease and the Rise of Preventive Medicine
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3-4.
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Such attention made Leicester's health officials self-conscious and led directly
to some investigations.
Through the second half of the nineteenth century the problem of diarrhoea
received more and more attention as it refused to yield to "progress." Raw
mortality from the "disease" in Leicester does not appear to have been a simple
function of population growth. Moreover the town consistently ranked first or
second in mortality from diarrhoea whether this was calculated per thousand
living or per thousand births. 9 Agents of the town made numerous attempts to
ascertain causes for the malady with a heightened sense of urgency when the
medical community was most vocal but the community had no remedy. The
complexity of diarrhoea hampered all such investigations. Crude miasmatic
theory was falling out of favor (a gradual and variable process) but notions of
disease that replaced it tended toward a unicausal approach, that is, that a
particular organism, biological reaction, or vector was anticipated for a particular
symptom or disease. Identifying such an association often led to the development
of an accepted remedy, at least as far as causation was concerned. The best
example of this would probably be cholera. After Dr. John Snow's detailed
investigation of cholera in 1854 it became roundly accepted that contact with an
infected water source was the mechanism of transmission. 10 But investigations of
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diarrhoea did not yield such definitive results and therefore no accepted
remedy developed during the period under study. These investigations will be
considered in their temporal contexts.

It is difficult to determine exactly when diarrhoea mortality came to be
perceived as a notable problem in Leicester. Local deaths were first tabulated in
1850 by Leicester's Medical Officer of Health (MOH), John Buck. Dr. Buck was
sufficiently familiar with the "disease's" patterns that he made note of the
fatalities only between August and October of the years 1850 and 1851. The third
quarter of the year would remain by far the most fatal from diarrhoea throughout
the period. 11 In addition to the time of year Buck considered little more than the
agent of the victims in his analysis. Recognizing that only the very young and the
very old perished from the "disease," and that these victims were more
homebound than the general population, Buck speculated that some type of
"organic poison" was acting in people's homes. 12 He hesitated to make bolder
statements than this and showed some foresight but he seemed to expect a single
cause. "Whatever may be the qualities of the subtle and hitherto unrecognized
agent which operates in producing such dire effects, will probably long remain a
matter for scientific investigation." 13
Through the 1850s annual diarrhoea deaths never dipped below 100 and in
1857 topped 200. Nonetheless concern about the deaths during this decade was
restricted to a circumscribed group. Of course families of victims experienced
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immeasurable loss but few civic leaders in Leicester raised an alarm. Joseph
Dare, Unitarian missionary to the working class, wrote in 1852: "I have officiated
at the Cemetary when as many as sixteen children have been buried in one day.
The districts of the poor in this town are ... filled with the lamentation and
weeping of mothers over the loss of their little ones." 14 Dare's implied social
distinction of the "disease" was geographically corroborated by the new MOH
and former town councilor, John Moore, in 1853. Dr. Moore looked a bit more
closely at the deaths than did Buck, and by "comparing the localities where Fever
and Diarrhoea have been most prevalent during the years 1851, 1852, and 1853, I
find but little difference; they prevail principally where sewerage is either entirely
wanting or very defective." 15 While these conditions might have described much
of the town in 1853 they would have been particularly acute in poor or working
class neighborhoods which tended to be overcrowded and often built on land with
poor natural drainage. 16
Diarrhoea occasioned little more comment from Moore in the 1850s The
MOH dutifully recorded the deaths each year· but did not expound on the problem
again until 1861. The year 1861 was not good for diarrhoea mortality in Leicester
but it was still short of the 202 deaths in 1857. What prompted Moore to
comment in 1861 was a sharp jump in fatality compared with 1860 that could not

12 LRO L.614, John Buck, Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health for 1851, 11. [hereafter
MOH 1851].
13 Ibid., 10.
14 Joseph Dare (1852); quoted in Barry Haynes, Working-Class Life in Victorian Leicester: The
Joseph Dare Reports (Leicester: Leicestershire Libraries and Information Service, 1991), 44.
15 LRO L614, John Moore, MOH 1853, 4.
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be correlated with hot weather or anything else. As yet Leicester was not
experiencing any outside pressure on the matter, so Moore had no reason to be
less than forthcoming in his assessment that
[t]he increase of mortality from this disease, so far as it respects our own
locality, does not appear to arise from any known cause. Hot and sultry
weather certainly predispose to it, and an indulgence in Fruits, etc., when
they are abundant is frequently an immediate cause; but neither of these
existed in 1861, on the contrary, the Summer and Autumn were most
congenial and fruit very scarce, but nevertheless, we find an increase in
the mortality from this disease of from 56 in 1860 to 160 in 1861. 17
Moore's candor about his own ignorance of the cause enabled him to objectively
address other contemporary notions. How firmly anyone held to a "fruit theory"
is open to question but by 1865 Moore believed that he had enough experience
with the "disease" to eliminate this as a cause. 18 The MOH encapsulated his view
That it should arise from some epidemic cause, of which we have no
cognizance. At the season of the year when these diseases are most
prevalent, there is always a large amount of vegetable refuse, which is
frequently allowed to accumulate until decomposition takes place: a more

16 Elliott, Victorian Leicester, 101-03. Elliott writes that overcrowding in Leicester was not as bad
as in some other towns such as Manchester.
17 LRO 20 D 72/2, John Moore, MOH 1861, 5.
18 LRO 20 D 72/2, John Moore, MOH 1865, 8.
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frequent removal of this refuse would tend, in some measure, to lessen
the amount of these diseases, as well as others of a zymotic character. 19

In the 1860s average annual diarrhoea mortality increased by some 71 % from
the previous decade. 20 This outpaced population growth from 1861 to 1871 by
31 %, and total growth from 1851 to 1871 by 14%. 21 By 1868, Leicester crossed a
threshold that had less significance numerically than it had rhetorically. In 1868,
three hundred forty-nine people died of diarrhoea in Leicester. Not only was this
140 more than in the previous year but this was the first time that more than 300
deaths had been reported in any single year. In raw numbers, this was four times
as many deaths as in London in 186822 a fact which caught widespread
attention. 23
Notice was taken of the situation in 1868 by the Registrar-General and this
infonnation was given publicity by the Lancet.

In his September Quarterly Report, the Registrar-General, referring to the
excessive diarrhoeal mortality in Leicester, remarked that there mu1-t exist
'conditions exceptionally favorable to the diffusion' of that disorder. The
Local Board of health, acting upon this suggestion, forthwith nominated a

19 Ibid. "Zymotic" is a term that was coined by Dr. William Farr and for the purposes of this paper
it may be loosely defined as infectious.
20 Average annual diarrhoea mortality from 1852 to 1861 was 128.6, from 1862 to 1871, 219.5.
Averages are used here because of annual variability.
21 Population growth from 1861 to 1871 was 40%, from 1851 to 1871, 57%.
22 Jack Simmons, Leicester: Past and Present, vol. 2, Modem City 1860-1974 (London: Eyre
Methuen, 1974), 13.
23 Comparative figures over short or relatively short periods of time were very important in
heightening awareness, more important for this purpose than their statistical significance. Because
ofa myriad of factors affecting specific outbreaks only trends are of ultimate importance. Thus
the drastic sounding comparison between Leicester and London in 1868 could have been an
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Sub-committee (including members of the medical profession) to take the
matter into consideration, and to report thereon. A document now before
us, addressed to the Board by Mr. James Thompson [Chronicle publisher
and council member], at whose instance the Sub-committee was
appointed, shows pretty clearly that the Registrar-General's surmise was
correct. Mr. Thompson speaks of 'the enormous number of open
cesspools scattered all over the town;' the number of pigsties, slaughterhouses, and stables; the inefficiency of some of the main sewers; and 'the
introduction into wells, by percolation, of the emanations from cesspools,
the water being drunk by the inhabitants of the locality.' Little wonder,
then, that diarrhoea should abound particularly during a season of unusual
dryness and heat. Judging from Mr. Thompson's statements, the main
sewer, instead of being, as it ought to be, an instrument of defence against
disease, is, by its bad construction, a source of constant danger. 24
While neither the Registrar-General nor the Lancet could be specific about any
causative agent it is clear that the medical journal endorsed Thompson's
association of the "disease" with the troubled sewage system. The Lancet was
especially concerned with the lack of mortar to cement the bricks in the deeper
sections of the Wicksteed system. This deficiency permitted sewage to leach
directly into soil and indirectly into basements.

aberration and carries less significance than the perennial ranking of Leicester at the top of the list
in terms of diarrhoea deaths per 1,000 population or 1,000 live births.
24 Lancet, 20 March 1869, 418.
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The Medical Officer of Health of Leicester in 1868 was the recently
appointed Dr. J. Wyatt Crane. The annual report of the MOH for 1868 could
hardly ignore that year's death toll from diarrhoea but Crane went far beyond his
predecessors in assigning a cause to the "disease." Where Buck had timidly
offered a "homebound theory" and speculated on the complexity of the disorder,
and Moore had dismissed the "fruit theory" and correlated the problem with
refuse, Crane brought forth another theory that assured subsequent controversy.
Seeming to belong to an earlier era, the bold statement that served as Crane's
emblem for a decade was "I believe that simple heat is the cause of Summer
Diarrhoea in this country."25
Crane's "simple heat theory" was open to criticism on its face but the doctor
added fuel to the fire. According to Crane, solar heat relaxed the digestive tract
giving rise to an inability to digest foods that would be innocuous in cooler
temperatures. Crane expected that all ages of people would experience diarrhoea
in hot weather but the disorder would prove fatal to "weakly children."26 As
Crane was forced to defend his theory he developed and elaborated it; ''weakly
children" were the result of factory labor. The MOH conceived of factory work
as a physically degenerating way of life, that is, robust individuals who worked in
factories (or workshops) gradually weakened in strength and stamina. Moreover,
Crane believed that this weakening was somehow heritable, so that the second
generation of factory laborers would be more susceptible than the first, the third
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more degenerated than the second, and subsequent generations would spiral
ever downward in their ability to resist this "disease."27 So Crane's "simple heat
theory'' became more complicated as it implicated an economic and social system.
Crane's theory appeared to be eminently vulnerable with regard to "simp_le
heat" so many of his detractors did not indulge themselves in the issue of
progressive factory debilitation over generations. "Simple heat" made skeptics of
laymen as well as medical professionals and laymen felt qualified to comment on
a theory that sounded as simplistic as "simple heat." In September of 1871, Crane
appeared before the town council to justify his position. Prior to this episode
Crane's theory had been the subject of three rather negative editorials in the
Lancet. 28 While the Lancet articles were not blatant personal attacks on Dr. Crane
(perhaps out of professional courtesy) in the September meeting one town
councilor took the "simple heat theory'' to its logical yet absurd conclusion.
William Barfoot, the councilor who had requested Crane's presence at the
meeting, acknowledged that criticism from outside Leicester led him to raise the
subject and read an anonymous letter from "a gentleman of very high scientific
attainments."29 The letter, dripping with sarcasm, read in part:
Don't let the ratepayer's money be squandered in what up to now has been
called sanitary reform. Don't let us waste our time in ventilating the
sewers, in examining the system of drainage and the details of it; let the
cesspools flourish and the wells in their close proximity be left for the
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inhabitants to drink from. It is the heat, and the heat alone that is the
cause of this plague. I should suggest that the Board of Health advertise
for a square mile of awning to shade the town of Leicester from the sun's
rays, and agree with the Waterworks Company to keep it constantly wet
with streams of water from Bradgate. 'Then' I confidently predict there
will be no more 'massacre of the innocents' and Leicester will be the
healthiest town in England, and the Officer of Health will have
immortalized himself as a sanitary reformer. 30
Barfoot continued the sarcasm a bit farther by saying "[i]f they adopted the heat
theory, it would give the Local Board very little trouble. They might dispense
with their sanitary inspectors certainly."31
The humorous tone that Barfoot's letter brought to the council meeting was
continued by Dr. Crane. I suggest that any use of humor helps to illustrate that
there was no panic in the town despite the hundreds of annual deaths. After
Barfoot's remarks Crane set about to defend his position but he prefaced his
argument with a witty rejoinder to Barfoot on the long-windedness of politicians.
From the account that was published in the Chronicle it would appear that Crane's
demeanor diffused at least some of the criticisms leveled against his theory. The
thrust of Crane's defense of"simple heat" was a comparison of Dublin and
Leicester. The MOH said that Dublin's diarrhoea mortality, far lower than
Leicester's, was due to the Irish town's cooler temperatures. Crane emphasized
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that Dublin was a much larger town, had a sewage system that was worse than
Leicester's, but averaged about 4 or 5 degrees Fahrenheit lower than Leicester in
the summer. He went on to predict that his next annual report would prove that
"simple heat" was fact not theory. In reference to Barfoot's sanitation sarcasm,
Crane stated his belief that sewerage improvements should still be a goal for the
borough because there was a connection between drainage and "fever" even
though there was no connection between drainage and diarrhoea.
Barfoot offered more rational criticism of"simple heat." Temperatures within
Leicester would have had little variation but diarrhoea mortality varied by wards
within the town. Using the MOH's own statistics from 1870, Barfoot showed that
the variation ranged from 1 death in All Saints' ward to 90 deaths-in Middle St.
Margaret's ward. Crane countered this meteorologically by contending that
cooling breezes acted favorably on high ground and where relatively few
buildings existed to block the flow of the wind. All of St. Margaret's was on low
ground and Middle St. Margaret's was surrounded by urban development which
impeded air flow.
Councilors C. R. Crossley and Dr. G. Pierce rose in part to defend Crane and
in part to further the non-meteorological dialogue of the "disease." Dr. Pierce
"did not think that Dr. Crane meant that heat was directly the cause of diarrhoea;
but it certainly did cause a great increase in fermentation." 32 It sounds as though
Pierce did not want to believe Crane's unequivocal pronouncements of his
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position. Pierce went on to posit that "[t]he increased temperature had a great
effect upon milk; and where, as was now the practice, infants were fed so much
from the bottle, they were likely to get sour milk, and in that way diarrhoea. " 33
Pierce's "milk theory" was one which would gain currency among Victorians but
there would be several different explanations advanced for the dangers caused by
milk. Pierce also suggested that Barfoot convene a "meeting of medical men to
discuss that important question. " 34
Crossley argued that heat was undoubtedly involved in diarrhoea mortality but
that it was wrong for investigators to expect to attribute the "disease" to only one
cause; he recommended that mortality statistics be compiled more narrowly than
by wards. He also brought soil composition into the debate; noting that Middle
St. Margaret's had a fairly large amount of open space, Crossley introduced the
"made ground theory." Areas such as Middle St. Margaret's were located where
clay pits or quarries had been worked in times past. The pits were surrounded on
the sides and bottom by unharvested clay which allowed for precious little natural
drainage. All types of garbage had been dumped into the pits, including dead
animals, and then buildings had been erected on top of this. It was Crossley's
belief that the garbage (or "made ground") decayed, was trapped by the clay, and
released toxins upward by evaporation in hot weather. He contrasted the
mortality in this ward with a ward that was built on soil with much natural gravel.
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In the ward built on gravel, cesspools had always been self-draining and there
were few diarrhoea deaths.

In the wake of the 1871 town council debate there was no new activity by the
borough, not even the meeting of medical men that Pierce had advocated.
Crane's annual report for 1871 cannot realistically be considered to have proven
the "simple heat theory" and he tended to emphasize the poor "vigour of the
infantile population" more often than "simple heat."35 Historian Barbara
Thompson finds that Crane was not alone among medical men in this perception.

In 1873, a Dr. Bridges, onetime physician to the Bradford Infirmary and later
Medical Inspector of the Local Government Board, wrote that the population was
"damaged at or before birth by the factory system."36 However, Barbara
Thompson notes, "by the 1870s the emphasis in explanations of causation had
gradually shifted from working mothers to the home environment."37 Elements of
both sorts of explanations, as well as others, can be seen in 1870s Leicester.
MOH Crane eventually took Crossley's advice and in 1873 sent the local
sanitary inspectors, Sergeants Buxton and Brayley, to conduct a survey of the
homes of infant victims. I label this seminal study as Crane's "paradox enquiry."
The inspectors were able to obtain information regarding 283 38 of the 314 deaths
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in 1873. 39 "Simple heat theory" was thoroughly vindicated in this enquiry,
not because it was proved in a positive sense but because all other theories
seemed to be disproved. Little remains of Crane's data but on no less than five
counts his conclusions earn the label of"paradox enquiry": houses with good air
circulation were more deadly than confined houses, clean homes were more fatal
than average or dirty homes, houses with piped water were more dangerous than
those which relied upon wells, mothers who did not work outside the home lost
more children than those who did, and breast-fed infants died with greater
frequency than did bottle-fed infants or infants fed by a combination of breast and
bottle. 40 The Lancet considered Crane's "paradox enquiry" to be "at variance
with professional theories."41 The Lancet was kind to Crane on this point. Yet,
"professional theories" had proved no more effectual at retarding diarrhoea than
had "simple heat theory" in the 1870s.
Another enquiry of 1873, presumably impressionistic, was offered by Joseph
Dare from conversations with an unnamed "medical gentlemen" of twenty years'
experience. 42 It is possible that this effort was meant to compete with the
"paradox enquiry" because it also offered five points of explanation. According
to Dare's source, diarrhoea mortality arose from early marriages that produced
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"poor, weakly, sickly, fragile things,',4 3 poor nursing care afforded by old
women and young girls in lieu of working mothers, feeding problems from
unclean bottles and water mixtures that contained arrowroot or flour, preventives
and remedies that contained metals or opium, and dirty or poorly ventilated
houses. 44 Dare's exposition, continuing the tradition established by Edwin
Chadwick of marshalling evidence to support an agenda, was intended to support
the notion that local boards should have the power to raze slums in pursuit of
public health. 45
In 1874, Crane believed that he was on top of the game. His annual report for
that year proclaimed "[t]hat it is heat which gives rise to summer diarrhoea is, I
believe, now almost generally acknowledged. The Society of Medical Officers of
Health, in London, met last year to consider the question, and [their] verdict was,
I believe, almost unanimous in the affirmative.',46 Crane, feeling vindicated and
secure, pontificated: "[t]he inhabitants of the factory towns ... owe their debility to
the gradual degeneration of themselves, and their forefathers and mothers by a
factory life, until a race is generated which is so debile as to be unable to resist the
first shock of disease.',47 Their children "were in fact born dying, and no carefully
selected diet or medical skill could avert the inevitable result.',4 8 The only attack
on Crane's theory from within Leicester in 1874 came from a new member of the
town council/Local Board, Mr. Richardson, who advocated a variation of"milk
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theory" by making the rather absurd claim that all infant mortality "was
entirely owing to the dilution of milk with water.',49 While Richardson's assertion
was absurd it implied a correctable situation as proposed to Crane's fatalism.
Three factors contributed to make 187 5 an important year for Leicester and the
diarrhoea question: recognition that "infantile mortality ... has now unhappily
become chronic in Leicester,"50 increased pressure from the medical profession,
and the flood of 1875 which created fears of epidemic. Deaths from the "disease"
were high in 1875, reaching 308, but this figure was by no means
unprecedented. 51 Moreover, the level of concern about diarrhoea, shown by press
references in the spring and early summer, was rising before the traditional season
of high mortality. To an extent concern was rising because actual deaths were
occurring but it would be wrong to conceive of this concern as a straightforward
and rational reaction to current conditions.
By 187 5 there was a clear pattern of unusually high diarrhoea mortality in
Leicester relative to other towns. Week after week and year after year the
Registrar-General listed the town at or near the top of the kingdom in infant
mortality and the "excess" of mortality was due almost exclusively to diarrhoea.
Constant repetition of comparative statistics was not lost on the Leicester
Chronicle and made the Lancet focus its attention on the town. The Lancet might
not have taken a different editorial viewpoint without Crane's "simple heat
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theory'' but the MOH made sure that Leicester became a target rather than just
a topic for the journal.
That the Lancet motivated Leicester's leaders toward action on diarrhoea
mortality is hardly questionable. The contemporary chairman oftq.e town
council's Sanitary Committee, Councilor Grimsley, acknowledged "public
attention having been called to this matter by the medium of the Lancet."52
Thomas Windley, who would become the Sanitary Committee's chairman for
thirty years, said in 1875 that he moved for a subcommittee to investigate
diarrhoea because of what he had read in the Lancet. 53 While the chronic
appearance of the "disease" and its publicity in the Lancet motivated intensive
investigation into the problem, it was the flood of 1875 that pushed concern to a
new level.
Before the flood, the Chronicle reported on impure milk samples, the national
Factory and Workshops Commission's report, Crane's rebuttal to that report, and
the creeping diarrhoea death toll in Leicester. The purity of retail cow's milk was
analyzed by Dr. Meadows along with other types of consumables. In his position
as Leicester's public analyst Meadows tested products from flour to beer. Of the
milk samples submitted to Dr. Meadows nearly 65% were found to be impure for
unspecified reasons; among other products only bread (7%) contained any
impurities. 54 Regarding the Factory and Workshops Commission's report the
Chronicle summarized the findings as contrary to Crane's supposition that factory
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work led to

debility. 55

Crane responded in the next issue of the newspaper by

claiming that he had been misunderstood. The MOH said that by "factory life" he
did not mean factory work per se but the lifestyle associated with working
mothers. 56 The Chronicle did not bother to attack this clear contradiction of the
fourth tenet of Crane's own "paradox enquiry" but noted sadly the imminent
return of the annual mortality. 57
After the July flood both dialogue and activity increased in Leicester. As
mentioned above the Chronicle predicted that disease would be epidemic in the
wake of the flood. Moreover, A. Buchan's "The Mortality of the large towns of
the British Isles in relation to weather" appeared and refuted "simple heat theory"
by a comparison of temperature and mortality between Bristol and Leicester. 58
But the most significant occurrence in post-flood Leicester was the
commissioning of the Buck-Franklin investigation.
The Buck-Franklin investigation emerged from within Windley's diarrhoea
subcommittee of the council's Sanitary Committee in August 1875. The field
work was well underway by the time the entire council discussed the merits of
such a study in the first week of September and publicity preceded the
discussion. 59 Councilors Windley, Grimsley, and Richardson all told the council
about the perceived pressure from the Lancet to take some action with regard to
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diarrhoea. 60 Richardson also spoke of the medical profession's dim view of
Crane's "simple heat" explanation. Grimsley complained of "certain writers"
who censured the town "in a way [it] did not deserve." The chairman spoke
defensively about Leicester's mortality rate and stated that diarrhoea did not arise
from unsanitary conditions in the town. In his opinion the Buck-Franklin
investigation might exonerate the borough's sanitary authorities and thus "efface
the blot from their otherwise fair escutcheon." Windley added that he thought it
unlikely that Buck and Franklin would successfully determine the cause of
diarrhoea.
Grimsley told the council that the subcommittee had first approached Crane to
conduct the investigation but the doctor was too busy with his MOH duties and
his private practice. 61 Richardson said that Leicester's MOH also believed that
there was nothing of value to be gained from another study of the problem.
Aldermen Stevenson and Winterton both spoke in support of the Buck-Franklin
investigation with Winterton adding that £ 10 was too cheap to pay for an
important matter such as this. Windley replied that on the odd chance that Buck
and Franklin were successful they would be paid in fame rather than pounds
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sterling. The council's discussion of the fait accompli was punctuated with
the mayor's derogation that if Major Tulloch could find the time to travel from
London to meet with the subcommittee then surely Dr. Crane should be able to
attend but he had not done so.
To the historian, the report which Dr. W. Elgar Buck and Mr. George Cooper
Franklin compiled is worth far more than the £26 5s. that each of the gentlemen
were ultimately paid for it. The statistical data alone provided a demographic
picture of the "disease" that outweighs their not insignificant conclusions.
Extensive exposition of the report is warranted in this dissertation. The essence of
Leicester's problem was that the town was generally not unhealthy; overall
mortality was 24.1 per 1,000 living compared with 25 per 1,000 for the 18 largest
towns in Britain. But 36.5% of all deaths in Leicester were of children under one
year of age compared with 26.3% in the 18 towns. Specifically, diarrhoea deaths
in Leicester amounted to 8.5 per 1,000 living, more than twice the national urban
mean of 3.8 per 1,000. Moreover, well over 1 child in 5 in Leicester did not live
to see their first birthday. 62 The investigators made house-to-house inquiries of
all homes which suffered a reported diarrhoea fatality of a child under five years
of age between 1 July 1875 and 30 September 1875. Of238 such cases, Buck and
Franklin were able to report on 216. 63
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Of the 216 deaths, 86% or 186 were under one year of age (in Crane's
"paradox enquiry'' 95% had been less than one year old.) 64 Before they
succumbed 42.6% suffered for one week or less, 27.8% from 1 to 2 weeks, 9.3%
from 2 to 3 weeks, and 20.4% for longer than 3 weeks. The average age of the
father was 30.8 years and the mother 29.9 years. Fifty-three of the mothers
(24.5% compared with the "paradox enquiry's" 28.9%) worked outside the home,
24 or 11.1 % worked for wages within the home, and 139 or 64.4% did not work
for wages at all. Only 22 or 10.1 % of the victims had been exclusively breast-fed,
while 133 or 61.6% were partially breast-fed, and 61 or 28.2% had never suckled
from the breast. Of particular note is that only 3 or 4 of this last group were fed
cow's milk exclusively. Another tantalizing statistic is that 39% of the victims'
mothers were "in the habit" of using opium laced cordials for their children but it
is unclear exactly what "in the habit" means.
There was no such ambiguity in "that all these infants who died were those
whose parents belonged to the so-called working classes; so it would seem that
those infants whose parents were of the middle or upper class, did not suffer
equally with those of the lower. They suffer to some extent, of course, but the
disease is not fatal among them."65 Buck and Franklin could not reconcile this
observation with the "simple heat theory." Moreover, Buck and Franklin were
forced to reject the opinions of the victims' own mothers because "[if] we had
taken the explanations of the mothers, we might return 80 per cent of these fatal
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cases as having been due entirely, or in great part, to

teething."66

A third

theory that Buck and Franklin were forced to reject was general uncleanliness of
the victims' homes; mortality could not be correlated with individual families'
hygienic practices regardless of their impressionistic relation to poverty. 67 A
fourth idea that was discredited was the "working mother theory." In their own
words:
We wish to draw particular attention to this: That 24.5 per cent of nursing
mothers [this would be potentially nursing mothers] go out to work is a
fact much at variance with current opinion. It is stated often that anyone
can tell how it is the infants die, 'that their mothers go out to work, and
that the infant does not receive proper food and attention' ... We here do
not hesitate to state our opinion that the nursing mothers do not, as a rule,
neglect their children. 68
In addition to the assertion that diarrhoea mortality was a function of class
Buck and Franklin observed that "[g]enerally speaking the distribution of the
disease is determined by the course of the river. The higher parts of the town
have but little."69 They went on to a geological/geographical explanation that
supported the "made ground theory." Middle St. Margaret's ward was still the
most fatal part of town with its clay perimeters and its "landfill' soil composition.
If the entire Buck-Franklin report could be reduced to one statement with regard
to causation it might be: mortality from diarrhoea was highest where the subsoil
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was saturated from stagnated sewage or where "made ground" filled the clay
pits that could not be drained. 70
Buck and Franklin went on to write of their belief that there was more than one
malady involved in diarrhoea. They described three types of the "disease." First,
diarrhoea could be merely a symptom of another disease. Second, diarrhoea
could be a "sequel" to another disease; that is some other disease could run its
course but leave the child in such a weakened state that he or she would be very
susceptible to diarrhoea. Third, "which is of the greatest importance ... with
regard to the present enquiry'' was a condition that they termed "specific
diarrhoea." 71 Specific diarrhoea was deemed to be present in those cases in which
the child had relatively healthy parents, had been healthy herself prior to the
attack, and died within one week of the onset of symptoms. 72 Four conditions
were considered to contribute to specific diarrhoea: decomposing organic
material, heat, air, and moisture. Quoting a Dr. Parkes, Buck and Franklin wrote
that "'probably they [the agents of disease] are low forms of life which grow and
propagate in these conditions. "'73 The investigators lamented public resistance to
postmortem examinations which they believed would shed more light on the
organisms involved. 74
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Reaction to the Buck-Franklin report was something of a mixed bag but it
would seem that no writers really changed their minds in the wake of its
publication. The Chronicle blamed the sewage system for the problem before
Buck-Franklin and argued that without "sewerage reform, more additional
'reporting' cannot but be regarded as less than useless."75 It did not change its
focus after the report. Joseph Dare wrote that he concurred with Buck and
Franklin yet maintained that "[ o]ne great cause, if not the chief cause, will be
found in the vice and immorality, the drink, bad food, and irregular habits of
numbers of the human family." 76 Dr. Crane, not surprisingly, disparaged all
aspects of the report from saturated subsoil to specific diarrhoea. Claiming
support from Councilor Grimsley he reiterated "simple heat theory" with special
attention to the lack of cooling breezes in the low-lying, high mortality districts. 77
The Lancet reported a host of likely contributing causes from maternal neglect
to narcotics but recognized that these problems, unlike drainage, were not unique
to Leicester. The journal tentatively accepted Buck-Franklin's conclusions but
recognized that the report did not attempt to identify a specific organism
responsible for specific diarrhoea. 78 About six months later, the Lancet was more
enthusiastic in its support of the report because Leicester appeared to be "in
remission" from diarrhoea deaths relative to the previous year. While the journal
gave credit to Buck and Franklin's work on saturated subsoil it contended that,
since no improvement could have been made on that account, the house-to-house
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investigation had proved to be a preventive measure by educating parents.
"Much of the excessive infant mortality among the working classes is directly due
to the ignorance and neglect of parents, and the apparent result of the recent
Leicester inquiry very forcibly suggests that much good might result from more
frequent investigations."79 When diarrhoea mortality in Leicester rebounded the
following month the Lancet made no mention of Buck and Franklin or their
conclusions. so
One member of Leicester's Sanitary Committee, Dr. John Sloane, decided to
launch his own investigation of diarrhoea in 1876. Sloane seized upon the BuckFranklin statistics to support his own hybrid of "sewage theory" and "milk
theory." He attacked Crane's "simple heat" with a crude comparison of average
third quarter, or July to September, temperatures and mortality. 81 He attacked
Crane's attendant notion of factory life debility without recourse to evidence: "I
do not think the people in Leicester are physically degenerating."82 Sloane
decided that Leicester's infant diarrhoea mortality was most likely caused by
children drinking milk which had come from cows that grazed on land that was
contaminated by its proximity to the sewage laden River Soar. 83 It would seem
that Sloane wanted to believe this explanation rather than being empirically
convinced of its veracity. Buck and Franklin had indeed shown that exclusively
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breast-fed children had low mortality but they had not shown that cow's milk
was dangerous at its source by any stretch of the imagination since exclusively
milk-fed babies comprised less than 2% of fatalities in their study. Sloane merely
associated infant mortality with his impression that infants were heavy consumers
of milk. He did not refer to Dr. Meadows' analyses which, in their published
form, did not distinguish between milk samples that were impure because of
adulteration and those that were impure because of spoilage. On a more useful
note, Sloane advocated that the nuisance inspectors, Sergeants Buxton and
Brayley, assess the milk consumption of diarrhoea victims in the future. 84
While the aging Dr. Crane began to lose interest in diarrhoea and the
controversy that surrounded the problem, a youthful Dr. William Johnston
represented new blood in Leicester's concern to resolve the problem. 85 New to
Leicester in the mid-1870s the Ulster-born Johnston would become Crane's
assistant in 1877 and his successor by 1880. Although Johnston's fame would
come primarily from the "Leicester Method" of smallpox containment, he was a
vociferous critic of the sewerage system and its relationship to diarrhoea mortality
even before he was in a position to effect any changes in the town's response to
smallpox. 86 His initial foray into the diarrhoea debate criticized "made ground
theory" and attacked the sewer system. 87

Ibid.
For Crane's flagging interest see the Lancet, 27 April 1878, 618. For brief biographical
information on Johnston see Stuart M. F. Fraser, "Leicester and Smallpox: The Leicester Method,"
Medical History 24 (1980): 317-18 and especially note 15.
86 Perhaps I use the word "fame" a bit loosely. Despite the fact that Dr. Johnston unintentionally
became a hero to the anti-vaccination movement, his name is almost universally misspelled, from
contemporaries such as the Lancet (with the odd exceptions of August 1878 and June 1885) to
84

85

196
Johnston's classic "Report on the Principal Zymotic Diseases during 1877"
was the doctor's first project on becoming Leicester's assistant MOH. Presented
to the Sanitary Committee of the town council on 18 January 1878, this document
spelled out the "Leicester Method," advocated low-cost day care for children of
working mothers, and provided a reasonable breakdown of causation of diarrhoea
mortality. Sensing the complexity of diarrhoea Johnston assigned 1/3 of the
blame to improper feeding of children. Rather than attack the intelligence of
working-class parents as Winterton did in 1875,88 or the debility associated with
factory life as did Crane, Johnston claimed that it was not reasonable to criticize
parents simply because the mother had to work outside the home to support the
family. Though he thought it regrettable he understood that such labor was
necessary and posited that the remedy was in "Creches or public Nurseries."89 At
the heart of Johnston's problem with mothers who could ill afford to breast-feed
was the reliance upon arrowroot and water formulas. Should there be made
available "fresh unadulterated cow's milk" in creches with trained attendants,
offered at minimal expense, diarrhoea mortality should surely decrease. 90
Johnston placed responsibility for the remaining 2/3 of diarrhoea mortality
squarely on the shoulders of the sewer system. His opposition to Buck-Franklin
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on this account appeared greater at the time of his study than it does today.
While Johnston disagreed with "made ground theory," he described conditions
that posed the same hazards: organic material, heat, and moisture (air was left
out.)9 1 The "Zymotic Report" shows historians that germ theory was increasing
in practical acceptance because decomposing organic materials were not assumed
to be the culprits per se, rather it was infected organic material coming into
contact with people that caused the "disease." This can be construed as a step
away from pythogenic theory and toward germ theory. But Buck-Franklin and
the "Zymotic Report" shared the condemnation of poor drainage. Whatever
organisms were living in stagnant sewage managed to make their way back to the
working-class citizens of Leicester. To Buck and Franklin they were non-specific
"low forms oflife" but to Johnston they were bacilli (Johnston made no
distinction between bacteria as a general category and bacilli as the rod-shaped
members of that category), capable of becoming airborne in sewer gas.
Johnston's appreciation of bacteria as an agent of disease demonstrates an
increasing sophistication in Leicester's approach to diarrhoea specifically and
germ theory generally, but it was also indicative of the times that he looked to
microbiology to find one particular bacillus, similar to typhoid, that would prove
to be the agent of the "disease."
The Chronicle was immediately enamored with Johnston, presumably because
his conclusions indicted the sewage system that the editors disparaged so
stridently. The newspaper gave extensive coverage to the "Zymotic Report" in its
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issue of 30 March 1878, without once mentioning the doctor's method of
smallpox containment. Referring to Johnston's diarrhoea investigation the
newspaper chose terms such as "courageous" and "exhaustive" as it praised the
doctor's "scientific skill .. .indefatigable industry and perseverance."92 No doubt
the new assistant MOH seemed quite impressive juxtaposed with Dr. Crane.
The Lancet was also taken with Dr. Johnston albeit not to the same extent as
the Chronicle and with quite some delay. As the summer diarrhoea season began
in 1878, the Lancet busily set about the annual bemoaning of Leicester's
seemingly permanent position at the pinnacle of the Registrar-General's list of
town mortality from the "disease." Indeed, the journal considered that such
attention had "lost its novelty" yet it remained "a duty [to] again and again ... call
attention to this preventable loss of infant life."93 The Lancet refused to accept
excuses such as "meteorological conditions" or "infant feeding" to explain the
problem because these were not "exceptionally vicious" in Leicester. The editors
were emphatic that they did not wish to discourage efforts to improve infant
feeding but Leicester's problem was "an exceptionally insanitary condition which
imperatively calls for amendment."94 So the journal was pleased with the·
"Zymotic Report" when it was finally addressed in the issue of 17 August; they
were pleased with Johnston's correlation of disease with sewerage deficiencies
but also cautious because "Dr. Johnston's results have not been accepted
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unreservedly by the sanitary authority. " 95 As we have seen, the "sanitary
authority" of Leicester inclined away from expensive remedial measures during
this period. Nonetheless, two examples show that there was at least some concern
among the more well-to-do citizens in Leicester about the plight of working-class
infants. First, evidence exists of a creche that was opened in response to
Johnston's recommendation. According to an anonymous corporation source the
creche opened on Metcalf Street in June of 1878 funded by £197 of charitable
contributions. 96 While independent corroboration of the opening of the Metcalf
Street creche is difficult, it was claimed that during 1879 the creche served 20
children daily and that both parents of these children had to work outside the
home or, in the case of widows, the mother had to work outside the home. 97
Second, in 1879, the Sanitary Committee began to make available an antidiarrhoea "mixture" for use as a remedy at no cost to the consumers.

In 1880, the diarrhoea mixture was again made available free to the public
from 31 July to 29 September. During this p;:irticularly fatal year there were 8,284
persons treated with the mixture and 346 deaths from diarrhoea during the period
of distribution. Table 6.1 shows the ages of the recipients of the mixture and the
ages of diarrhoea victims during the third quarter of 1880. Johnston's data does
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not attempt to link the deceased with use of the mixture so inferences on the
efficacy of the mixture would be unwarranted but certain demographic
information is revealed. Johnston's data on the number supplied shows that
infantile diarrhoea struck all ages of the population even though mortality, shown
just as clearly, was quite age-specific. In 1880, something near 7% of the entire
population availed itself of the diarrhoea mixture. Some 36% of the recipients
were under the age of five, the group with fully 98% of the mortality. However,

Table 6.1. Mixture distribution, 31 July to 29 September 1880, and diarrhoea
deaths, 1 July to 30 September 188098
Age

<1

1-2

2-3

3-4

4-5

5-10

10-15

15-20

761

763

553

411

1076

645

397

244

76

14

4

1

1

0

0

Age

20-25

25-35

35-45

45-55

55-65

65-75

75-85

85<

#Suppl

368

796

899

515

352

187

70

5

0

0

0

0

1

2

2

1

#Suppl 486
ied
#Deat
hs

ied
#Deat
hs

fact that it opened as a response to Johnston's plea and that it was a charitable venture rather than
a form of municipal socialism.
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only 6% of the recipients were children under one, the group in which 70.5% of
the deaths occurred. Still, the data shows that a great many parents attempted to
treat their children's "disease" via this civic program and it can be assumed that
others received some treatment by private practitioners. The Sanitary Committee
continued its program of mixture distribution "in the poorer districts of the town"
until 1891 with more than 10,000 persons receiving the treatment in at least one
year, 1884. 99
The year 1880 would record Leicester's highest numerical level of diarrhoea
deaths in the period under study but the season of mortality occurred rather later
in the year than usual. As late as 14 August, the Chronicle had high hopes for the
children in this year. So constant had been the association between diarrhoea
fatality and the town that in its review of the Registrar-General's weekly report
the Chronicle considered it newsworthy to print: "Leicester is not mentioned in
connection with this disease." 100 But any celebration would have proved
premature for by the end of the month deaths in the town were strikingly high. 101
As September began "Leicester has once more regained its unenviable place" at
the top of the Registrar-General's list. 102 The Chronicle began to lose some of its
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zeal for the "old, old story." 103 In a fatalistic tone the newspaper wrote "[a]s
for the origin of the periodic visitation, where doctors still differ, it would be
useless for the unprofessional student to attempt to decide." 104 The Lancet was
equally exasperated with "this annual sacrifice of infant life in Leicester" but
pleaded "[i]t should not surely be impossible to discover why infant mortality in
Leicester is so high." 105
Johnston's report for 1880 could not provide a simple solution to the problem.
Still citing the sewerage problems in the town he blamed ignorance and neglect of
mothers for deaths that could not be explained by the "fungoid impurities" in
sewer gas. 106 But Johnston was able to point to two noteworthy features of 1880:
first, the summer of such dire mortality had been a relatively cool one and second,
that all ages of Leicester's population had suffered bouts of diarrhoea. 107 So,
another nail was placed in the coffin of "simple heat theory" by temperature
comparison but Johnston was not trying to resurrect the specter of "weakly
children" by his age comparison. The age specificity contained in Johnston's
report was meant to show that fatalities alone did not revel the prevalence of the
"disease."
In 1881, when diarrhoea deaths in Leicester dropped to a raw figure of 193,

there was some relief expressed in the town. 108 Yet this feeling did not spread to
those watchdogs of national public health, the Registrar-General and the medical
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press, because 1881 was a light year for such mortality throughout the
kingdom. The death toll in Leicester remained proportionately high so the Lancet
reported the
Annual death-rate from diarrhoea in the twenty large English
towns ... averaged 2.8 per 1000 [living of all ages]. Whereas however, the
rate of this fatality did not exceed 0.7 in Plymouth, 0.9 in Bradford, and
1.1 in both Oldham and Bristol, it ranged upwards in the other towns to
3.4 in Hull, 4.0 in Leeds, 4.3 in Nottingham, and was no less than 6.8 in
Leicester. The excess of diarrhoea fatality in Leicester is of annual
occurrence, but the proportion of this excess is larger than ever this
year_ 109
Implicit in these statistics is a rebuttal of the factory life component of "simple
heat theory" because of the relative health of towns such as Bradford and Oldham.
As in the case of the sewage system, by the 1880s, the Local Government Board
(LGB) had heard enough complaints to launch their own investigation. During
the 1881 diarrhoea season the LGB commissioned Dr. Ballard and Mr. Power to
get to the bottom of the problem. 110
Ballard and Power were unable to provide any kind of quick fix to the
diarrhoea problem a la Major Tulloch and the sewerage problem in 1884. The
reason for this was that no accepted remedy had developed on the prevention of
diarrhoea in the way that sewage irrigation had come to be a well accepted
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solution for town drainage. It would take Ballard (Power was no longer in the
project) eight years to produce a 130-page report that the doctor himself
considered provisional and subject to retraction or modification. 111 The length of
time involved in the Ballard project, besides recommending his industriousness,
indicates the complexity of the problem much as his equivocation on the
conclusions indicates its mysterious nature. Nonetheless, it was hoped in
Leicester that Ballard would uncover a panacea.
Citing Dr. Ballard's ongoing investigation during several years oflow or
moderate death rates provided Leicester with a brief respite from internal pressure
to new activity. Johnston's 1882 and 1883 annual reports did little more than give
mortality statistics and mention Ballard's ongoing study. 112 But the RegistrarGeneral's statistics took no holiday. In the midst of the particularly cool summer
of 1882 the town was more than three times as fatal as the national average for
large towns and the Lancet was as vocal as ever in calling attention to the
situation. 113
In 1884, the death toll again rose above 300 to 344, nearly 200 more fatalities

than in the previous year. Dr. Johnston "hoped that some practical and
unmistakable recommendations for the mitigation of the evil may be included in
the exhaustive Report which Drs. Ballard and Power have been engaged upon for
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several years past." 114 He also reiterated "sewer theory'' with emphasis on the
transfer of "living organic ferments" from sewers to subsoil to humans. 115 He
noted that of the retail cow's milk tested in 1884 only 6% of the samples were
found to have impurities. 116 But in an otherwise unambitious annual report Dr.
Johnston provided the twelve step description of the course of the "disease"
mentioned above.
The summer of 1885 brought the usual attention from the Registrar-General
and the Lancet. 117 The year also brought a new MOH to Leicester as Johnston left
the post to devote more time to a successful private practice. 118 Dr. Henry
Tomkins, the first truly full-time MOH in Leicester, brought renewed vigor to the
problem although it reached only a moderate mortality level in his first year. 119
While Leicester's diarrhoea mortality was twice the average of the large towns in
1885 it was not the most fatal town in that year, being surpassed in that capacity
by Preston. 120 Tomkins mentioned heat as an exciting cause of diarrhoea but his
annual report was well received in the Lancet nonetheless. 121
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Dr. Tomkins' tenure as Leicester's MOH was challenged early on because
of the "excellent work" of his predecessor. 122 The new doctor from Manchester
was warned that it would "not be an easy matter to follow Dr. Johnston." 123 But
starting in 1886, Tomkins made a most comprehensive study of the "disease"
which included experimental as well as observational methodology. He explained
that he believed that the population of Leicester had become numbed to the
annual tragedy because of its incessant repetition. He dismissed many of the
conclusions of the investigators who had preceded him but of Johnston's "fungoid
impurities" he said "[i]t is more than probable that this statement will ultimately
be proved. 124 To indicate the imprecision of previous studies and to educate his
employers he added
Already grave suspicions had fallen upon some aerial contamination as
being the probable cause. But sewer gas, effluvia, miasms, malaria, bad
smells give us no real explanation, these terms are little better than cloaks
for our ignorance. The Scientist of the present day demands something
more tangible and real than this. 125
First, Tomkins located a section of the town which he called the "diarrhoea
area" because it contained 33% of the population but 84% of the diarrhoea deaths
in 1886. Predictably this area was low-lying and flat. He collected air samples
from this area and compared them with samples from areas of higher elevation
and lower death rates. Air from the diarrhoea area contained "various micro-
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cocci and bacilli" numbering between 2,000 and 7,000 per cubic meter while
air above higher ground had between 60 and 900. Tomkins cultivated these
organisms in a laboratory setting. He did postmortems on an unspecified number
of victims of diarrhoea and found that some victims had these organisms in their
spleens and kidneys but all victims had them in ulcerations or the mucous
membranes of their intestines. Still unable to isolate individual culprits, Tomkins
injected someone (himself?) with small cultivated doses from both air and
postmortem sources. The result was that "I have been able to induce with
certainty a sharp attack of Diarrhoea, lasting from twelve to twenty-four hours."
The MOH realized that he did not have incontrovertible proof of the agent of
disease but there were four positive assertions that he could make: first, these
organisms existed in vastly larger numbers where dian:hoea was prevalent than
where it was not, second, they were present in the bodies of the victims, third,
they could be shown to reproduce under laboratory conditions, and fourth the
cultivated specimens caused diarrhoea. He further claimed that sewage would
make an ideal medium for the organisms to procreate and the warmer the sewage
the more the organisms would prosper. 126
In his next annual report Tomkins looked back at the history of the "disease."

Because natural deaths were not tabulated by cause in Leicester until 1851,
Tomkins looked for the traditional bulge in mortality during the third quarter of
the years before diagnostic statistics were kept. What the MOH found remains as
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suggestive as it remains ambiguous. Table 6.2 shows that from 1845 through
1850 "diarrhoea season" was not an especially fatal time of year; the traditional
bulge in quarterly mortality statistics did not exist in the late 1840s. During those
six years the third quarter was the most deadly on only one occasion and in 1849
it was the least deadly. This led Tomkins to posit that summer diarrhoea was
significantly less virulent in Leicester's past. As Tomkins already subscribed to
"sewer theory" generally this information reinforced his perception that the
deficiencies of the Wicksteed sewer system could indeed be translated into the
loss of human lives as the Chronicle had said some years before. 127 Yet Tomkins
realized that this data was subject to another interpretation: that improvements in

Table 6.2. All deaths by quarter 1845-1850 128
Year

1st Quarter

2"0 Quarter

3ro Quarter

4tn Quarter

1845

445

432

458

354

1846

342

305

436

460

1847-

442

327

343

345

1848

353

379

353

401

1849

516

411

360

402

1850

351

302

367

393

126
127
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death rates from causes other than diarrhoea created the third quarter bulge by
reducing their totals in the other quarters. While the MOH believed that diarrhoea
had worsened to create the third quarter bulge he had to remain tentative on this
point. 129
His adherence to "sewer theory" gave Tomkins an optimistic view about the
future of diarrhoea in Leicester. The Gordon sewer system was the single most
important remedy to Tomkins and construction of the system continued apace
during his tenure. In the meantime the Sanitary Committee made several attempts
to stave off the "disease." In 1886 disinfectant was added to sewage in the lowlying districts with no apparent effects. 130 In 1887 water mixed with carbolic acid
was sprayed on the streets of those districts and mortality did decrease. Tomkins
was unable to make a direct connection between the spraying and improved
mortality but the project was continued in 1888. m Milk analysis continued in a
more efficient manner as it was placed under the auspices of the MOH. Purity
infractions were treated more as health transgressions rather than commerce
deceptions. 132
Tomkins continued his research for the next several years and was able to limit
potential disease agents to a smaller group of "micro-cocci and small bacilli."
Without intentionally commending pythogenic theory he acknowledged an
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extremely offensive smell that came from his cultivated microbes. 133 He also
tested a more sophisticated heat theory and found that diarrhoea season could be
correlated with a sustained temperature of 60°F at a level of one foot
underground. 134 His continual experimentation, his conclusions, and his
cooperation with Dr. Ballard won him considerable praise from the medical
press. 135
Dr. Ballard's report finally appeared in April of 1889. Except for some quite
minor disagreements the three main causal factors that he found for diarrhoea
agreed with Tomkins' assessment of the situation. The first causal factor was
constantly damp soil that had contact with sewer or cesspool leakage. Loose or
fine soil exacerbated the transmission of micro-organisms that manufactured
"virulent chemical poison[s]." Where Ballard and Tomkins disagreed was on the
heat and depth of the soil that optimized the production of these organisms.
Tomkins believed that the critical point was when the temperature at one foot
maintained 60° but Ballard thought that a depth of four feet reaching 56° was the
catalyst. The second causal factor had to do with cleanliness and ventilation
especially with regard to food storage. The quality of food and milk that babies
were fed had long been considered germane to the issue but Ballard emphasized
the spoilage of originally healthy foodstuffs to a far greater degree than had
previous investigators. The third causal factor, more tentative than the first two,
concerned feeding and family life. Like other researchers Ballard noted that
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exclusively breast-fed infants died in the fewest numbers and that the children
who had never suckled tended to fare the worst. He saw this as a problem of
working women only insofar as surrogate caregivers were less conscientious
about feeding than mothers. Illegitimate children were in the most precarious
position, presumably because their living conditions would be more squalid and a
single parent less able to devote the requisite attention to the child. 136
Ballard's recommendations were not earth shattering for the most part either.
Sewerage improvement and the elimination of cesspools headed the list.
Drainage of ground that was still left damp was another priority and the sealing of
basements with concrete or cement would further protect homes. Other housing
recommendations included the widening of streets, increasing the distance
between buildings, and eliminating "back to back" housing. He advocated higher
standards of cleanliness for cow sheds and dairies (included in 1890 legislation)
as well as private homes. Within households Ballard recommended that food not
be stored in basements and that pantries be ventilated, moreover he cautioned that
milk might need to be boiled. 137
Later comments about the Ballard report are generally favorable. The
anonymous author of Notes on MOH writes that the "report is an excellent piece
of work, and it is interesting to see how nearly the author came to putting his
finger on the real cause. He mentions that all the conditions which produce
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flybreeding." 138 Moreover, historian David Reeder' s current work also
involves consideration of a fly vector. 139 If flies should prove to be the important
vector for diarrhoea it, of course, remains to be seen why flies would be in.ore
prolific in Leicester than other parts of Britain. The failed system of sewerage
now as then, appears to be the most reasonable answer.
But Ballard could not merely assume the validity of "sewer theory" and as a
consequence his investigation had to be more comprehensive than originally
intended.
The form in which I received my first instructions was to inquire into the
cause of the annually recurring high mortality from diarrhoea in Leicester;
but it very soon became obvious that the diarrhoea of Leicester did not
differ in its nature from that of other places .... Leicester, however carefully
looked at, could not be interpreted by itself The attempt had been made
by local observers over and over again, but had failed of any satisfactory
result. ... [nonetheless] Leicester and its misfortune had still to occupy a
notable place. 140
In striking fashion, Dr. Ballard encapsulated the entire dialogue of diarrhoea, the
dialogue that made the "disease" into a local problem as much as the mortality
itself Leicester was never the only town that experienced visitations of summer
diarrhoea and it was not always the most fatal town. But the repeated listing of
Leicester at or near the top of the Registrar-General's returns made local leaders,
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the medical press, and ultimately the Local Government Board focus their
concern about the "disease" as though it was unique to the town. I would suggest
that this situation continued as long as it did because diarrhoea remained a
mystery, albeit slightly less mysterious over time, throughout the period 1849 to
1891.
The terminal point of this examination, 1891, was not chosen because
diarrhoea was suddenly cured at that time. The malady diminished in virulence
but it did so gradually. 141 The year 1891 was chosen primarily because the
Gordon sewer system was completed and to a lesser extent because Henry
Tomkins died in office shortly thereafter. 142 Continuing this study beyond the
completion of the Gordon system would not produce the answer to the problem
because "causes of infant diarrhoeal mortality [were] multifarious." 143 While I
strongly support the notion that "sewer theory" goes farthest in explaining the
difference between Leicester and other towns, it is insufficient to account for the
"disease" as a whole. F.B. Smith believes that the availability of sterile foodstuffs
for infants was the most important ingredient for the diminution of diarrhoea and
this argument cannot be ignored. 144 By 1905, Leicester had a municipal milk
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depot that provided sterilized or powdered milk to infants whose mothers
could not breast feed. 145 Moreover, Anne Hardy remarks on the overall
diminution of fly-breeding as horses on public streets were replaced by
automobiles. 146 So three possible solutions to the problem were taking place at
roughly the same time and it does not seem possible to consider any in isolation.
Again, this is a function of the "disease" being more than a singular effect from a
singular cause.
We may or may not come across definitive answers in the quest for the agents
of diarrhoea but if we do they will likely involve both stagnant sewage and tainted
food. We can say for certain that some of the early remedies such as purgatives
or opium cocktails would have only exacerbated the problem. But for all the
principals in this story, when the problem went away so did the need to determine
its cause. To Sanitary Committee Chairman Thomas Windley, looking back at his
forty-four years of service, the Gordon system seemed to be the essential
ameliorative factor but his main concern was that overall infant mortality in
Leicester had declined from over 20% to something approaching half that
number. 147 Windley's relief was evident.
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7. "Time will show who is right - Leicester or the world:" smallpox
vaccination 1
On 17 May 1876, Frank Palmer was released from gaol. Some 15,000
of his supporters made ready for the celebratory procession that would
begin at six-thirty in the evening from the town's market-place. 2 Banners
were made, carts and marchers queued, and speakers arranged for each
stop along the parade route. Palmer himself was seated in the lead cart in
full prison garb alongside such notables as the Rev. William HumeRothery and Amos Booth. As the procession moved forward a band
marched and played, a cart full of small children waved flags, and some of
the banners in the crowd read, "Down with Medical Despotism," "The
Parent the First Guardian," and "Down with State-poisoning." After stops
at the important "gates" of Leicester, the procession returned to the
market, where Booth urged the crowd to remain peaceful despite HumeRothery' s fiery accusations of blasphemy against the central government
and the medical profession. Booth stressed the longevity of the cause and
restraint; he argued that seven years of diligent work should not be
destroyed by one night of righteous violence. Motions to petition
Parliament for redress were made, seconded, and carried and then a copy

Lancet, 22 September 1888, 585.
The description of the demonstration is taken from the Leicester Chronicle (hereafter
!&) of 20 May 1876. The estimate of crowd size is from Bill Lancaster, Radicalism,
1
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of the noxious 1871 Act was burned. Frank Palmer, martyr to the cause,
was given the honor of seconding one of the motions.
Palmer was a riveter in the shoemaking industry in Leicester; now he
was also a bona fide working class hero. His imprisonment had given him
the opportunity to communicate directly with Leicester's radical MP, Peter
Alfred Taylor. His release was the occasion for joy and rededication to the
cause. One of the resolutions passed by the assemblage condemned his
tormentors, the Leicester Board of Guardians. Frank Palmer had served
twenty-four hours in gaol rather than pay a twenty shilling fine for
refusing to have his child vaccinated against smallpox. He had not been
dressed in prison garb until after his release.
There are several ways to view the anti-vaccination movement in
Leicester. Superficially it appears both irrational and dangerous. Why
would anyone oppose the clearly beneficial practice of smallpox
vaccination? Even among historians who hold low opinions of the value
of nineteenth century medical interventions, vaccination for smallpox is
seen as one of the few success stories. Contemporary medical opinion also
found anti-vaccinationism absurd. What was wrong with vaccination that
made thousands in Leicester applaud Frank Palmer's gesture toward
martyrdom? The answer involves two distinct issues: first, the efficacy of
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vaccination; second the 1867 Vaccination Act which added penalties for
those who refused to comply with the previous and already compulsory
vaccination acts.
The efficacy of vaccination was not as apparent to the working class
residents of Leicester as it was to the mainstream of the medical
profession. Two reasons for this were first, improper vaccination could
actually transmit disease, and second, vaccination only protected an
individual for about seven years. Those who complained to Unitarian
missionary Joseph Dare were well aware that recently vaccinated people
developed diseases. 3 Nineteenth century proponents of vaccination did not
clearly advertise the need for periodic revaccination; ordinary people could
see that those who had been vaccinated in infancy were not forever
immune from smallpox. Historians Anne Hardy and F.B. Smith recognize
these shortcomings of vaccination and argue that additional methods were
necessary to eradicate the disease. 4

Hardy places greater emphasis on

isolation of cases than does Smith, but ultimately they both conclude that
while additional methods were necessary smallpox could not have been
eradicated without vaccination. Indeed the World Health Organization's

Leicester University Press, 1987), 83.
See Joseph Dare, 1869 quoted in Barry Haynes, Working-Class Life in Victorian
Leicester: The Joseph Dare Reports (Leicester: Leicestershire Libraries and Information
Service, 1991), 47.
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(WHO) eradication of smallpox in the 1970s relied upon both vaccination
and the timely isolation of smallpox victims, a strategy proposed by
Leicester's Medical Officer of Health (MOH), William Johnston, in the
1870s.
The second issue, the 1867 Vaccination Act, initially stimulated little
anti-vaccinationist protest in Leicester; in 1869 fewer than twenty people
attended the first meeting of the Leicester Anti-Vaccination League at
Temperance Hall. 5 But in 1871, in the midst of an epidemic, parliament
strengthened vaccination sanctions and Leicester's Temperance Hall was
filled to capacity with anti-vaccinationists. 6 Moreover the movement
continued to grow; the 15,000 who cheered Frank Palmer in 1876 would
be dwarfed by the estimated 80,000 to 100,000 for a demonstration in
1885. 7 By the time of the 1885 demonstration, Leicester had become the
acknowledged capital of British anti-vaccinationism and compliance with
the law was the exception rather than the rule. 8
These two facets of the vaccination issue, efficacy and compulsion,
have been advanced by historians Stuart M.F. Fraser and Bill Lancaster as

4 Anne Hardy, The Epidemic Streets: Infectious Disease and the Rise of Preventive
Medicine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), and F.B. Smith, The People's
Health: 1830-1910 (London: Croom Helm, 1979).
5 J.T. Biggs, Leicester: Sanitation Versus Vaccination (London: National AntiVaccination League, 1912), 79.
6 LC, 22 July 1871.
7 Christopher Charlton, "The Fight Against Vaccination: The Leicester Demonstration
of 1885," Local Population Studies 30 (1983): 63.
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the reasons for working class resistance and middle class resistance
respectively. 9 Yet neither of these capable authors have taken the
Leicester anti-vaccinationists as their primary focus of investigation.
Fraser believes that the anti-vaccinationists tended to obscure a more
important issue, that of Johnston's "Leicester Method" of smallpox
containment which will be discussed below. Lancaster argues that the
working class-middle class alliance of anti-vaccinationists represented the
last occurrence of the cross class cooperation mobilized in the educational
and religious campaigns of the 1860s.
These historians illuminate important points in their studies, but more
thorough investigation of the Leicester anti-vaccinationists reveals four
additional points. First, the increasingly professional and scientific
medical practitioners in the mainstream advanced new explanations for the
causation of diseases that were at variance with formerly mainstream
ideas, ideas of practitioners on the medical fringe, and, in the eyes of some
lay people, at variance with common sense. At the same time that Robert
Koch, William Johnston, and Henry Tomkins were elaborating the theory
that invisible microbes caused disease, many people, including some
physicians, still held to miasmatic or pythogenic theory. Smallpox
vaccination, despite its grounding in the belief that the disease was

8
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communicable from person to person, evoked little resistance until the
advent of the 1870s anti-vaccination movement. Second, the Liberalradical axis of Leicester politics was zealous in its defense of local
autonomy after the town's experience with the General Board of Health
from 1848 to 1858. Third, politicians in Leicester, from members of
parliament such as P.A. Taylor and J.A. Picton to the town council and the
Board of Guardians, were sensitive and responsive to the desires of their
constituencies in this era of expanding democracy. Fourth, and more
tentatively, Leicester's middle class co-opted an essentially working class
movement because of the increasingly intrusive parliamentary provisions
regarding vaccination.
It might seem surprising that Leicester would become Britain's antivaccination capital by 1885. After all under the guidance of Alderman
Joseph Whetstone, the town had been one of the first municipalities to
apply to itself the Public Health Act of 1848. But the 1848 Act combined
permissive application with central government supervision and a veto
power lodged in the General Board of Health. 10 The town encountered
much opposition from the central government on sewerage and without
Whetstone's dogged commitment to health and sanitation, the original

Smallpox: The Leicester Method," Medical History 24 (1980): 328.
Ibid., 327, and Lancaster, Radicalism. Cooperation and Socialism, 83.
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Wicksteed system might never have been built. Central government
pressure also led to the showdown of 1885, when the Local Government
Board finally forced extensive and expensive remedial measures on the
borough.
Between 1848 and 1885 the town was also periodically pilloried by the
medical press for its unusually high rate of infant mortality. This
"excessive" mortality was due almost exclusively to the malady known as
summer diarrhoea and also occasioned serious scrutiny by the Local
Government Board. The twentieth century disappearance of summer
diarrhoea remains something of a mystery, but it is clear that for many
years the town's leadership was quite defensive about the attacks from the
medical profession and the central government. Thus though the borough
of Leicester was one of the pioneers of Victorian public health practices,
important relationships among the interested parties had soured and, at
least on some issues, had become adversarial.
The Vaccination Acts came to include sanctions after their initial
introduction in 1840. 11 In 1840 Parliament had determined that local Poor

See John Prest, Liberty and Locality: Parliament. Permissive Legislation and
Ratepayers' Democracies in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990), 24-4 7.
11 See R.M. MacLeod, "Law, Medicine and Public Opinion: The Resistance to
Compulsory Health Legislation 1870-1907, Part I" (Public Law, Summer 1967): 107-28.
This paragraph and the one that follows owe much to this source, but Macleod
considers Cheltenham to be the early capital because it was the home of Hume-Rothery
and his National Anti-Compulsory Vaccination League. I disagree with this
characterization by 1875, because of the actions of the Keighley Guardians.
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Law Boards of Guardians would be responsible for their communities'
smallpox vaccinations, and in 1841 had decreed that the services should be
free of charge. By 1853, on the heels of a widespread smallpox epidemic,
parliament made the vaccination of infants compulsory, but no provision
was made for penalties arising from non-compliance. By 1867 parliament
added penalties of a twenty shilling fine or fourteen days in gaol for noncompliant parents. Then in 1871, during another epidemic and with
minimal debate about the issue, parliament compelled the Guardians to
appoint local Vaccination Officers with the ability to prosecute parents.
The prosecution of parents by local Vaccination Officers was made
mandatory by a further act of 1874, in response to the recalcitrance to the
Keighley Board of Guardians.
In 1875 the Keighley Board of Guardians voted eight to six to defy the
statutes and subsequently seven of the Board members were gaoled. At
this point Keighley was clearly Britain's anti-vaccination capital;
prosecutions of parents in Leicester had begun as early as 1869 and
followed in other places throughout the country. One aspect of the 1874
act confirmed an 1873 court decision which allowed for the repeated
prosecution of the same parent for refusing vaccination. This provision in
particular drew the ire of the anti-vaccinationists.
The social composition of the anti-vaccination movement defies simple
characterization. Early opponents to vaccination included Quakers,
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Primitive Methodists, Secularists, homeopaths, hydropaths, "Electric
Practitioners," and undifferentiated members of the working classes. 12 As
we shall see below resisters came to include Anglican, Baptist, and
Unitarian clergy, some medical doctors, Conservative, Liberal, and radical
politicians, middle and working classes, men and women. I do not wish to
imply that anti-vaccinationists comprised a majority of any of these
groups, except in Leicester and at specific times. Nonetheless, for a
sympathetic characterization of anti-vaccinationism we must understand
the types of boundaries which the movement transcended. For some,
vaccination represented a type of single-issue politics that has become
quite familiar in the early twenty-first century, while to others vaccination
was but one issue among many and perhaps emblematic of other concerns.
Agitation against the gender-specific Contagious Diseases Act has been
well documented in other studies; it need only be mentioned here that
there was a bit of overlap in membership. 13 But a major difference
between the two protests was that the Contagious Diseases Act affected
only women, and particularly only women in naval ports, whereas the
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vaccination acts affected a much greater number of people. This
distinction makes it easier for historians to rail against the Contagious
Diseases Act because it was clearly discriminatory, but it leaves historians
of the anti-vaccinationists in something of a muddle. By hindsight we can
argue that the anti-vaccinationists were wrong in their rejection of
vaccination and their rhetorical reliance upon "sanitation" as a palliative,
but as mentioned above, vaccination did not confer the immunity from the
disease that its proponents sometimes alleged. Some historians, notably
Fraser and Christopher Charlton, might give the anti-vaccinationists more
credit than they are due. This credit again stems from the imperfect
immunity afforded by vaccination, but is closely connected to the Leicester
Method of isolation of smallpox patients introduced in 1877 by Dr.
William Johnston. Similarities between the Leicester Method and the
method eventually adopted by the World Health Organization one hundred
years later tend to cloud the issue of Victorian anti-vaccinationism because
the anti-vaccinationists might then be viewed as visionaries. However, an
analysis of the anti-vaccinationists reveals that they were far from
visionary and despite their admiration of Dr. Johnston's Method, isolation
alone was not sufficient to rid the world of smallpox. Indeed, Johnston
himself was no anti-vaccinationist. The anti-vaccinationists could see that
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vaccination did not eliminate the disease, but they came to argue that it
was unnecessary where the Method was used, and this conviction has
proved to be as fallacious as the notion that vaccination conferred perfect
and life-long immunity.
Following the epidemic that occasioned the 1853 legislation to make
vaccination compulsory, Leicester's Medical Officer of Health (MOH),
John Moore (MOH 1853 to 1866), expressed his belief in the ameliorative
value of vaccination and his hope that parliamentary legislation would
encourage further vaccination in Leicester. Fifty-two of Leicester's
inhabitants had perished in the epidemic, but Moore took comfort in the
accelerating vaccination/birth ratio that moved from approximately 75% to
91 % between 1853 and 1854. Yet by the time that Moore left office in
1866 the vaccination/birth ratio had dipped below 50%. 14 Indeed the
vaccination/birth ratio displayed peaks and valleys, sometimes quite sharp
ones, up to the 1880s. The peaks corresponded with new legislation
and/or the waning of epidemics while the valleys represented times when
epidemics were raging or times when epidemics were becoming faded
memories. It is not paradoxical that vaccination should wane during
epidemics and wax immediately thereafter because it was always
considered dangerous to "weaken" children by vaccination during the

Press, 1989).
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periods that the disease was most prevalent. What is worthy of note is that
between epidemics and new legislation, for example from 1854 until 1868,
vaccination/birth ratios had a generally downward trend.
Thus it does not follow that Leicester was always a well vaccinated
town as historian Stuart Fraser and contemporary anti-vaccinationist J.T.
Biggs contend. To be sure, Fraser is more concerned with the period after
1877, but to properly address the epidemic of 1871-2 it must be considered
that prior to the 1867 Act vaccination in Leicester had dipped to 36% of
births. Biggs and other anti-vaccinationists would claim long after the
epidemic of 1871-2 that the high levels of vaccination in 1869 should have
prevented the 42 deaths in Leicester if vaccination were effective.
Moore's successor, Dr. J.Wyatt Crane (MOH 1867-1879), has
previously been shown to be a less than model MOH. 15 Generally an
adherent of miasmatic theories of disease, 16 Crane was elderly, and had
little regard for the thousands of working class citizens for whom he was
nominally responsible. He had neither the inclination nor the energy to
pursue the issue of vaccination amongst the lower orders. Fortunately for
Dr. Crane, and less fortunately for his successors, the responsibility for
vaccination devolved onto other authorities. In the non-epidemic periods

John Moore, Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health 1853 (hereafter MOH
1853), LRO L.614, Moore, MOH 1858, LRO L.614, Moore MOH 1866, LRO 20 D 72/2.
15 See earlier chapters in this dissertation, particularly chapter 6 on summer diarrhoea.
16 Porter and Porter, "The Politics of Prevention," 23 5.
14

227
of his tenure Crane raised little attention to vaccination. During the 18712 epidemic Crane did little. While we might expect that the borough's
MOH would be a leading light on all matters of public health, as were his
predecessors John Buck and John Moore, and his successors, William
Johnston and Henry Tomkins, Crane consistently argued that most things
were fine, and those that were not were the fault of Providence. Indeed
one might argue that Crane made every effort to ignore or deny public
health problems that confronted him.
It was during Crane's nine year watch that anti-vaccinationism gained

an organizational foothold in Leicester and smallpox killed more people
than it had in the previous two decades or would in the following four
decades. Prosecutions under the 1867 Act were sporadic; by 1869 only
three parents had been gaoled. But on 16 June 1871, Sarah Annie
Wrigley, 17 an anti-slavery advocate and widow of a doctor, went to gaol
rather than be fined for refusing to have her child vaccinated. Sentenced
to fourteen days, but released in less than four, Mrs. Wrigley became the
first of the Leicester "martyrs" who were celebrated by the movement. At
the "well attended" celebratory meeting at Temperance Hall, Mrs. Wrigley
claimed that she was bound to follow any
English law not opposed to Nature's laws, and which are God's

17

Biggs, Leicester: Sanitation Versus Vaccination, 103.

228

laws, ... but tell her of any [English law] opposed to Nature's laws,
which had caused disease, suffering, and death - a law which had made
healthy children unhealthy, and which brought many to an early grave and tell her that she, an English mother, must obey that law, she said,
'No."1s

Mrs. Wrigley went on to say that she had personally witnessed death and
disease resulting from vaccination. Her speech, the sixth of the meeting,
was an emotional high point. Amos Booth, the most eccentric antivaccinationist, 19 in a "lengthy speech," argued that no "medical man"
could prove that vaccination was effective. Other speakers decried the
treatment of Mrs. Wrigley at the "hands of the Mayor and the Borough
Magistrates, for no criminal offense, but for wishing to exercise liberty of
conscience and parental right." 20 The Leicester anti-vaccinationists did
not explicitly seize upon Mrs. Wrigley's sex to underscore her martyrdom;
one speaker, a Mr. Clarke, said that she was fulfilling a role that her
husband would have undertaken had he survived, and Mrs. Wrigley said
that she was fulfilling a promise to her late husband, but at no time during
the meeting did any speaker argue that her sex made her punishment or her
treatment more or less onerous. The symbolic value that her sex had on her

LC. 22 July 1871.
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martyrdom can only be inferred from her presence at the speakers'
platform and the comments about English motherhood. I suspect that her
sex made her a desirable martyr to put on parade, but the exploitation of
her sex was decidedly understated.
Anti-vaccinationism in Leicester continued to grow after the epidemic
in the early 1870s. The frequency of vaccinations to births declined from
105% in 1872 to approximately 69% in 1877. 21 Clearly the epidemic had
made believers out of some skeptics, yet the traditional pattern held:
vaccination decreased as memories of epidemics faded. Antivaccinationist rhetoric remained unchanged; vaccination was decried as
unhealthy and intrusive.
This was the climate during the martyrdom of Frank Palmer. Palmer
was not the only anti-vaccinationist gaoled during his brief incarceration;
Charles Eagle remained behind on Palmer's release. Eagle was a leader of
the Anti-Vaccination League and has been described as a working class
secularist. 22 But it was Palmer who became the martyrs' conduit to
parliament. Frank Palmer's correspondence with P.A. Taylor became a
matter of public record because Taylor, ever the politician, sent copies of
the correspondence to the Leicester Chronicle. Taylor took the matter as a
constituency problem; he wrote letters to Home Secretary Cross and
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Leominster's MP, Blake, who was due to meet with the Home Secretary.
The gist of these letters concerned not the law, but the treatment of Palmer
and Eagle. The MP wanted to know if and why the two had been
handcuffed. Moreover, he wanted to know why Eagle had not paid his fine
to be released as had Palmer. 23
One week later Taylor addressed his constituency about antivaccinationism in an open letter published in the Chronicle. Taylor had
been among the parliamentarians on the Select Committee that had framed
the 1871 act. In 1876 he did not express overwhelming support for the act,
but he did not declare for the anti-vaccinationists either. He argued both
sides of the issue, but he told the Chronicle's readers that repeal of the law
was impossible regardless of his particular stance. He added that he
thought the fine should be changed to a ten shilling stamp that could be
purchased rather than imposed by a magistrate. Taylor contended that this
had been his position in 1871 as well. 24 Another letter in the same issue of
the Chronicle, from a J. Smith, argued that the efficacy of vaccination was
"not so much the point with the anti-vaccinators, as their desire to be
delivered from the yoke of what they regard as a ruthlessly cruel and
tyrannical law." 25 Both Taylor and Smith missed the pro-vaccination
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point. Medical opinion held that because smallpox was a contagious
disease, refusing vaccination put communities rather than individuals at
risk. To them it was not a matter of individual conscience.
This was an issue that allowed little room for compromise. Historians
Dorothy and Roy Porter write that the theory of disease that informed the
anti-vaccinationists was "Chadwickian," or a blend of miasmatic and
pythogenic. 26 This position is confirmed by the rhetoric of the Leicester
anti-vaccinationists until at least 1877. 27 But in 1877, Dr. William
Johnston, Leicester's new and energetic Assistant MOH, introduced what
would come to be known as the Leicester Method. The Leicester Method
included prompt notification to the MOH (within twelve hours), by the
victim's family or physician and subsequent isolation of smallpox cases at
the borough fever hospital. If at all possible the victim's family and
contacts were to be removed to the fever hospital as well. Failing that, the
victim's contacts were to be quarantined at home, but either way the
victim's home was to be disinfected with sulfur. 28 Johnston's Method was
clearly predicated on the assumption that smallpox was contagious, yet the
anti-vaccinationists came to rally around the Method as an alternative to
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vaccination. Rather than discard their conception of infectious disease
arising from filth, the anti-vaccinationist spokesmen tended merely to
append the Method onto it. This implied a rather muddled theory of
disease, part miasmatic and part germ theory. Stuart Fraser argues that
rhetoric and actions of the anti-vaccinationists confuse analysis of the
more important issue of the Leicester Method. This is due to his
conviction that the Method should be considered in its more modern
context; the Porters rightly argue that the anti-vaccinationists were
themselves confused. 29
Dr. William Johnston was "a thorough believer in the value of
vaccination. " 30 He believed that he had originated the Method, but some
historians have disputed his originality. 31 Though Johnston was pleased
with the performance of the Method in 1877, he advocated a Local Act of
Parliament to require householders and doctors to report cases of certain
diseases such as smallpox to the MOH so that isolation at the fever
hospital could begin forthwith. Johnston was aware that Bolton had

Report]. The Method was modified in 1884 to allow family members to be quarantined
in their homes rather than the fever hospital.
29 Fraser, "Leicester and Smallpox," 332, Porter and Porter, "The Politics of
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already acquired such an Act and apparently Huddersfield had as well. 32
The Lancet claimed that Leicester doctors were nearly unanimous in
opposing such an act because it applied the ten pound penalty to doctors as
well as householders, but there is little evidence of this unanimity. 33 This
Leicester Corporation Act, requiring notification, was passed on 13
September 1879 and became an integral part of the Leicester Method
although the Act did not specifically mention the isolation of smallpox
patients and contacts. 34 I find it curious that there was no outcry against
compulsory notification, except for those doctors who did not want to be
financially liable. It was surely clear that upon notification, isolation
would soon follow and this went against miasmatic theory. Moreover, this
would be a rather drastic intrusion of the government into the lives of
English citizens who happened to be victims and their families. Perhaps
the principle of resistance to governmental intrusion was advanced only
when sufficient numbers were affected, or perhaps it varied with who the
affected individuals were likely to be.
Fraser argues that the Leicester anti-vaccination movement has been
wrongly characterized as a movement that inexorably grew from its
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humble beginnings in 1869 to an apex in the 1890s. 35 He relies upon the
introduction of the Leicester Method in 1877 to explain the precipitous
and lasting decline of the vaccination/birth ratio that became indisputable
in the 1880s. Indeed Fraser's vaccination/birth numbers would seem to
support this assertion; after the epidemic of 1871-2, vaccinations/births
tumbled from the panicked 105% to 60% in 1880 to 3% in 1890. This
decline in vaccinations would appear to correlate with the introduction of
the Leicester Method, but for one measure that Fraser did not consider: the
penalties for non-compliance were significantly reduced just before the
Method was introduced. It suddenly became less expensive to be an ardent
anti-vaccinationist.
William Henry Maskell had been the Leicester Union's Vaccination
Officer since 1868. 36 He was not only responsible for providing free
vaccinations, but also for prosecuting those parents who were noncompliant. Maskell contended that the watershed year for non-compliance
was 1876 rather than 1877. In 1876 some members of the Board of
Guardians, whom Maskell called a deputation, went to the borough
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magistrates to advocate a reduction in the twenty shilling fine to the ten
shillings that Taylor had proposed for the stamp. 37 The magistrates
introduced the ten shilling fine by September, 1876. After March of 1877
the twenty shilling fine was never again imposed. 38 Maskell served 138
summonses in 1876 as compared with 54 in 1875, a 156% increase. In
1877 the number of summonses increased by another 48% as the ten
shilling/seven day penalty fully replaced the twenty shilling/fourteen day
penalty. In fairness to Fraser, I should mention that the vaccination/birth
ratio rose to 75% in 1877 and would never again be that high. 39 But,
Maskell was in a position to know to what extent and why Leicester's
working class population resisted compulsory vaccination. It was his
opinion that the reduction of penalties in 1876 coupled with an
increasingly anti-vaccinationist Board of Guardians greatly exacerbated
the trend toward non-compliance in Leicester.
It would beg the question to argue that anti-vaccinationism became a

political force in Leicester only after such candidates were elected to the
town council or the Board of Guardians on an anti-vaccinationist platform.
Bill Lancaster argues that the first local politician to exploit the issue in a
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campaign was a Conservative in a race for town council. 40 Such an
eventuality would surely be an anomaly in Leicester were it not for the
power that the anti-vaccinationist movement could mobilize in the town by
the 1880s. Nonetheless, it should be recognized that there were antivaccinationist Liberals already in office by the time that elections came to
be decided upon the issue.
In Maskell 's 1880 complaint to the Board of Guardians, he accused
several of the Guardians of fanning the anti-vaccinationist flames by
attending their rallies. Guardian Lennard replied that he was perfectly
within his rights to attend such meetings and Guardian Wright said that as
for himself he had not attended too many; Wright added that a "paid
official" such as Maskell had no right to criticize his employers. Maskell
argued that in his thirty-eight years of public service he had "never come
into contact with the amount of antagonism that he had met with in this
[anti-vaccination] situation. " 41 Yet in 1880 pro-vaccination forces still
represented a majority of the Guardians and the town council. The
Leicester Union Guardians had been among the nation's most industrious
in enforcing compulsory vaccination since the 1867 Act. Britain's first
gaoled anti-vaccinationist, William Johnson, was prosecuted in Leicester. 42
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Disraeli's Home Secretary, Richard Cross, once complained that
Leicester's magistrates were "' guilty of a petty abuse of power,"' by
enforcing penalties with "unusual severity. " 43 It has also been advanced
that the sixty-four (or sixty-one, according to Dale-L. Ross) parents who
eventually were gaoled in Leicester amounted to more than any community
in Britain. 44 Again it would appear that the penalties for non-compliance
may have been more intimately related to public sentiment about
vaccination than was the introduction of the Leicester Method. This
sentiment translated to hostility when enforcement was at its harshest
(from 1869 to 1884) and to widespread non-compliance when penalties
were reduced.
Poor Law Guardians, and one third of the town council, were elected
annually until 1883 when Guardian elections became triennial. Antivaccinationist J.T. Biggs identified the East St. Mary's Ward election of
1882 as "[ o ]ne of the earliest municipal contests where the subject was
brought into prominence." 45 In this campaign the Conservative candidate
and ardent anti-vaccinationist, Mr. Hughes, had switched parties in order
to challenge the Liberals, Dr. Lankester and Mr. Walker, whom he
considered to be too equivocal on the issue. A campaign "poster that was
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placarded all over the Ward" urged Liberals to "'lay aside party for
principle. "' 46 To reassure voters in the ward the poster argued that,
"' [t]here is no political crisis in this contest for the Liberal Party. If they
lose [these] seats, they still retain their great majority in the Council. "' 47
Mr. Hughes won his seat on the town council. The Guardians' elections in
the following year would prove to be something of a referendum on the
vaccination issue. 48
A significant occurrence in the anti-vaccination movement might well
have influenced all local elections after 1881. The sitting MP for
Leicester, P.A. Taylor, amended his previous position on vaccination and
became the de facto leader of Britain's anti-vaccination movement. 49
Whether Taylor became the champion of anti-vaccinationism through a
thorough study of the issue as he claimed or whether it was the result of
his acute political barometer cannot be proven. What is clear is that, by
1881, Taylor, more than Amos Booth, George Bernard Shaw, or even the
Rev. Hume-Rothery, was the national leader of the anti-vaccination
movement. The Unitarian Taylor, the "Dean of [the] Radical Wing of
[the] Liberal Party," began to be the primary financial supporter of the

"An Anti-Vaccinator," quoted in ibid., 83.
Ibid.
48 See in particular, Dr. Lakin's comments, LC, 3 March 1883.
49 P.A. Taylor, "Vaccination. A Letter to Dr. W.B. Carpenter, C.B.," (1881), LRO
Pamphlets, vol. 67.
46
47

239

London Society for the Abolition of Compulsory Vaccination in 1881. 50
Indeed it could be argued that the Society might have been unable to
function without his frequent two hundred and fifty pound contributions.
This Society pushed for complete repeal of the laws rather than the
reduction of penalties that had been the stated aim of the National AntiCompulsory Vaccination League. In 1881, Taylor argued that
the general faith in vaccination amongst the middle and upper classes
is their firm belief that the medical profession ... are almost
unanimously convinced by their personal experience of the
protection afforded by vaccination .... [but,] it is clear that the
enormous proportion of the profession have neither time,
opportunity, nor inclination for the real scientific examination of
the results of vaccination. 51
Biggs believed the Board of Guardians' elections of 1883 to be a
monumental victory by returning a majority of anti-vaccinationists. He
argued that the majority of candidates elected had pledged to be antivaccinationist and had been supported for that reason, but some later
reneged. 52 The critical vote on prosecutions ended in a tie, but the provaccination forces roused the Chairman of the Board from his sickbed in
order to cast the deciding vote in favor of prosecution. I would suggest
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that the number of parents awaiting prosecution grew to unprecedented
levels, several thousands of parents, because of the perceived victory in
the 1883 elections. Local vindication of the anti-vaccination cause
appeared to be at hand. It might well have appeared that antivaccinationism had triumphed in Leicester, for the Guardians decided that
Mr. Maskell should receive an annual stipend of ninety pounds rather than
the 6d. per vaccination that he had been hired upon, as he now spent more
time pursuing those in default than he did vaccinating those in
compliance. 53 The effect of changing penalties and changing leadership
upon non-compliance in Leicester should not be assigned to Johnston's
Method, although anti-vaccinationists did advocate the Method as an
alternative to vaccination. 54 Biggs argued that anti-vaccinationism had
won the day in Leicester in 1883. There is merit in his argument; the
narrow margin that held for prosecution in 1883 had fallen apart well
before the next election and after 1884 no prosecutions for noncompliance took place in Leicester. 55
In 1883 Johnston, for several years Leicester's chief MOH,
recommended the extension of the Leicester Method to all of Britain based
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on its local success. 56 In 1883 Taylor brought anti-vaccinationism to the
floor of the House of Commons. Biggs would later argue that the
ambivalence of the Guardians in 1883 was the result of Taylor's utter
failure to persuade the Commons toward repeal. 57 Taylor's measure,
supported by Jacob Bright and C. Hopwood among others, secured the
votes of but 18 of the 652 MPs. 58 Yet Taylor's comments in the debate
surrounding his proposed measure are revealing in two ways: one
historic graphical, the other historical.
First, Taylor argued that the medical profession was reticent to tell
what it knew about the efficacy of vaccination. In an earlier document he
termed this a "conspiracy of silence ... [that was] avowed and defended by
the Lancet. " 59 By 1883, Taylor argued "that the fallacies and falsehoods
by which vaccination is upheld is the work of some dozen fanatics, whose
whole function consists in upholding a crumbling superstition." 60 In his
1881 letter to W.B. Carpenter, Taylor had maintained that most doctors
were simply too busy to apprise themselves of vaccination data and
therefore followed the orthodox "Jennerian" line. In 1883, Taylor
extended this argument to include the MPs who relied upon ·the "dozen
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fanatics." Historian R.M. MacLeod somehow fitted this argument with the
silence of the British Medical Association to conclude that the medical
profession and the central government refused to engage in the vaccination
debate. 61 This is patently untrue with regard to the medical profession 62
and unlikely with regard to the Local Government Board. 63 Yet,
MacLeod's interpretation has been accepted by many historians.
Taylor's 1883 speech in the Commons also raises the question of who
the anti-vaccinationists were. Clearly a diverse group represented their
interests at elections. As mentioned above, a Conservative was elected to
the town council on this single issue, yet the quintessential radical, Taylor,
had little trouble being returned to Parliament. By 1883, Taylor had
decided that the penalties for non-compliance were thoroughly class based.
He argued that the working classes suffered most heavily because the ten
shilling fine was insignificant to the middle and upper classes. 64
I have argued that the anti-vaccinationists were diverse in both
religious affiliation and political party. Neither non-conformity nor
Liberalism provide sufficient explanations for the breadth of antivaccinationist sentiment in Leicester. Moreover, social class does not
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suffice as a predictor of resistance. It is often advanced that the working
class and the middle class resisted for different reasons, the working class
because of the fear that vaccination caused disease and the middle class
because of the central government's intrusion into private life. Before
accepting that scenario contemporary evidence should be considered. But,
evidence from the rank and file anti-vaccinationists is indeed hard to come
by as attitudes or explanations usually were offered by only the most
vocal. Nonetheless, some inferences can be drawn about the composition
of, and rationale for, anti-vaccinationism.
As mentioned above, the Unitarian missionary to the poor of Leicester,
Joseph Dare, considered early anti-vaccinationism to be a working class
phenomenon that was encouraged by medical fringe practitioners and
individual perceptions that disease had been spread by vaccination.
Neither of these factors can be considered as peculiar to the working class.
Practitioners on the medical fringe, hydropaths, homeopaths, and others,
cannot be characterized as appealing primarily to the working class.
Rather it might have ·been thafthe working class were a minority of their
patients. 65 The idea that vaccination spread disease was also embraced by

For example, see Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin: The Life of a
Tormented Evolutionist (New York: Warner Books, 1992), 374.

65

244

many members of the middle class. 66 Likewise it cannot be assumed that
the middle class and small shopkeepers were the only people who objected
to the interventionist public health measures of the central government, 67
although the working class witnesses from Leicester before the Royal
Commission in 1891 mentioned only the spread of disease as a motive for
resistance. 68
Anti-vaccinationist J.T. Biggs argued that the middle and upper classes
in Leicester eschewed vaccination more rapidly and completely than did
the working class. His argument was based on a comparison of the drop in
vaccinations performed by the Vaccination Officer and private physicians.
Biggs assumed that vaccinations performed by the Vaccination Officer,
Mr. Maskell, represented working class vaccinations and those performed
by private doctors represented middle or upper class vaccinations. These
statistics showed that from 1876 to 1886, annual public vaccinations had
dropped from 2,188 to 559, or 75%, while private vaccinations had
dropped from 1,462 to 39, or 97%. Biggs concluded "that the intelligent
middle and upper classes of Leicester have abandoned the practice to a
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greater extent even than the working classes." 69 While Biggs' assertion
might be accurate, it might be contested on statistical grounds as well as
the dubious assumption that intelligence was class based. One very
intelligent man, MOH Henry Tomkins, merely countered the argument by
denying that educated and well-to-do people had abandoned the practice. 70
Such a simple style of argumentation was uncharacteristic of Tomkins, but
he had clearly become exasperated with Leicester's anti-vaccinationists
since he was hired as the borough's MOH in 1885. Similar impressionistic
characterizations would also be used to describe working class antivaccinationists.
Mr. Maskell, who encountered more vaccination opposition than any
magistrate or Guardian, wrote to the Local Government Board that "he
found the greatest objection to vaccination among the lowest classes [especially] 'shoe hands. '" 71 Leicester had once been virtually
synonymous with the hosiery trade, but after mid-century boot and shoe
manufacturing assumed an increasingly important role in the town's
economy. 72 At some points in the Victorian period as many as 41 % of
Leicester's reported jobs were in the footwear industry, though the
industry was itself diversified among factories, workshops, and outwork.
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Maskell had been a Metropolitan policeman for many years before coming
to Leicester, yet maintained that he had never come across "a more
disreputable lot than the shoehands of Leicester who opposed this
vaccination." 73 G.H. Ellingworth confirmed that of the twenty-one parents
gaoled between October, 1883 and September, 1884, most were indeed
shoehands, but questioned what Maskell expected in Leicester: "colliers or
shipbuilders?" 74
Maskell's dim view of the anti-vaccinationists was challenged by some
of the Guardians. The "agent" to Leicester's Anti-Vaccination League
said that the "disreputable" class would sooner submit their children to
vaccination than face the ten shilling fine; his visits to the homes of
working class anti-vaccinationists proved to him that they were largely
hard-working and sober. 75 Guardian Leeson suggested that the antivaccinationists were the most intelligent members of the working classes.
Moreover, Leeson cited Alderman Stratton as one magistrate who had
determined that the resisters who appeared before him were "decent" and
"hard-working." 76 Historian Dale-L. Ross supports this position, at least
with regard to Leicester's martyrs, and argues that of the sixty-one gaoled
(Biggs lists sixty-four), between 1869 and 1884, most had chosen gaol
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rather than pay the fine. 77 Ross' implication, of course, is that the martyrs
had ten shillings to spend, or seven days to spend idle, on this matter of
principle.
It would be very difficult to extend Ross' position to cover the whole
of Leicester's anti-vaccinationists, but in a few cases the behavior of the
Guardians sheds a little light. The anti-vaccinationists among the
Guardians, and the anti-vaccinationist leadership in general, repeatedly
encouraged martyrdom and celebrated the martyrs upon their release. At
one of these meetings, J. Lunn termed it a "high honour" to be incarcerated
for the cause and M.H. Bunton said that to be a martyr took a "moral
courage superior" to that of paying the fine. The five martyrs being
celebrated each took the podium to impart "amusing stories" of their time
in gaol. Moreover, those present collected forty-two shillings for the
benefit of martyrs. 78 In another situation a father in poor health failed to
appear before a magistrate to answer his summons and was sentenced in
absentia. He was taken to gaol, but his wife paid the fine the next day and
effected his release. J. T. Biggs brought the matter to the attention of the
Guardians at their next meeting and the Guardians themselves put together
enough money to reimburse and reward the couple. 79 These activities of
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the Guardians not only reflected the strength of anti-vaccinationism in
Leicester, but reinforced it. If, as Leeson had said, the Guardians
considered the anti-vaccinationists to be the most intelligent members of
the working class and if, as Bill Lancaster has argued, middle class and
working class political agendas remained similar .in this period, noncompliance with the Vaccination Act could be interpreted as a sign of
working class respectability, despite Maskell's derogation of the resisters.
To the extent that martyrs were feted and to the extent that resisters were
remunerated by the Guardians and others, it becomes less important to
know the actual income levels of the anti-vaccinationists and more
important to consider their aspirations. This would be a desirable, if
daunting, topic for further research.
The leaders of Leicester anti-vaccinationism are less opaque than the
rank and file, yet some ambiguities remain. Many leaders have been
mentioned above, but I shall say more here. Bill Lancaster cites the
working class martyr Charles Eagle and elastic web manufacturer Michael
Wright as the movement's leaders. 80 There might be some truth in
Lancaster's assertion as to the origin of the movement, but some
skepticism is appropriate because his source, the autobiography of a
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secularist, selects these two secularists and no others. 81 Subsequent
leaders are less ambiguous and less likely to be characterized as members
of the working class. Engineer J.T. Biggs joined the -local league as
secretary in 1870 and later became a Guardian and a Councilor. Amos
Booth had the resources to traverse throughout the country speaking on
behalf of anti-vaccinationists. 82 William Lakin was a physician, as was
latecomer Henry Lankester. Joseph Leeson and James Leavesly, both
Guardians and Councilors, were footwear manufacturers. The Rev. 's
Albert Smith, Robert Caven, and J. Page Hopps, were Anglican, Baptist,
and Unitarian respectively. Charles Lunn was a hosier and Thomas Wright
was a solicitor, alderman, and twice the mayor. Charles Eagle was still
active in 1891, but his words went largely unnoticed in the press. 83 By the
1880s anti-vaccinationism in Leicester had become a dominion of the
middle class, but the minions and the martyrs were still working class.
The "Great Leicester Demonstration" against vaccination in 1885 has
been adequately explored in previous studies and the details need not be
recapitulated here. 84 Nonetheless, nuances and numbers deserve mention.
From retirement, P.A. Taylor sent encouragement; forty or fifty other
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towns sent delegations; historian Christopher Charlton writes that between
eighty and one hundred thousand people took part in the demonstration. It
was a mark of anti-vaccination agitation in Leicester that no violence took
place in any meeting or demonstration. Despite parades that featured
symbolic lynchings and graphic displays of doctors as demons, there were
no reports of injury or damage in 1885, 1876, or at any other antivaccinationist event. By 1885 the Leicester Method was a cornerstone of
the anti-vaccinationist argument; Leicester's Method had so far been
successful in containing almost all "importations" of the disease. The
"Great Demonstration of 1885" brought more attention to antivaccinationism, and Leicester's role in it, than any previous event; the
Times covered the demonstration and the Lancet was subsequently moved
to send a special commissioner to investigate the situation in Leicester.
Though a direct link cannot be established, the demonstration in 1885
blazed a trail that would arrive at the Royal Commission on the
Vaccination Laws that began in 1889.
The path to the Royal Commission was not smooth. The Lancet, the
Local Government Board, and Leicester's Board of Guardians engaged in
heated and frequent debate about the merits of the Method and the
possibility of epidemic. In Parliament, Taylor's successor,
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Congregationalist minister J .A. Picton, continued to press for reform or
repeal. The Royal Commission would begin work in 1889, hear the
Leicester delegation in 1891, and present its findings in 1897. The result
of the Commission was an amendment to the Vaccination Law that
permitted parents to declare themselves to be conscientious objectors and
escape prosecution. Staunch anti-vaccinationists such as .J. T. Biggs were
not satisfied by anything short of repeal, but the controversy became much
quieter as many Leicester parents availed themselves of the conscientious
objector clause.
There is one postscript to the anti-vaccination story in Leicester. A
smallpox epidemic coursed through Britain in 1892-93. Advocates of the
Method and anti-vaccinationists in general were pleased to report only 357
cases and 21 deaths from the disease. On a sadder note, of the cases that
occurred in Leicester, 66.6% of the victims were under ten years of age.
This percentage of cases in children under ten, in a town which had been
almost completely unvaccinated for a decade, was between two and three
times as high as in towns that did not abandon vaccination. 85
Perhaps no other political issue attracted such broad and diverse
support in Victorian Leicester as did anti-vaccinationism. It would appear
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that the combination of interests that comprised the anti-vaccination
movement did not coalesce on other issues. Though the vaccination of
infants remained compulsory in Britain until the 1940s, the antivaccinationists of Leicester could claim political success because of the
appointment of the Royal Commission and the resultant conscientious
objector amendment. There is irony in the "triumph" of the antivaccinationists; their success was due to their dogged allegiance to a
muddled and incorrect theory of disease, yet the Method that came to
symbolize an alternative to vaccination eventually became such a critical
adjunct to vaccination that the world would not now be rid of smallpox
without it.
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8. Conclusion
Leicester's awkward position in Victorian public health provides
researchers with a unique blend of activity and passivity in response to health
problems. This checkered past illustrates that the history of public health is a
history of trial and error rather than the history of"progress" by design. The
story of Leicester in the nineteenth century provides examples of advances
and reversals, pioneering and complacency. Sometimes the pioneers were
wrong; sometimes reformers could not overcome inertia. Nonetheless, the
Victorian borough was a crucible where contemporary medical thought,
"sanitary science," political economy, and public opinion were forged
together to produce diverse responses to public health problems. No
knowledgeable historian would argue that Leicester was typical among
English towns as its leaders, their agents, and the citizens addressed the
pressing health issues of the second half of the nineteenth century. In many
ways Leicester was unique. But the history of public health in Leicester from
1849 to 1891 is more than a story of an odd Victorian borough; it is a story of
life and, all too often, death.
The singular determination of one civic leader, Joseph Whetstone, led the
borough of Leicester to pioneer a mid-century sewage system; the irony is that
his efforts might have placed the borough behind the curve in implementing
effective sewerage. Whetstone was ahead of his time. He defied what has
been termed the "civic gospel" of improvement by insisting that municipal
sewerage take precedence over municipal grandeur. Following Whetstone's
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leadership, the borough poured tens of thousands of pounds into a drainage
system that later backed up sewage into the homes of residents who lived in
the town's low-lying areas. Though he had the best of intentions, the
Wicksteed system that Whetstone fought for failed. Whetstone did not
survive the Wicksteed system and his successors on the town council proved
themselves weaker than this "strong shouldered" man. Whetstone was indeed
ahead of his time; his expensive failure led the town council to resist
improvements until a court injunction forced them to revamp the system.
Joseph Whetstone was also an early advocate of a piped water supply for
Leicester, but in this case he was not quite early enough. Private profit
literally took precedence over public health. By its earlier incorporation the
Leicester Waterworks Company established itself as the sole legal supplier of
piped water to the borough. So Whetstone's town council, in order to assure
that there would be a piped water supply, guaranteed a stream of profits to the
Waterworks Company's investors. The profit-driven Company faced
competition only from urban well water, and the wells became increasingly
polluted during the Victorian period. By its rules and rate structures the
Company showed favoritism toward industry and well-to-do residential
customers over the less affluent residents and municipal sanitation projects.
By its refusal to supply water to those residents who wished to use Company
water merely to flush water closets, the Company probably inhibited public
health improvements. Though such potential health benefits can not be
measured, we can reasonably imagine that the incidence of typhoid fever
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could have been reduced by the presence of more water closets in Leicester
at an earlier time. Moreover more children might have survived the threat of
summer diarrhoea had excrement been more universally flushed away rather
than collected in insect-breeding havens. The piped water supply from the
Company probably provided health benefits to its consumers; it certainly
benefited the investors. Although the municipal takeover of the Waterworks
Company in the 1870s remains an somewhat mysterious, the period of the
private, profit-oriented Company shows that public health took a back seat to
profits.
Typhoid fever was effectively diminished in Leicester by clean water and
the efficient removal of sewage, the cornerstones of Chadwickian sanitation
but, irony was again part of the story. This filth disease was prevalent in
Leicester but not more so than in other British towns. Once a poorly
understood fact of life, this endemic disease became a cause celebre after it
claimed the life of Prince Albert in 1861 and nearly claimed that of Crown
Prince Edward in 1871. Leicester's public health authorities attempted to
diminish typhoid fever by relying on misguided theories of disease causation
that, in this case, did no harm. While Dr. J.Wyatt Crane was Leicester's
Medical Officer of Health (MOH), he was often satisfied, or possibly relieved,
that the borough was not unusual among British towns because of typhoid
fever mortality. The borough's sanitary inspectors and Crane's successors in
the MOH position were not so complacent. Inspectors Buxton and Braley,
and MOHs Johnston and Tomkins, closed polluted wells and forced
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residential proprietors to improve sanitary conditions. The town council aided
these health authorities' endeavors by obtaining parliamentary approval for
the local Compulsory Notification of Diseases Act in 1879.
The value of compulsory notification was more clearly and again
ironically, shown in combating scarlet fever mortality rather than that of
typhoid. Scarlet fever is not a filth disease as is typhoid fever. Nonetheless,
amalgamating pythogenic disease theory with germ theory led toward the
reduction of scarlet fever mortality. Like typhoid fever mortality, Leicester
was not notorious among British towns for its scarlet fever mortality. In
hindsight, Leicester was remarkable for its success against this disease that
claimed the lives of many British children. Scarlet fever was endemic in
nineteenth century Britain, but occasionally flared to epidemics. Crucially,
and unlike typhoid fever, scarlet fever can be airborne. Not surprisingly then,
scarlet fever presented danger in school settings because of the proximity of
infected children to other children who had no immunity. Still, Leicester's
health authorities made great strides toward reducing scarlet fever mortality
even while incubation times and contagious periods were poorly understood.
The borough's private parliamentary Act of Compulsory Notification, in
1879, forced all health providers in the borough to report cases of certain
diseases to the borough's Medical Officer of Health. Scarlet fever was among
these enumerated diseases. Leicester's MOHs, Johnston and Tomkins, would
then send inspectors to the homes where scarlet fever had been reported, or
visit the houses themselves. Moreover these MOHs took pains to warn
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schoolmasters of scarlet fever symptoms. With a rudimentary
understanding of the contagious nature of scarlet fever, the borough's health
authorities would then urge the parents of scarlet fever victims to allow
stricken children to be removed to the borough's fever hospital. This was an
imperfect system; no child could be taken to the fever hospital without the
parents' permission and the fever hospital was itself periodically overrun by
smallpox patients. Yet the system demonstrably worked between 1879 and
1889.
Ultimately, this did not mean that "progress" was assured. Despite the
ultimately measurable success of this public health measure it was at the level
of trial and error at its inception in 1879. Though working class parents
accepted the system, its effectiveness had peaked by 1889. Middle class
parents refused to allow their children suffer the indignities of the fever
hospital so scarlet fever mortality plateaued. The value of this interventionist
strategy has been overlooked in the historiography of scarlet fever. The
eminent historian of public health in London, Anne Hardy, could not have
been aware of Leicester's success with scarlet fever mortality because she did
not have the relevant data. She explained Leicester's unusually low rate of
scarlet fever mortality in 1889 by inferring decreased virulence of the diseasecausing agent. I accept the notion that scarlet fever decreased in virulence
over time. But given the strong evidence that scarlet fever mortality
decreased in Leicester from 1879 to 1889, during the very same period that
compulsory notification was initiated in Leicester and ending when only the
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middle class refused to have their children isolated, I believe that Hardy
misinterpreted the limited information that she had. Hardy argues that the
decreased virulence of scarlet fever originated in Leicester and Nottingham;
this is true, but Leicester and Nottingham both had the powers of compulsory
notification well before 1889 when London, the focus of her detailed study,
first gained compulsory notification powers.
Anne Hardy detours around summer diarrhoea in her book The Epidemic
Streets, but summer diarrhoea cannot be avoided in a study of nineteenth
century public health in Leicester. This "disease's" etiology proved
completely opaque to health professionals throughout the nineteenth century.
Yet Victorian society was a record-keeping society and all the statistics
indicated that Leicester perennially had the nation's highest rate of infant
mortality. Most of that infant mortality was directly attributed to summer
diarrhoea. Given the medical profession's inability to explain or ameliorate
the "disease," the profession merely pointed an accusing finger at the borough
where infants were most likely to die. This condemnation came from the
medical journal, the Lancet, and was echoed by the health officials of the
central government and Leicester's own Liberal newspaper, the Chronicle.
The town council and its MOH, J. Wyatt Crane, were largely fatalistic about
this "disease." When Crane posited his theory that "simple heat" caused
summer diarrhoea, the councilors did not take the explanation seriously but
remained unwilling to devote substantial sums of taxpayers' money to
uncover a more reasonable explanation. Town leaders explicitly bowed to
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external pressure to investigate its causes but did so on the cheap. I believe
that the leaders' complacent posture can best be explained by recognizing that
this was a class-based "disease." Working class parents saw their babies die
in alarming numbers. Middle class leaders could afford complacency; their
children did not die. When investigations pointed toward shoddy housing and
backed-up sewage as causative agents nothing was done. Improvements
would have been very expensive. By the tum of the twentieth century,
summer diarrhoea mortality in Leicester was declining. Was this due to the
new Gordon sewerage system? Was this related to more widespread use of
water closets in the 1890s? Was this due to the introduction of supervised
day-care for working mothers and milk depots in the 1880s and 1890s? Was
the diminution of summer diarrhoea merely a consequence of diminishing
horse traffic and dung in the borough as automobiles replaced horses in the
twentieth century? Did all these factors combine to reduce insect vectors of
disease by the twentieth century? We do not know. We do know that infants
with diarrheal symptoms need treatment with re-hydrating agents rather than
purgatives or opiates, but that does not explain why Leicester was particularly
susceptible to summer diarrhoea mortality. We know that many mothers in
Leicester worked outside the home, but that does not explain the "excess"
summer diarrhoea mortality in Victorian Leicester. 1 Was there one disease at
the root of the "disease" known as summer diarrhoea in Victorian Leicester?
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We might not know today why so many babies died in nineteenth century
Leicester, but the answer might come in the near future.
The answer to the world's smallpox problem seemed to be finalized in the
1970s and it had a clear connection to Victorian Leicester. The "Leicester
Method" was to identify and isolate smallpox victims at the same time that the
general public was being vaccinated; this formed the basis for the World
Health Organization's eradication of smallpox some three decades ago. Yet
the effort to deal with smallpox had a bizarre history in Leicester. Edward
Jenner published his findings on smallpox vaccination as early as 1798 and by
the 1860s Leicester was what some contemporaries called a "well-vaccinated
town." Every MOH in Leicester, including William Johnston who founded
the "Leicester Method," supported wholesale vaccination of the population.
Yet once more, public health "progress" could be thwarted and indeed
reversed. When the central government made the vaccination of children
compulsory, some of Leicester's residents rebelled and formed an antivaccination movement. Its middle class leaders complained about the
coercive powers of the central government and the prevailing "medical
establishment." When parliament introduced significant fines for parents who
refused to have their children vaccinated, Leicester's middle class antivaccinationists only became more vocal. They identified and celebrated
working class "martyrs" to the cause. While middle class leaders such as
Amos Burke feted such martyrs with parades against "medical tyranny,"
ordinary people simply recognized that vaccination did not confer the
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promised lifelong immunity from the disease and had the potential to
introduce other diseases. Burke and his eccentric cronies, such as J.T. Biggs
and the Baptist Rev. Hume-Rothery, led a charge against the central
government's role in public health. Due to anti-vaccinationist pressure, the
financial penalty for refusing to have a child vaccinated was halved in 1877.
Once the penalty was reduced, Leicester's working class parents refused, en
masse, to have their children vaccinated. Only then did Leicester become the
anti-vaccination capital of Britain.
William Johnston's "Leicester Method" followed soon on the heels of the
government's reduction of penalties. The chronological proximity between
the reduction of fines and the introduction of the Leicester Method has caused
confusion. Johnston never proposed identification and isolation of smallpox
victims as an alternative to vaccination. Yet later anti-vaccinationist rhetoric
posited part of the Leicester Method, isolation, as a rational alternative to
vaccination. Should we then assume that the majority of Leicester's parents
read Johnston's "Zymotic Report," accepted the isolation part of the Method,
and rejected the vaccination part? Historians such as S.M.F. Fraser, Dorothy
Porter, and Roy Porter, have taken the position that the Method explained the
near-universal refusal of Leicester's parents to have their children vaccinated.
I believe that the evidence indicates otherwise. When the penalty for noncompliance became affordable many parents simply chose to pay the fine
rather than expose their children to what they perceived to be the dangers of
vaccination. Such decisions were as rational as reliance upon the Leicester
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Method of isolation. Yet the existence of Johnston's Method provided
wonderful rhetorical fodder for the leaders of the anti-vaccination movement.
The anti-vaccinationists focused upon what Peter Baldwin would term the
"neo-quarantinism" of victim isolation, 2 but Johnston himself believed in
universal vaccination in addition to victim isolation. It was Johnston's
complete program that enabled the WHO to eradicate smallpox from
humankind.
Still, the smallpox virus survives. Vaccination became optional in Britain
a century ago; it is not widely practiced anywhere in the twenty-first century.
But smallpox is a threat in the twenty-first century as a potential weapon of
mass destruction. A smallpox-laden bomb or missile might be very unlikely,
but a less dramatic release of the virus into an unvaccinated population could
have devastating results. Universal vaccination as a preventive measure
would also bring unwanted results. A tiny fraction of those vaccinated, even
under optimal hygienic conditions, would succumb to the disease. So in an
imperfect world, if smallpox is re-introduced into twenty-first century
populations William Johnston's nineteenth century Leicester Method, in its
complete form, might be our best defense against this historical scourge of
humankind.
Thus I argue with alacrity, the study of public health in Victorian Leicester
remains relevant. Not all of the problems and responses that arose in the
Baldwin acknowledges that the anti-vaccinators would have been loathe to use this term, but he
also terms the Method as the "acme ofantivaccination ... institutionalized." Peter Baldwin,
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nineteenth century borough suggest a blueprint for the twenty-first century.
Many do not. But understanding the messy processes that influenced and
limited public health initiatives is very relevant. In Victorian Leicester such
factors included medical knowledge, political leadership, public opinion, and
cost. The way that these factors mixed varied by context; the most consistent
factor in Leicester's nineteenth century public health was that deductive logic
was irrelevant.
The state of medical knowledge at any given time might superficially
appear to be gradually developing and universally disseminated among
professionals in the field, but such has not been the historical case.
Occasionally new developments have been serendipitous, but more often
developments have come in response to specific problems. So the first step in
changing the state of medical knowledge was usually the identification of a
circumstance as a problem. The mere existence of a health-threatening
condition did not lead directly to efforts to ameliorate the condition. Rather
other considerations, such as whose health was threatened, how many were
threatened, and how severe the threat was to victims, all played a role in the
definition of a circumstance or condition as a problem. Moreover new
medical conceptions, which with hindsight appear "cutting-edge," were not
necessarily or readily accepted by all medical professionals. One need only
compare the thinking of J. Wyatt Crane with his contemporaries Pasteur and
Lister, to see that not all doctors followed the leading lights. And it was J.
Contagion and the State in Europe, 1830-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
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Wyatt Crane rather than Louis Pasteur who was advising Leicester's political
leaders.
Fortunately or unfortunately, political leaders have had a profound
influence on public health policies and consequently on the public's health.
Most politicians of course seek to placate constituencies, but Joseph
Whetstone was different. Whetstone might have been altruistic and
something of a visionary; had his desires translated directly into realities he
might be considered a hero. He did try to save lives, but the contemporary
level of knowledge and contemporary legalities impeded his vision. When
Joseph Whetstone passed from the scene in Leicester, no one else with such
"strong shoulders" replaced him. Thereafter most public health policies in the
borough of Leicester were guided not by visionaries, but by the purse and
public opinion.
The importance of public opinion on matters of public health should not be
underestimated. Of course the public rarely spoke with one voice in the
Victorian era, nor does it today. Various "publics" weighed in on public
health issues in different ways and with different results. In nineteenth
century Leicester the relevant publics ranged from investors in the
Waterworks Company to the press, from the middle class alone to the
borough's population as a whole. Public health issues were addressed in
piecemeal fashion; they were defined as problems individually and each
proposed remedy met with its own relevant public. Only rarely was a public
290. Baldwin cites Fraser and Porter and Porter.

265

health issue shaped by the opinions of the borough's populace as a whole
and we should view the anti-vaccination movement with some degree of
cynicism because of its unbalanced leadership. Far more often than not, the
public opinion that mattered was the opinion of that segment of the public
who had wealth. Though the study of public health in Victorian Leicester
reveals many things, perhaps none is more obvious than the connection
between health and money.
The value of public health in Victorian Leicester was most often measured
in pounds and shillings rather than in life or well-being. Sewerage was
intended for profit. Fresh water was intended for profit. Typhoid fever was
defined as a serious problem when wealthy people suffered from it. The
effectiveness of scarlet fever intervention melted when middle class parents
refused to have their children hospitalized under conditions that were beneath
their station. Summer diarrhoea could be a laughing matter for the town
council because only working class children died. The anti-vaccination
movement was led by members of the middle class for abstract doctines rather
than for the health of the general public. This dissertation shows that money
and wealth were privileged determinants of public health responses in
nineteenth century Leicester.

In this borough that might correctly be deemed "progressive," we have
seen that working class infants' lives were marginalized by the paltry sum
paid for the Buck-Franklin investigation into summer diarrhoea. We have
seen Henry Tomkins' frustration with middle class priorities about scarlet
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fever hospitalization. We have seen that the Waterworks Company refused to
allow their product to be used in a way that was often recommended and truly
might have decreased typhoid fever mortality. We have seen that the town
council had to be forced by injunction to improve Whetsone's expensive
failure with sewerage. And we have seen that single-issue middle class antivaccinationists sometimes turned the town into a circus for their own ends.
The common thread throughout these disparate issues is that money talked
and found a listening ear.
This study of Victorian Leicester has discovered three major findings about
the study of public health. First, that public health history is complicated and
inextricably connected to political history, social history, and cultural history.
The borough passed from one equilibrium in 1849 to another equilibrium in
1891, but this passage did not occur by straight paths nor by parallel paths.
Second, that public health is a societal construction and the construction
follows a pattern. First, a problem is defined. Second, a response is
advocated. Third, the response is implemented. Fourth, people must
cooperate with the response. Above all, the construction is complicated
because there are a great many publics involved. In Victorian Leicester public
health responses had great variation because of the number and different
interests of the publics and because health issues were addressed in piecemeal
fashion. Moreover responses were not necessarily ameliorative for the
original problem.
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Third, more local studies should be done to flesh out the complicated
history of public health in nineteenth century Britain. It was largely at the
local level that the drama of public health played out. Such studies, and
indeed this study, are relevant to current public health issues.
Health for profit remains the paradigm. Some elements of public health,
such as sewerage and fresh water, have been accepted largely as public
responsibilities, but not without cost to consumers. They are not "rights" in
twenty-first century parlance, but they are not typically profit-directed
ventures either. Indeed there is no "right" to health. Ironically, HMOs
(Health Maintenance Organizations) today have more say about people's
health than did the MOHs of the nineteenth century. MOHs were concerned
about expenses, they were employees of the town council, but they did not
limit the way that money could be spent on health with the same power that
HMOs can do today. Indeed MOHs and HMOs have one thing in common:
an interest in health. But MOHs were concerned with public health, HMOs
are concerned with individual health within the parameters of their
profitability.
Throughout this dissertation some issues remain problematic beyond the
level of medical knowledge and beyond the dissemination of medical
knowledge. Public health issues remain in the realms of politics, economics,
and public opinion. Many public health issues not currently defined as
problems could be so defined. Malnutrition among children is one such issue;
to the extent that ketchup was accepted as a vegetable in 1980s school lunch
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programs, we can imagine laughter reminiscent of William Barfoot and Dr.
Crane about summer diarrhoea in nineteenth century Leicester. Many other
public health issues are clouded by politics and public opinion. For example,
many people object to the widespread availability of condoms to prevent
sexually transmitted diseases. Armed with the notion that condoms might
prevent some communicable diseases, some people argue that such a
preventive leads directly to promiscuity and this barrier to disease should be
removed. William Johnston advocated and initiated what could be called a
day-care for working mothers in nineteenth century Leicester, but in the
twenty-first century a certain working woman tells millions of her radio
listeners that mothers who work do irreparable harm to their children. So
some public health issues have advanced very little in the last one hundred
and fifty years. Working mothers continue to be targets for those with social
agendas far beyond public health agendas, but the two have often been
confused.
Indeed public health has ramifications for many aspects of society. All too
often history is written without reference to public health. Histories continue
to be written as though health and disease are matters of Providence. Yet
politics, economics, and social change occur within the poles of health and
disease. Disease can be, and has been, a limiting parameter to the possible. It
remains so today. Moreover health remains in the realm of cost-effectiveness
to the point that pounds or dollars are used to measure health and human life.
Death and disease are uncomfortable subjects, but necessary parts oflife. In
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this dissertation I have tried to show the connection between the living and
the dead. Moreover I want to show a connection between those who are alive,
those who died, and those who will live on. Many thousands of people died in
Victorian Leicester from what contemporaries called "zymotic" diseases.
Sadly, many of these victims were children. Their families, in many cases
lived on. A full rehearsal of public health in Victorian Leicester would show
that those who had money were the least likely to see their children die. The
borough, as a political body, came to care more about the middle class than it
did about the working class. This might not be right, but it was real.
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